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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METACOGNITION, SELF-ACTUALIZATION,
AND WELL-BEING AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS:
REVIVING SELF-ACTUALIZATION AS THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION
by
Yalda Amir Kiaei
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Thomas G. Reio, Jr., Major Professor
This non-experimental, correlational study (N = 513) examined the relationships
among self-actualization, well-being, and metacognition. Need-satisfaction and nondefensiveness were also tested as mediators in the relationship between metacognition
and self-actualization. A battery of paper-and-pencil self-report measures was
administered to a sample of undergraduate and graduate students in a public university in
South Florida. Correlational and hierarchical regression analyses and structural equation
modeling for mediational analysis were used to test the hypotheses.
The results largely supported the hypotheses with only a few exceptions.
Students who demonstrated higher level of self-actualization experienced higher wellbeing as well (the result of this hypothesized relationship was equivocal for parent
students, n = 61). Moreover, need-satisfaction and non-defensiveness were found to be
significantly and positively associated with self-actualization, providing preliminary
supporting evidence for Maslow’s (1968) and Rogers’ (1951, 1961) theories of selfactualization. In addition, students with higher levels of general metacognitive
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competence were more likely to demonstrate higher level of need-satisfaction, nondefensiveness, self-actualization, and well-being (the result of the third hypothesized
relationship was equivocal for female immigrant education students, n = 78).
Further, metacognition and need-satisfaction, and metacognition and nondefensiveness shared common variance in predicting self-actualization. The relationship
between metacognition and self-actualization was mediated by need-satisfaction and nondefensiveness, except for non-education students (n = 201), for whom no mediational
effect was detected by non-defensiveness.
In sum, the findings imply that general metacognitive competence, which can be
taught as a set of skills, theoretically contributes to students’ self-actualization and wellbeing. This study provides support for a conceptual model of self-actualization, which
introduces this phenomenon as a goal-oriented process that is essential to students’ wellbeing and can be attained by exercising metacognition. The discussion of the findings
highlights implications of this study for theory, research, and practice as a guide for
scholars, researchers, and practitioners in the field of education and psychology.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The chapter begins with the background to the problem by providing a brief
reintroduction to a philosophy of education which has been overlooked for long. It is
followed by the problem statement, purpose of the study, and theoretical framework.
Next, the significance of the study, research hypotheses, definitions of terms,
assumptions, delimitations, and organization of the study are discussed.
Reviving a Philosophy of Education: Self-Actualization as the Purpose of Education
Writing in the fourth century BC, Aristotle (2004) argued that well-being or
eudaimonia is the ultimate purpose of life for human beings, and the means to achieve it
is actualizing one’s potentials through education and exercise of reason. Possibly, a
similar notion had led 20th century’s philosophers of education to outline the purpose of
education as becoming fully self-realized and self-actualized (Butler, 1966; Farmer,
1983). The following brief summary of a historical overview of educational policies
(Hanlon, 1968) traces the footprints of this Aristotelian perspective in educational
philosophies and policies as represented in the statement of educational objectives over
the years.
In 1938, self-realization was among the objectives of American education
established by Educational Policies Commission1, the remainders being human relations,
economic efficiency, and civic responsibility (Cangemi, 1987; Hanlon, 1968). It is worth
noting that later Broudy (1954) considered self-realization, self-determination, and self1

A reforming agency founded in 1935 by the National Education Association (NEA) and the Department
of Superintendence to represent public education and develop long-range policies for American education
that promote American democracy by emphasizing moral and spiritual values (Hunt, Carper, Lasley II, &
Raisch, 2010)
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integration as the main goals for education, and Cangemi (1987) regarded all of these as
characteristics of self-actualizing personalities. Despite this mention of self-realization in
the official statement of 1938, in this statement self-realization was outlined more as
fulfilling societal and literacy demands and less as characteristics that reflected selfactualization. A few self-actualizing objectives were included, such as intrinsic
motivation for learning, appreciation of beauty and intellectual endeavors, and directing
one’s own life responsibly.
In 1947, “The Imperative Needs of Youth” adopted by the National Association
of Secondary School Principals (NASSP) showed some considerations of individuals’
needs as well as social needs. In 1957, “Behavioral Goals of General Education in High
School,” another NASSP policy document, also highlighted some aspects of selfrealization as it was related to individuals’ interest and well-being. Over the years,
policies of education moved towards slightly greater considerations of individuals’ needs
and flourishing and legitimatized individuals’ endeavors to achieve for themselves. For
instance, in 1961 “The Central Purpose of American Education,” issued by the
Educational Policies Commission, stated that the school “seeks … to equip the pupil to
achieve for himself, … to be free; a man must be capable of basing his choices and
actions on understandings which he himself achieves and on values which he examines
for himself…. the development of every student’s rational powers must be recognized as
centrally important” (Hanlon, 1968, p. 163).
In 1965, “A Climate for Individuality,” published by American Association of
School Administrators, explicitly declared that schools are responsible for helping
individuals achieve their self-actualization. Unfortunately, references to self-
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actualization in national education policies and objectives stopped in the 1960s.
However, scholarly efforts to revive the self-actualization philosophy of education gently
continued. For instance, Hanlon (1968) in his book, Administration and Education:
Toward a Theory of Self-Actualization, envisioned self-actualization as the main function
and the framework for both administration and education. While introducing socialization
and education as two distinctive roles of the school system, Hanlon (1968) argued that
socialization as a form of organizational self-actualization is the work of administration
while individual self-actualization is the function of education. Hanlon (1968) specified
that administration “is the process of the organized human group making of itself what it
wishes to be, and education is the process of the individual human being making of
himself what he wishes to be” (p. 133). The present study embraced Hanlon’s (1968)
perspective on education that emphasized the role of the school system in helping
individual human beings develop the skills to take control of their personal growth and to
become what they wish to be and are capable of being.
If human well-being is the worthy goal of life and self-actualization is the way to
get there, the educational system along with any other social organization should be the
means for individuals to move towards self-actualization (Goldstein, 1959). Education
should function as an organizer of experiences that prepares individuals for maintaining a
fulfilling life, and if education does its job well enough, an educated person should
possess a self-actualizing personality. Voeks (1970) emphasized this focal mission of
education when he identified an educated person as being cognizant of
interconnectedness in the world, having a meaningful integrated view of the world, being
continuously self-motivated, having an increased appreciation for arts, being
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compassionate about people, developing respect for individual differences, thinking
critically, being accountable for one’s action, and living up to one’s values. These
features are all parallel with self-actualizing characteristics outlined by Maslow (1968).
Requirements for Self-Actualization
Actualizing one’s potentials or self-actualization has been introduced as the
ultimate needs of human beings (Maslow, 1968), a life-long process (Rogers, 1961), a
way of living (full of commitment; Gowan, 1972), and a challenge (Kerr, 1991). It also
most frequently has been discussed in terms of actualizing tendency (Rogers, 1951), the
desire, motive, or tendency to live up to the highest level of one’s capabilities (Globe,
1970; Goldstein, 1939; Rogers, 1961). Maslow (1968) and Rogers (1951, 1961, 1980)
speculated that there are some factors that can hinder self-actualization or actualizing
tendency. For Maslow (1968), it was unsatisfied basic needs (e.g., physiological, safety,
belonging, and esteem); for Rogers (1951), it was excessive activation of psychological
defense mechanisms when people frequently feel threatened by being in situations which
imply that they are not worthy or good enough (i.e., They have diminished unconditional
self-worth or positive self-regard).
Given this, in order for individuals to move towards self-actualization effectively
and efficiently there are some requirements to be met. Hanlon (1968) argued that schools
can and must equip individuals with these requirements. “Without education no true selfactualization of individuals is possible” (Hanlon, 1968, p. 152). Self-actualization
requirements, as detailed by Hanlon (1968), include a conceptual subsystem, a social
climate subsystem, and an environmental subsystem:

4

A conceptual subsystem. A conceptual subsystem consists of a developed world
view, a true vision of the self within the world, and a set of self-actualizing goals that
provide the momentum for willing, planning, evaluation, and problem-solving.
A climate subsystem. A climate subsystem helps create a psychological
environment necessary for self-actualization. It is composed of three elements: (a) an
optimum freedom (provided by the social environment) and self-control element that
enables individuals, themselves, to take control of their actions to accomplish the tasks at
hand (i.e., self-regulation); (b) an energizing element that enables individuals to bring
forth from inside enough energy and enthusiasm needed to accomplish the task and direct
this energy to do so; (c) a linkage element which is a community-based relationship that
provides students with social acceptance and support.
An environmental subsystem. An environmental subsystem provides
individuals with material environment needed to accomplish the task of selfactualization. It includes a facilitative element and a supportive element. A facilitating
element consists of all materials immediately needed to effectively and efficiently
implement self-actualization plans. Examples are food, drink, clothing, shelter, and
recreational facilities. A supportive element is always necessary to provide a facilitative
element, for instance, money, financial aids, and public service.
Some of the climate subsystem elements such as optimum freedom and linkage
element and all elements of the environmental subsystem are basic human needs outlined
by Maslow (1968). The linkage element addresses Roger’s (1951, 1961) concern about
providing psychologically safe environment for growth. Such an environment establishes
a community in which students feel less threatened by judgments of others and hopefully
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less often encounter situations that trigger their psychological defense mechanisms. All
these requirements of self-actualization are in the realm of education and can be taken
care of to the relatively decent extent by schools and through establishing appropriate
educational policies.
The task of establishing each of these subsystems and their elements should be
undertaken at both social and individual levels; meaning schools as organized human
groups and individual human beings are responsible for accommodating these
subsystems. Individual students play important roles in acquiring and maintaining the
required elements for self-actualization including the conceptual subsystem, and selfcontrol element, and energizing element of the climate subsystem. Yet the responsibility
starts from schools and at the societal level.
As Hanlon (1968) put it, self-actualization is impossible without education.
Schools as the primary educational organizations are responsible to equip the conceptual
subsystem by helping students to expand their worldview and envision their selfactualization goals. Schools need to maintain optimum freedom within which individuals
feel free to pursue what they want to become. They also are responsible to train students
in self-control to realize their optimum freedom necessary to accomplish the task of selfactualization. Schools should provide a motivating environment that emancipates the
energy of individuals to accomplish the task of self-actualization and educate individuals
to motivate themselves. Schools must provide an accepting and supporting environment
which helps students feel psychologically safe, free their real selves, believe in
themselves, and as a result, become less defensive and more productive in the challenges
that life offers. Schools are also responsible for providing material resources to keep
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students on track to accomplish their self-actualization tasks and to prepare them to
recognize and take care of these needs by themselves in the future. Ultimately, schools
hand the responsibility to the students by training them to be independent, effective
individual beings in fulfilling their actualizing goals. Whether or not schools are taking
this training task seriously is discussed in the following section.
Problem Statement
The link between psychology and education has been established long ago by
pioneers such as William James (1842 – 1910), John Dewey (1859 – 1952), and E. L.
Thorndike (1874 -1949). In practice though, the relationship has been very distant. At its
best, schools and educational psychologists work towards theorizing and applying a
variety of interventions targeting students with behavioral problems, special needs, and
learning-disabilities (O’Donnell, Reeve, & Smith, 2007; Santrock, 2011). In the realm of
educational research, studies have obsessively focused on students’ academic
achievement. The scholarly attempts to investigate the association of psychology-based
school practices and interventions with personal growth and/or human overall well-being
have been scarce.
Today’s educational system seems to be shorthanded in conceptualizing and
operationalizing a holistic view of education. The high pressure of good academic
performance has often left students’ psychological nurturing, their personal growth, and
their overall well-being to themselves. Despite a long-standing self-actualization
philosophies of education (e.g., Broudy, 1954; Butler, 1966; Farmer, 1983), yet this
vision has not found its way into contemporary educational policies and school practices.
The present study was undertaken to shed light on the possible applications of theories of
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self-actualization from humanistic psychology and theories of well-being from positive
psychology in the realm of education and to bring into attention a consideration of
students’ personal growth and well-being.
Although theories of personal-growth in humanistic psychology are assumed to be
in line with theories of human well-being in positive psychology (Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), this association has rarely been analyzed empirically. It has
been limited to theoretical arguments or taken for granted. For instance, the
psychological concept of self-actualization, which initially appeared in theories of
personal growth in humanistic psychology (Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1951), is frequently
referred to as an indicator, rather than a predictor, of human well-being in positive
psychology literature. The relationship between self-actualization as an antecedent and
human well-being as an outcome has not been investigated. By this dissertation study,
the researcher undertook the task of contributing to the literature in this regard. In the
present study, self-actualization was viewed as a goal-oriented process and a precursor to
individuals’ well-being.
Moreover, it is important for our educational system, which is currently
influenced by many behavioral and academic interventions, to examine interventional
strategies which accommodate students’ personal growth and well-being in addition to
their academic and behavioral learnings. Among these instructional interventions is the
development and application of general metacognitive competence. The popularity of
metacognitive instructions in educational settings is for their hoped effects on training
independent effective learners (Gaskins & Pressley, 2007). The concept of
metacognition, however, goes beyond classroom learning. For instance, Hanlon’s (1968)
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perspective on self-actualizing subsystems at the individual level can be explained by
theories of metacognition.
In the frame of metacognitive processes, equipping a conceptual subsystem with
proper self-actualizing goals and tasks could be referred to as goal setting. The control
element of the climate system requires a combination of monitoring the situation and
controlling the actions or strategies being used (i.e., metacognitive regulation). A
metacognitive experience also deals with personal variables such as believing that one
can do a task, being aware of one’s own interest, and/or keeping oneself motivated during
the task. This feature of metacognition works as an energizing element in the climate
subsystem. All these processes, needed to develop a system that fosters selfactualization, can be explained in a general metacognitive framework. Taking this
holistic view of metacognition in terms of its long lasting implications in contributing to a
fulfilling life, the current study investigated metacognition as a necessary factor for
cultivating one’s highest potentials.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between
metacognition, self-actualization, and well-being. The present study examined the
theoretical contribution of metacognition in a holistic development of human beings
towards self-actualization. Theoretically, this contribution can occur either directly, or
through need-satisfaction, or through being less defensive by adopting more adaptive
psychological defense mechanisms (i.e., functional/adaptive coping). To fulfill this
purpose, this study investigated the mediating effect of need-satisfaction and
defensiveness on the association between metacognition and self-actualization. This

9

study also tested whether self-actualization theoretically contribute into individuals’ wellbeing. With this, this study bridged the gulf between the literature on humanistic
psychology, positive psychology, and cognitive psychology, and shed light on possible
ways to enhance individuals’ potentials through skills (e.g., metacognitive strategies) that
are teachable at school.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Following the argument made above, the main research questions were to what
extent metacognition may contribute to self-actualization and to what extent selfactualization may contributes to individuals’ well-being. More detailed research
questions are listed below, all hypotheses were tested while controlling for certain
demographic variables (e.g., Gender, Major, and Immigration Status):
1. Is self-actualization associated with human well-being?
H1: There is a positive relationship between self-actualization and human wellbeing.
2. Is the adoption of adaptive styles of psychological defense associated with selfactualization – as deduced from Rogers’s (1951) theory of actualizing tendency?
H2: There is a positive relationship between the adoption of more adaptive styles
of psychological defense (i.e., Non-Defensiveness) and self-actualization.
3. Is need-satisfaction associated with self-actualization – as the highest level need
as deducted from Maslow’s (1968) theory of self-actualization?
H3: There is a positive relationship between need-satisfaction and selfactualization.
4. Is metacognition associated with need-satisfaction?
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H4: There is a positive relationship between metacognition and need-satisfaction.
5. Is metacognition associated with the style of defense mechanisms adopted by an
individual?
H5: There is a positive relationship between metacognition and adaptive style of
psychological defense (i.e., Non-Defensiveness).
6. Does metacognition predict self-actualization over and above need-satisfaction
and styles of defense mechanism?
H6: There is a positive relationship between metacognition and self-actualization
independent of need-satisfaction and styles of psychological defense.
7. Is metacognition associated positively with well-being?
H7: There is a positive relationship between metacognition and well-being.
8. Does need-satisfaction mediate the relationship between metacognition and selfactualization?
H8: Need-Satisfaction mediates the relationship between metacognition and selfactualization.
9. Does adopting more adaptive defense mechanisms mediate the relationship
between metacognition and self-actualization?
H9: Non-Defensiveness mediates the relationship between metacognition and
self-actualization.
Conceptual Framework
After introducing a philosophy of education that favors self-actualization as the
aim of education, this section establishes the conceptual framework within which the
relationships between metacognition, self-actualization, and well-being may be
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explained. This study took a holistic approach to the issue of individuals’ well-being by
bridging the domains of cognitive psychology, humanistic psychology, and positive
psychology within an educational framework. The concepts of well-being from positive
psychology, self-actualization from humanistic psychology, and metacognition from
cognitive psychology were of particular interest in the present study.
Well-being and Excellence
Aristotle (2004), the Greek philosopher of 4th Century BC, in his collection of
lectures, Nicomachean Ethics, conceptualized the ultimate good of human being as being
consisted of everything that a person needs or wants. He called it eudaimonia. “‘eu’
means ‘well’ and ‘daimon’ means ‘divinity’ or ‘spirit.’… He [Aristotle] regards
‘eudaimon’ as a mere substitute for eu zên (‘living well’)” (Kraut, 2010). Although the
psychological literature predominantly has translated eudaimonia as happiness, the
present study recognized the term “well-being” as more accurately reflecting the
connotations of the original term.
Aristotle (2004) argued that well-being is achievable if a human being can grasp
her/his characteristic activity (i.e., something that s/he is meant to do well in order to be
who s/he should be). Therefore, who one should be and what one should do is different
from individual to individual based on the social role one undertakes. But Aristotle
(2004) also assumed a common essence for individuals as human beings, which is to
perceive themselves “worthy of great things” (Aristotle, 2004, p. xvii). These “great
things,” Aristotle (2004) explained, are virtues, or in more contemporary term excellences
(Ackrill, 1973; McDowell, 1980). Virtues take different intellectual and/or character
forms. Some examples of virtues or excellences as mentioned by Aristotle (2004) are
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practical wisdom, judgment, generosity, and self-restraint. In modern terms, actualizing
one’s capacities (i.e., self-actualization) is the process that leads to the manifestation of
excellences (Roger, 1951). Aristotle (2004) also introduced excellences as being
attainable through training, experience, and/or personal efforts. Putting this statement in
the contemporary terminology, Aristotle (2004) argued that self-actualization is attainable
through education. In this study, metacognition which is a teachable skill was examined
as an educational gateway to achieve self-actualization and, in turn, well-being (Aristotle,
2004).
In Aristotelian perspective, every virtue or excellence at the individual level is a
pursuit that contributes to well-being. Thus, actualizing one’s potential is not accepted as
a component of well-being, but as a predictor of well-being. This is in contrast to the
psychological literature which uses self-actualization as eudaimonia, as an indicator of
well-being, or as a subscale in measuring eudaimonic well-being (e.g., Deci & Ryan,
2001, 2008; Fowers, Mollica, & Procacci, 2010; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). Self-actualization
is rather an indicator of optimal human functioning that leads to human well-being. In
line with Aristotle (2004), the present study investigated self-actualization as a
contributor to human well-being, as opposed to an indicator or a component of wellbeing. Following section explains different contemporary approaches to well-being
research and to the conceptualization of human well-being.
More recent conceptualization of well-being resulted in two different lines of
research on this phenomenon, hedonic (e.g., Diener & Lucas, 1999) and eudaimonic
well-being research (e.g., Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Vella-Brodrick, Park, & Peterson, 2009;
Waterman et al., 2010). The hedonic perspective of well-being deals with subjective
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happiness, which includes positive and negative emotional experiences and cognitive
judgments of life-satisfaction (subjective well-being; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). Eudaimonic
well-being has been discussed in well-being and positive psychology literature as
personal expressiveness (Waterman, 1990, 2008) through engagement in life (i.e.,
engaging in life experiences that match the individual’s skills and thus entails high level
of cognitive and emotional absorption by the task in hand; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990); and
meaning in life (e.g., pursuing goals that go beyond the self; Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff,
2002). Engagement and meaning were highlighted by Peterson, Park, and Seligman
(2005) as two of the three routes to happiness or a full life, the third being pursuing
pleasure (i.e., hedonic well-being).
To operationally define eudaimonic well-being, Waterman and his colleagues
(2010) developed the Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being (QEWB) to capture the
subjective experiences of expressiveness. Reviewing the content of the measure by the
researcher indicated that the measure embeds engagement and meaning in life.
Expressiveness occurs when individuals engage in actions that are in the direction of
developing their potential and oriented towards achieving their personal goals while
adding meaning to their lives. Waterman et al. (2010) argued that these subjective
experiences are “signifiers” of eudaimonia.
Self-Actualization: A Goal-Oriented Process
The term and idea of self-actualization was originated by Kurt Goldstein in his
book, The Organism (1939): Self-actualization is “the tendency to actualize, as much as
possible, [the organism's] individual capacities” (p. 46). The term, self-actualization was
popularized by Maslow (1968) as the highest level needs in his hierarchy of needs
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suggesting that the satisfaction of this need is the key to happiness/well-being and the
ultimate life satisfaction. The term actualizing tendency introduced by Rogers (1951) is a
built-in desire in every being to manifest and develop one’s abilities to the fullest
potential possible. Rogers (1961) discussed the fully functioning person as the one who
lives with an active actualizing tendency. That is, a fully functioning person engages
oneself in the process of self-actualization.
The concept of self-actualization has always been criticized for being vague and
not being operationally defined (Jones & Crandall, 1991). Self-actualization or
actualization of one’s inner nature has been considered to imply similar connotations as
do concepts such as maturation, full humanness, and ultimate being (Maslow, 1968) or
full functionality (Rogers, 1951). Weiss (1991) argued that the concept of selfactualization has lacked and needed a cohesive conceptual framework that provides it
with a well-established operational definition.
Rule (1991) proposed a goal-oriented framework for actualization which gives
recognition to both terms self and actualization. He argued that self needs to be
measured as a separate variable through self-reported Likert-scale inventories that record
the relevancy of items to the person. Actualization also denotes the process of growth,
change, unfolding, developing, and transcending, none of which are static, frozen in time
(Rule, 1991, p. 252). Human beings are goal-oriented as much as they are growth
oriented (Rule, 1991). In fact, growth or self-actualization is the goal for the self. Goals,
Rule (1991) stated, are “functions of the broader concept(s) of self” (p. 252).
Similar to Rule’s (1991) conceptualization of self-actualization as a goal-oriented
process, Ryan, Huta, and Deci (2008) introduced a goal-oriented theoretical framework
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for optimal human functioning based on self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan,
1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000). SDT is primarily a theory of human intrinsic motivation (i.e.,
the pursuit of and the engagement in an activity “because of its inherent interest and
enjoyability;” Ryan et al., 2008, p. 146). Ryan et al. (2008) proposed a conceptualization
of eudaimonia that introduced it as a process of living well (i.e., eudaimonic living; p.
140), rather than a personality or an end. It is “defined in terms both of pursuing goals
that are intrinsically valued and of processes that are characterized by autonomy and
awareness” (p. 163).
In line with Aristotle (2004)’s perspective, SDT (Ryan et al., 2008) views
eudaimonia as being achievable through actualizing one’s excellences, stating that
eudaimonic living “requires engaging one’s best human capacities by actively pursuing
virtues and excellences….” (p. 143) and “it is a way of living that is focused on what is
intrinsically worthwhile to human beings” [emphasis in the original] (p. 147). Ryan et al.
(2008) explained eudaimonia as “a way of living” [emphasis in the original] (i.e.,
eudaimonic living), not a psychological outcome (p. 147). Nevertheless, the SDT
conceptualization of eudaimonic living corresponds more closely to the concept of selfactualization.
The present study, in line with Rule (1991), considered self-actualization as a
goal-oriented process. The conceptual framework set forth by the present study
introduces actualizing tendency as the chief intrinsic motivation (Rogers, 1951, 1961)
and presents self-actualization as the way of practicing eudaimonic living. Selfactualization involves pursuing and striving to achieve self-actualizing goals which are
(a) inspired by eudaimonic and intrinsic aspirations (e.g., self-acceptance, relatedness, &
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helpfulness; Kasser & Ryan, 1996); (b) personally valuable and bring joy and pleasure to
one rather than being imposed by other people or pursued to avoid negative feelings such
as guilt or shame (i.e., self-concordant goals; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Sheldon, 2004); (c)
pursued because they are good by themselves not because they are the means to achieve
other goals (i.e., constitutive vs. instrumental goal orientations; Fowers, Mollica, &
Procacci, 2010); (d) intrinsically worthwhile to human beings (i.e., virtuous; Aristotle,
2004; Ryan et al. 2008; Seligman, 2002); and (e) personally expressive (Waterman et al.,
2010).
Need-Satisfaction and Self-Actualization
For Maslow (1943), the process of self-actualization can start only when basic
needs have been satisfied to a relatively acceptable extent:
The need for personal growth in its highest degree (i.e., self-actualization) would
emerge due to relative satisfaction of lower-order needs, namely, the
physiological, safety, love and esteem needs which make it a rare occurrence.
Because satisfied people who already met their basic needs are scarce. (p. 85)
As opposed to the first four levels of needs that are the motivation for survival, the
highest-level need, self-actualization is a motivation for growth. It also is a growing need
that cannot be fully gratified like the previous ones because it is to perform to one’s
highest potential, which is ever-expanding. Maslow (1968) emphasized that the selfactualization process does not need to wait for full satisfaction of the basic needs, but
only for gratification of them to the extent that inhibit frustration (p. 199).
SDT also has satisfying basic and universal psychological needs in its
conceptualization of eudaimonic living. For Ryan et al. (2008), one of the pillars of
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eudaimonic living is “behaving in ways that satisfy basic psychological needs for
competence, relatedness, and autonomy” (p. 139). SDT highlighted the mediating role of
psychological need-satisfaction in the relationship between intrinsic goal attainments and
well-being. Need-Satisfaction was however emphasized by Maslow (1968) as a
prerequisite to get to the higher-order need of growth and self-actualization.
Accordingly, the present study examined the relationship between need-satisfaction and
self-actualization while considering the satisfaction of basic psychological needs as a
precursor to self-actualization.
Conditional Self-Regard, Defensiveness, and Self-Actualization
Carl Rogers’ (1951) theory of actualizing tendency or self theory was also built
upon the assumption that there is a natural tendency for actualization. In Rogers’ (1961)
words,
it is the urge which is evident in all organic and human life — to expand, extend,
become autonomous, develop, mature — the tendency to express and activate all
the capacities of the organism, to the extent that such activation enhances the
organism or the self. (p. 35)
The actualizing tendency, however, may not be active in many people because of the
discrepancy they experience between their real self and their ideal self. The ideal self
(versus the real self) is dictated by the environment (i.e., society or culture) as who one
ideally ought to be as opposed the real self which is who one is both capable of being and
willing to be. The ideal self can deviate or differ from the real self. This paradox has the
potential to put the individual in a state of identity conflict or in a constant struggle to
retain his/her self-regard and his/her sense of the self, which according to Rogers (1951)
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would lead to increasing incongruent, neurosis, and the shattered self. This struggle is a
result of developing conditional self-regard. That is, one’s feeling of self-regard becomes
conditional to satisfy others and to meet other people’s expectations. Instead of defining
and pursuing one’s goals, the individual protects one’s self-worth and self-regard by
complying with other peoples’ wishes.
People react differently when their concept of the self is being threatened, but all
attempts are intended to maintain and retain their self-concept and self-regard in
threatening situations (DeMarree & Marrison, 2011; Rogers, 1951). They do so by
activating their defense mechanisms (or employing coping mechanisms). Gleser and
Ihilevich (1969) noted that “defense mechanisms are relatively automatic cognitive and
behavioral maneuvers that function to relieve anxiety, handle conflicts, and protect the
self from disorganization and perceived threats” (as cited in Berzonsky & Kinney, 2008,
p. 112). For instance, denial is one defense strategy that keeps the situation and /or the
memory of it out of one’s consciousness. Perceptual distortion is another strategy that
refers to reinterpreting the threatening situation in a way that pushes it away from the self
and attributing it to everything or everyone other than the individual her/himself. An
example of adaptive defense mechanism is humor. Humor helps people to express their
feelings or ideas about some unpleasant topics in a way that gives pleasure to others and
is less hurtful to them. Planning is another example of adaptive coping mechanism.
When employing this coping mechanism, people look for solutions to their problems and
think of some strategies to tackle them.
Defense mechanisms become frequently active when the person is trapped by
conditional self-regard. As a result, the discrepancy between the real self (i.e., what the
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person is actually able to accomplish) and the ideal self (i.e., what the person is expected
to accomplish that may be beyond her/his capability) is high and the person is recurrently
experiencing situations that highlight this discrepancy (i.e., threatening situations). The
high-frequency activation of defense mechanisms, as Rogers (1951) theorized, could lead
to neuroses which would hinder one’s personal growth. Rogers (1951) regarded the
emancipation of actualizing tendency as due to reducing defensiveness. Assuming that
individuals at higher level of unconditional self-regard are less defensive, meaning, they
employ more functional and adaptive coping mechanisms and less maladaptive defense
mechanisms, the present study was undertaken to illuminate the relationship between
self-actualization and non-defensiveness.
Metacognition
Flavell (1976) first introduced the term, metacognition, and explained that "in any
kind of cognitive transaction with the human or non-human environment, a variety of
information processing activities may go on. Metacognition refers, among other things, to
the active monitoring and consequent regulation and orchestration of these processes in
relation to the cognitive objects or data on which they bear, usually in service of some
concrete goal or objective" (p. 232). His model of metacognition or cognitive monitoring
(Flavell, 1979) included four interacting facets: Metacognitive knowledge; Metacognitive
experience, Goal/Task; and Actions/Strategies. Metacognitive knowledge is knowledge
about human beings as cognitive agents and as different from one another in their
cognitive performances (i.e., the person variable). It is also knowledge about
environmental and contextual factors (e.g., task, strategies, physical environment,
resources) affecting cognitive performance (i.e., the task and strategy variables). When a
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person asserts that s/he is better in performing on a task (e.g., reading comprehension)
and her/his friend is better in doing the other task (e.g., arithmetic), that person is
demonstrating her/his metacognitive knowledge with respect to the person variable.
Metacognitive experiences are “any conscious cognitive or affective experiences
that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise” (Flavell, 1979, p. 906). For
instance, once a person perceives or feels that s/he is not able to understand or follow the
logical argument just made on a certain subject, the person engages in a metacognitive
experience. Goals or tasks are what cognitive processes are oriented to and actions or
strategies are what the person needs to do to achieve the goals and accomplish the task.
An example here would be the cognitive goal/task of recognizing the adequacy of some
instructional statements; the actions/strategies would be using different techniques to
identify the flaws, omissions, and obscurities within those instructional statements
(Markman, 1977). Another example of cognitive task/goal is recalling certain items; the
corresponding action would be studying those items in a way that fulfill this goal
(Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970).
In addition, Flavell (1979) argued that metacognition has the potential to lead
people “to select, evaluate, revise, and abandon cognitive tasks, goals, and strategies in
light of their relationships with one another” (p. 908) which adds the function of control
to Flavell’s (1979) metacognitive monitoring model. Brown (1977, 1978) clearly
distinguished between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation, and now
there is relatively a scholarly consensus (e.g., Efklides, 2001; Flavell, Miller, & Miller,
1993; Schraw, 2001) that metacognition includes two primary facets: (a) metacognitive
knowledge or awareness, which is knowledge and awareness about all different variables
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involved in the process of metacognition; and (b) metacognitive regulation, which is
about metacognitive monitoring and control of actions through setting goals and working
with appropriate strategies to achieve goals. Metacognitive skills (Efklides, 2001) which
are used for metacognitive regulation include, but not limited to, (a) interpreting the
situation; (b) guiding, orchestrating, and supervising thoughts, emotions, and actions; (c)
identifying and characterizing the problem; (d) predicting the limitations of one’s
cognitive capacity and knowledge repertoire for a given problem-solving task; (e)
planning by setting and selecting goals and strategies; (f) tracking the progress; (g)
evaluating the process of problem-solving; and (h) revising the plan and goals if
necessary. In fact, metacognitive regulation is characterized by using a combination of
these monitoring and control processes during deliberate problem-solving (Brown,
1978).
Nelson and Narens (1990) presented a model of metacognition which described
metacognitive regulation as two metacognitive functions, monitoring and control. They
defined two levels of metacognitive functioning that are related through a flow of
information: meta-level (i.e., cognition) and object-level (i.e., actions/behaviors).
Monitoring was defined as the process in which “the meta-level is informed by the
object-level” [emphasis in the original] (Nelson & Narens, 1990, p. 127). This function
can change the mental representation the meta-level already has of the object-level. This
alteration leads to initiating a new scheme, thought, and idea (i.e., cognition) or
continuing, modifying, or terminating an existing one. Control was defined as the metalevel modifying the object-level by producing a new state of action at the object-level
(Nelson & Narens, 1990). It manifests itself in form of initiating a new action or
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continuing, modifying, or terminating an existing action. Control in any form is informed
by the metacognitive monitoring or monitoring judgment (Nelson & Narens, 1990),
dealing with questions such as What is the problem? What is the goal? How to set the
goals and sub-goals? What strategies to use?, that makes metacognitive regulation a
deliberate process of problem-solving.
Integrating Flavell’s (1979), Brown’s (1977, 1978), and Nelson and Narens’
(1990) conceptualizations of metacognition, the researcher set forth a conceptual
framework in which self-actualization was regarded as a metacognitive goal/task and
metacognition was discussed as another precursor to the process of self-actualization
when. Setting first-level goals such as personal growth has been argued to be a way of
eudaimonic living (Ryan et al. 2008). Goal setting is a metacognitive regulatory process
(Tarricone, 2011) which entails the activation of both metacognitive knowledge and
regulation involving person, task, and strategy variables. For instance, while setting selfactualization as the goal and using his/her monitoring judgment, the person needs to
recognize her/his personal interests and pursuits (i.e. metacognitive knowledge of the
person variable), know her/his habits and styles of problem-solving (i.e., metacognitive
knowledge of the person variable), prioritize her/his goals and identify the possible ways
to approach them by setting sub-goals to achieve the main goal (i.e., metacognitive
regulation of the task variable), have knowledge of alternative strategies to approach
her/his goal (i.e., metacognitive knowledge of the strategy variable), and select a strategy
that is appropriate for the task and for her/him (i.e., metacognitive control of the strategy,
task, and person variables).
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Further, need-satisfaction or employing more adaptive defense/coping
mechanisms can be considered sub-goals in the self-actualization process. Each sub-goal
then is a separate metacognitive task. Assuming need-satisfaction as the task, the action
is using one’s knowledge and monitoring judgment to identify personal needs and to
think of adaptive ways to fulfill those needs. Metacognition may help with avoiding the
abundance of maladaptive defense mechanisms and, instead, selecting adaptive coping
mechanisms when dealing with threatening situations (i.e., the cognitive task). In this
experience, the person needs to recognize that a threatening situation has occurred (i.e.,
metacognitive monitoring of the task variable), identify the typical automatic reaction of
his or her mind to the situation (i.e., metacognitive knowledge of his typical defense
mechanism as the person variable), believe that s/he can control the situation (i.e.,
metacognitive control of the person variable), have knowledge of alternative
strategies/adaptive defense mechanisms (i.e., metacognitive knowledge of the strategy
variable), and select a strategy that is appropriate to tackle the task and works for him/her
(i.e., metacognitive control of strategy, task, and person variables). The researcher
hypothesized that individuals who are more developed in their metacognition are more
advanced in the process of self-actualization and also more successful in needsatisfaction and adopting more adaptive defense/coping strategies.
Summary of the Conceptual Framework
The path towards self-actualization and a fulfilling life is by no means a clear path
and it is plausible that it may never be clarified entirely due to its complexity.
Nevertheless, given that happiness and being-the-best-one-can-be have been the greatest
struggles for individuals, research into their possible components and contributors will be
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enlightening. A review of seminal conceptual literature (e.g., Maslow, 1968; Rogers,
1951, 1961; Ryan et al. 2008; Seligman, 2000) suggested that a conceptual link between
self-actualization and well-being is implied by the literature; however, the nature of this
relationship and, in fact, whether or not they are two distinct phenomena, is rather
ambiguous in the existing literature. The conceptual framework developed for and tested
in the present study introduced self-actualization and well-being as two different
phenomena and conceptualized well-being as the outcome of self-actualization.
Furthermore Maslow’s (1968) need-satisfaction and Rogers’ (1961) non-defensiveness
were conceptualized as precursors to self-actualization.
In addition, within this conceptual framework, the author of the present study
argued that metacognition is essential for recognizing the self-actualizing needs and goals
and for facilitating the regulation of personal efforts towards those goals. Metacognition
needs to be oriented towards becoming who one is, identifying one’s potentials, and
demonstrating the most and the best of one’s capacities. The author argued that
metacognition can serve the purpose of self-actualization by facilitating need-satisfaction
and non-defensiveness as well as by helping self-actualizing goal setting and goalstriving.
Metacognition has been recognized as a 2-component construct including
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation (i.e., monitoring and control). A
comprehensive metacognitive process uses metacognitive knowledge and the information
obtained through metacognitive monitoring for metacognitive control. Metacognitive
knowledge is the knowledge of ones’ capabilities, beliefs, interests, emotions, and
cognition and the knowledge of the task in hand (goal), the environment and the
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appropriate strategies to tackle the task. Metacognitive monitoring is the evaluation of
the situation including person, task, and strategies which, in a joint effort with
metacognitive control, takes care of the regulation of thinking and emotion towards
accomplishing the task and producing a new state of action. In the conceptual framework
developed for and tested in the present study, metacognition was identified as a potential
antecedent to the process of self-actualization and a possible precursor to needsatisfaction and non-defensiveness.
The Significance of the Study
Under the pressure of high-stake standardized testing, school curriculum and
instruction are strictly focused on academic achievements that provide little, if any,
opportunity for working on students’ personal growth and identifying and actualizing
their potentials. Practical significance of findings from the present study is to inform
educational practices from early childhood through 12th-grade and to the university to
adopt and promote a self-actualizing perspective in education. It was also hoped that this
study would encourage educational researchers to develop further research to investigate
the influence of different school practices on students’ learning in the area of personal
growth and their well-being, rather than focusing primarily on their academic
performance.
Further, this study is intended to help develop interventions that support students
to build upon their potentials throughout their academic life, which is a great deal of their
everyday life for at least 12 years. The findings from this study provide support for
utilizing the research variables in the development of specific curricular and instructional
models. For example, the findings from the present study add to the literature on
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teaching and learning that invests in the implications of metacognition in school settings.
The empirical support for the model presented in this study could provide a theoretical
foundation for further research to develop models of curriculum and instruction that
teaches metacognitive skills specialized for need-satisfaction and reducing defensiveness
and to help students develop a system of learning and living towards self-actualization.
Additionally, the present study sheds light on the empirical research on selfactualization by introducing a new approach to operationally defining this concept. The
growth theories of Rogers (1951, 1961) and Maslow (1968), along with Aristotle’s
(2004) account of well-being share a commonality in the recognition they give to the
development of personal capacities to their fullest potential for healthy personal growth.
The self-determination theory of eudaimonia also provides a contemporary account of
human optimal functioning and eudaimonic living by integrating all these great theories
of well-being, motivation, and personal growth. Previous studies of self-actualization
addressed this concept as a static construct such as a personality trait. In the present
study, self-actualization was measured as a goal-oriented process according to Rule’s
(1991) conceptualization of self-actualization and guided by the literature on goal
aspirations, goal motivations, goal orientations, and goal striving as related to full
functionality, personal growth, and well-being (e.g., Fowers, et al., 2010; Kasser & Ryan,
1996; Emmons, 1999).
This study adds to the literature in humanistic psychology and positive
psychology by shedding light on the relationship between self-actualization and human
well-being. Self-actualization in positive psychology literature is frequently referred to
as an indicator, rather than a predictor, of human well-being. However, the association
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between the process of self-actualization and human well-being as an ultimate good has
rarely been analyzed.
The present study contributes to the body of knowledge in psychology as it
identifies and tests a link between cognitive psychology, humanistic psychology, and
positive psychology. The conceptual framework presented for this study demonstrated a
connection between metacognition, self-actualization, and well-being. Theories of
metacognitive awareness and regulation (e.g., Flavell, 1979) imply that, to nurture one’s
potentials to its highest level, one needs to be able to handle a successful metacognitive
process. Within this framework, self-actualization, need-satisfaction, relaxing defense
mechanisms and adopting adaptive coping styles can be set as goals of metacognition.
Definitions of Terms and Operational Definitions
This section presents a list and brief definition of constructs of interest and how
they were measured. More details on the instruments and the measurement and
validation procedure are presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Eudaimonic well-being. Eudaimonic Well-Being (EWB) refers to the quality of
life that is defined by the development of a person’s best potentials (Sheldon, 2002;
Waterman, 1990). The present study measured this variable by using a slightly modified
version of the Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being (QEWB; Waterman et al.,
2010) and some adopted items from Life Regard Index-Revised (LRI-R; Debats, 1998).
Hedonic well-being. Hedonic well-being is “the belief that one is getting the
important things one wants, as well as certain pleasant emotions that normally go along
with this belief” (Kraut, 1979, p. 178). It is comprised of cognitive and affective
components. In the present study, the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener,
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Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) were used to measure these two components
respectively.
Self-Actualization. Self-actualization refers to actualizing one’s best potentials
(Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1951) which is goal-oriented and involves “growth, process,
change, unfolding, evolving, [and] transcending” (Rule, 1991, p. 252) while “pursing
intrinsic goals, [and] acting autonomously and volitionally” (Ryan et al., p. 163). The
present study measured this construct, based on Rule’s (1991) conceptualization of selfactualization, as a goal-oriented process through two different measurement components
(a) Actualizing-Self and (b) Actualization-Striving. The operational definitions of these
measurement components are explained in more details in Chapter 3.
Need-Satisfaction. Human beings are born each with an essential inner nature
embedding a series of needs at different levels (i.e., physiological needs, safety needs,
belonging needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization). Relative satisfaction of needs at
each lower level is crucial to achieve self-actualization (Maslow, 1968). In the present
study, need-satisfaction was measured primarily by adopting Sheldon and Elliot’s (1999)
approach in measuring need-satisfaction which was based on three basic psychological
needs identified by Deci and Ryan (1991), namely autonomy, competence, relatedness
(more details in Chapter 3).
Non-Defensiveness. Defense mechanisms refer to psychological and behavioral
mechanisms people employ as a natural reaction towards every social and external force
that threatens their self-regard (Vaillant, 2000). They are conceptually related to coping
mechanisms, known as “cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external
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and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the
person” (Folkman & Lazarus, 1984, p. 141). Non-Defensiveness was measured as a
combination of scores on two different measurement components: (a) Adaptive Coping
and (b) Defensiveness, using the 28-item Brief COPE (Carver, 1997).
Metacognition. Metacognition refers to cognition about cognition which
includes both knowledge and regulation of cognitive processes (Flavell, 1979).
Metacognition as measured in the present study by a modified version of Metacognitive
Awareness Inventory (MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994) encompasses the two aspects of
metacognition (i.e., knowledge and regulation).
Assumptions and Delimitations of the Study
Assumptions
The study’s assumption included: (a) every human being has an inner nature with
some embedded potentials as well as biological and psychological needs; (b) human
beings in general follow similar higher-order (i.e., growth-oriented) values to add
meaning to their lives; (c) human well-being in any form is the outcome of human
functioning; (d) goal orientations presented in the measures of self-actualization are
representative of all first- and second-order goals or values2; and (e) measuring basic
psychological need-satisfaction based on Deci and Ryan (1991)’s work is fairly
compatible with need-satisfaction suggested by Maslow (1968) assuming that
physiological and safety needs are already relatively satisfied. Finally, it was also

2

First-order goals/values are intrinsic goals which are not reducible to other values and their existence is
not dependent to other values (Ryan et al., 2008). Pursuing them represents constitutive goal orientation
that means pursuing goals which are good by themselves and intrinsically worthwhile to human beings. On
the contrary, second-order goals, pursuing which represent instrumental goal orientation, are goals that are
pursued as the means to achieve other goals.
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assumed that participants were honest and accurate in answering to the self-report
questionnaire.
Delimitations
The present study used an ex post facto research design which results in lower
internal validity because the results cannot be interpreted causally due to a lack of
randomization of the sample and manipulation of variables. An ex post facto design is
useful however research-wise for identifying variables for future manipulation (Newman
& Newman, 1994), which was one of the intended goals of this study. Future studies
using experimental research designs should follow this study to illuminate the findings.
Furthermore, the sample was a convenience sample of undergraduate and
graduate students in a public university in a demographically unique area with a large
Hispanic population, which limited the external validity of the study’s findings to be
generalized to other age groups and demographically different populations. University
students were chosen as participants of this study as an emerging adult population, who
are age-wise perceived to be more advanced in their development in all aspects than
grade school students and also are in a period of frequent change and explorations
(Arnett, 1994, 2000), a characteristic that was intended to provide the study with more
variability and richer data as the participants navigate their way towards selfactualization.
Organization of the Study
This chapter included the background to the problem, problem statement, purpose
statement, and theoretical framework. The significance of the study, definitions of terms
assumptions and delimitations were also discussed. Chapter 2 provides a review of the
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literature that supported the study and the conceptual framework presented in the first
chapter. Chapter 3 describes the research method used to conduct the study. Chapter 4
presents the findings of the study, and Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the
results and implications for theory, research, and practice.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The current study was framed to examine the relationship between metacognition,
self-actualization and well-being to link the world of cognitive psychology, humanistic
psychology and positive psychology in an educational context. Although the present
study was not an experimental design and has not tested any intervention, the more longterm intention of the present study is to provide a framework for the educational system
to design interventions that help students activate their actualizing tendency, identify and
actualize their potentials, and build their way towards a fulfilling life. This study
investigated metacognitive development as one possible way to satisfy this purpose.
Accordingly, this chapter provided an extensive review of theoretical and empirical
literature on well-being, self-actualization, and metacognition and how these concepts are
theoretically and empirically related.
This chapter includes theoretical and empirical literature reviews. The first two
main sections are allocated to the theoretical literature review, and the third section
presents the empirical literature review. The first section focuses on seminal works of
scholars who pioneered the conceptualization of human well-being, self-actualization,
and metacognition. The second section addresses the contemporary conceptualization of
each concept and the critiques, controversies, or misconceptions around them. In the
third section, the empirical literature which examined the relationship between variables
of interest is reviewed. Finally, a summary is presented which puts together concluding
remarks of the chapter.
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Background on Research Variables
This section discusses, respectively, the seminal work of Aristotle (2004) on
human well-being or eudaimonia, Maslow’s (1968) and Rogers’ (1951, 1961) seminal
works on self-actualization, and various models of metacognition conceptualized by
Flavell (1979), Brown (1978), and Nelson and Narens (1990). The organization of this
section is as follows: (a) well-being is defined and conceptualized from Aristotelian
perspective; (b) self-actualization is introduced from Abraham Maslow’s and Carl
Rogers’s perspectives, pioneers of theories of self-actualization; and (c) Metacognition is
characterized by merging Flavell (1979)’s, Brown (1978)’s, and Nelson and Narens
(1990)’s conceptualization of metacognition. More contemporary accounts of human
well-being, self-actualization, and metacognition will be discussed in the second section
of this chapter.
Aristotle’s Account of Well-being: Eudaimonia and Virtue
Aristotle (trans. 2004), the Greek philosopher of 4th Century BC, in his collection
of lectures, Nicomachean Ethics, discussed the ultimate good of human beings.
According to his argument, the ultimate good is “complete without qualifications”
(Aristotle, 2004, p. 10). Aristotle (2004) viewed well-being as the good that consists of
everything a person needs or wants (i.e., it includes all goods). It is also self-sufficient
and valued for itself; it “on its own makes life worthy of choice and lacking in nothing”
(p. 11). We pursue every other valued action or characteristic for the sake of that
ultimate good, but we do not seek the ultimate good for the sake of anything else.
Furthermore, it is “to be something of one's own that cannot easily be taken away;”
(Aristotle, 2004, p. 7); thus it is independent of others’ giving.
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Aristotle (2004) referred to such an ultimate good as Eudaimonia. In Greek
culture, eu means “well” and daimon means “divinity” or “spirit.” Aristotle, however, did
not highlight anything about the godliness of this phenomenon and instead regarded
‘eudaimon’ merely as eu zên (i.e., living well; Kraut, 2010). Although the psychological
literature predominantly has translated eudaimonia as “happiness,” the present study
recognized the term “well-being” as more accurately reflecting the connotations of the
original term. Happiness will be discussed later as being subordinate to well-being.
The question is how one can attain eudaimonia? Aristotle (2004) argued “it is
possible that we might achieve that if we grasp the characteristic activity of a human
being” (p. 11). Ergon or the characteristic activity of any being is an action unique to
every being that makes it what it is. Therefore, the good of every being is “the doing well
of” that ergon (p. 11). For human beings, one’s ergon is something that s/he is meant to
do well in order to be who s/he should be. The ergon is different from one person to
another considering the different social roles one assumes (p.12). Yet Aristotle (2004)
assumed a common essence for all people as human beings which strive for the ultimate
good. He called it daimon or human nature. Thus human ergon may take different forms
for one person: (a) several forms due to the different roles one takes in one’s life and (b)
one general form due to the universality of human nature.
Aristotle’s (2004) discussion of human nature was abstracted around the concept
of the daimon (translated as soul) as the inner nature of human being. It is viewed as the
source of human actions. His conceptualization of daimon corresponds to the concept of
the inner self or the true self in contemporary discussions of human nature (Nagle, 1972;
Norton, 1976; Rogers, 1951). Aristotle (2004) believed in “a universal account of
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wellbeing, especially one grounded in human nature” (p. xviii). He argued that the
greatness of the soul “consists in thinking oneself worthy of great things” (i.e., virtues; p.
xviii). He considered well-being mainly a result of an activity of human inner nature
which involves the philosophical contemplation and the exercise of reason in service of
arête or virtue (i.e., “living well and acting well,” p. 13).
Virtue in the Aristotelian school of thought, or in fact in Greek culture, refers to
excellence (Ackrill, 1973; Aristotle, trans. 2004; McDowell, 1980), the actualized
capacity, or the well-performed characteristic activity (Aristotle, 2004). In human
beings, virtue takes two forms: (a) intellectual virtue and (b) virtue of character.
Examples of the former are practical wisdom and judgment, which mainly originate and
develop from teaching or education, and examples of the latter are generosity and selfrestraint which are the products of habituation or nurturing (Aristotle, 2004).
Although Aristotle did not operationalize the concept of eudaimonia and selfactualization, his conceptualization of eudaimonia implies that every virtue or excellence
is a contributor to well-being, not a component of well-being and not well-being in itself.
Thus, actualizing one’s potential is not accepted as a component of well-being or as wellbeing itself, but as a contributor to it. Contrary to the Aristotelian perspective, the
psychological studies use self-actualization or personal growth as a subscale when
measuring well-being (e.g., Psychological Well-Being; Ryff & Keyes, 1995), or
conceptualize eudaimonia as self-actualization (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan et al.,
2008), or measure self-actualization as an indicator of well-being (e.g., Fowers et al.,
2010).
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In line with Aristotle (2004), the present study investigated self-actualization as a
contributor to human well-being (Figure 1), as opposed to an indicator of well-being.
That is, self-actualization and well-being were treated as separate variables. In the
present study, eudaimonia has been operationally defined in accordance with the
contemporary account of eudaimonia (Waterman et al., 2010) and the eudaimonic aspects
of a full life: (a) engagement (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Peterson et al., 2005) and (b)
meaning (Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002; Peterson et al., 2005). The present study used
a combination of the Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being (QEWB; Waterman et
al., 2010) and a few items from Life-Regard Index-Revised (LRI-R; Debats, 1998). The
21-item QEWB was developed to measure eudaimonic well-being, and its content
involves some aspects of meaning and engagement in life. Six items from LRI-R, which
was originally developed to measure meaning in life, were added to QEWB to bring
additional meaning-oriented contents in measuring eudaimonic well-being.
In addition, from Aristotelian perspective, virtues develop in a person by means of
education and exercise of reason as well as habituation. Aristotle (2004) viewed the
actualization of capacities (i.e., self-actualization) as being teachable in part and always
involving the pleasure of contemplation and deep cognitive engagement in accordance
with the target capacity or excellence. Thus, developing one’s excellences (i.e., selfactualization) involves contemplation and is attainable through education. The present
study examined the role of contemplation in living a eudaimonic life based on the
Aristotle’s statement that “… virtuous activity itself involves the pleasure of
contemplating one's own virtuous actions” (Aristotle, 2004, p. xxx). It investigated the
relationship between metacognition (as a form of contemplation) and self-actualization
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(as a way of living a eudaimonic life). The two following sections discuss the seminal
works on self-actualization (Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1951, 1961) and metacognition
(Brown, 1978; Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990).

Self-Actualization

Well-being

Figure 1. Aristotle’s approach to human well-being
Self-Actualization
The term and idea of self-actualization was originated by Kurt Goldstein in his
famous book The Organism (1939). Self-actualization is “the tendency to actualize, as
much as possible, [the organism's] individual capacities” (p. 46). It was also discussed by
Rogers (1961) in his book Client-Centered Therapy and was popularized by Maslow
(1968).
The term self-actualization, however, is used and defined loosely in the literature.
For instance, Goble (1970) introduced it as‘‘the desire [emphasis added] to become more
and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming’’ (p. 15).
Gowan (1972) described it as a life filled with a profound sense of commitment. Kerr
(1991) viewed self-actualization as challenging the limits of intellectual potentials to use
the intellectual gifts to the fullest. He, however, reduced its operational definition to
receiving advanced academic degrees or prestigious jobs (Kerr, 1985). Reis and his
colleagues (Reis & Callahan, 1989; Walker, Reis, & Leonard, 1992) considered it the
achievement in recognized fields of endeavor such as in the areas of National Merit semifinalists, patents, the United States Senate, and the Supreme Court. In another study, the
term self-actualization was used “to describe a state of fully realizing one’s potentials”
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(Serotkin, 2011). Although self-realization is a necessary step for actualizing one’s
potentials (Waterman et al., 2010), it is not synonymous with self-actualization.
In another note, literature recognized a connection between learning and selfactualization. For instance, Burleson (2005) argued that learning and creativity are
essential to self-actualization as much as self-awareness, intrinsic motivation, and selfactualization are critical to learning. The link between learning and self-actualization is
explained in Aristotle’s (2004) conceptualization of well-being as well. He discussed
self-actualization as a teachable skill and as the route towards well-being. It is not,
however, clear in what way self-actualization is crucial to learning and creativity.
Creativity is rather a characteristic of self-actualizing people (Maslow, 1968).
Despite different conceptions about self-actualization, Maslow (1968) and Rogers
(1951, 1961) presented the most elaborate theories of this concept. They explained the
concept of self-actualization as well as the factors which may precede its manifestation.
Maslow (1968) introduced self-actualization as the highest-level need for human beings
and argued that its achievement is due to the relative satisfaction of lower-level needs
(e.g., physiological, safety, belonging, and esteem). Rogers (1951) primarily discussed
actualizing tendency as the main motivational force in human beings that underlies all
other motivations. His theory implies that self-actualization is possible only if people
develop unconditional self-regard which manifests itself in the form of lower
psychological defensiveness. Two following sections summarize Maslow’s (1968) and
Rogers’ (1951, 1961) theories of self-actualization each of which introducing a precursor
to the self-actualization process, respectively need-satisfaction and non-defensiveness.
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Maslow, self-actualization, and need-satisfaction. Maslow’s (1968) personal
growth theory is driven by a notion that human beings live and act based on a hierarchy
of needs. He theorized that needs prioritize human behavior (i.e., responses to
environmental stimuli). Human beings respond to needs based on their hierarchical
strength or urgency (i.e., the most urgent one first; e.g., thirst before hunger). Maslow’s
(1968) hierarchy of needs starts with physiological needs on the base and continues with
safety needs, belonging needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization. This hierarchy is
from stronger to weaker needs in terms of the urgency by which needs compete for a
response (i.e., from the most urgent to the least urgent need).
Therefore, after the physiological needs such as hunger and thirst are taken care
of, our fears and concerns about providing safety, stability, and protection are up. Then
having caring and affectionate relationships comes into play as well as a sense of
belonging (to groups and individuals). Next, the need for esteem comes at two levels: (a)
the need for respect of others, attention, and recognition and (b) the need for self-esteem
that includes, but not limited to, competence, confidence, and freedom. These four levels
of needs Maslow (1968) defined as deficit needs – dissatisfaction of any of them results
in a health deficit (mental or physiological). Maslow (1968) argued that people’s
philosophy of life and what they think about their future life or ideal life gives insight
about their deprivations and their uncovered needs.
The highest level of need is called self-actualization (being-needs) and is a
motivation for growth, as opposed to the first four levels that are the motivation for
survival. It also is a growing need that cannot be fully gratified like the previous ones
because the need for self-actualization is the need to perform to one’s highest potential
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which is ever-expanding. Maslow (1968) also emphasized that the self-actualization
process does not need to wait for full satisfaction of the basic needs, but only for
gratification of them to the extent that inhibits frustration (p. 199). Gratification of
deficit-needs and being-needs happens concurrently, rather than one being the
prerequisite for the other.
Maslow (1968) also listed clinically observed characteristics of healthy people –
those without deficits who have devoted their time and effort to self-actualization. Selfactualizing people demonstrate (a) “superior perception of reality;” (b) “increased
acceptance of self, of others and of nature;” (c) “increased spontaneity;” (d) an “increase
in problem-centering;” (e) “increased detachment and desire for privacy;” (f) “increased
autonomy, and resistance to enculturation;” (g) “greater freshness of appreciation, and
richness of emotional reaction;” (h) “higher frequency of peak experiences;” (i)
“increased identification with the human species;” (j) “changed (the clinician would say,
improved) interpersonal relations;” (k) more democratic character structure; (l) “greatly
increased creativeness;” and (m) “certain changes in the value system” (p. 26). These
characteristics were drawn from the biographical analysis of people who, Maslow (1968)
thought, were fulfilling the criteria of self-actualization. Albert Einstein, Abraham
Lincoln, Eleanor Roosevelt, Thomas Jefferson, Jane Adams, and Benedict Spinoza are
examples of subjects in Maslow (1968)’s research.
For Maslow (1968), self-actualization entails a process of becoming. Human
beings are all constructed in a way that always feel the tendency or need for becoming a
“fuller and fuller being and … pressing toward what most people call good values,
towards serenity, kindness, courage, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness” (p. 155).
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It is an ultimate that “we can approximate … more closely or less closely” (p. 82).
Maslow (1968) also argued that self-actualization is not an experience for fully selfactualizing people, but all of us experience the self-actualizing state in our peak moments
– when we are universally tolerant, amused, and accepting. He argued that these are our
“healthiest moments” (p. 97) in which we are present with our “greatest maturity,
individualization, [and] fulfillment” (p. 97). Self-actualizing people experience these
episodes in their lives quite frequently.
In sum, Maslow (1968) regarded self-actualization as the highest-level need in his
hierarchy of needs. This hierarchy is organized from stronger (more basic) to weaker
(more advanced) needs in terms of the extent of their urgency for a response:
physiological needs, safety needs, belonging needs, esteem needs, and the need for selfactualization. The first four basic needs are deficit needs dissatisfaction of which results
in a psychological deficit. Self-actualization however is a being-need and it is the desire
to grow and fulfill our potentials. All these needs can co-exist, while the lower-level
needs should be gratified beyond the level of frustration in order for the higher level
needs to bloom. Based on this argument, the present study investigated the relationship
between need-satisfaction and self-actualization (see Figure 2).
Need-Satisfaction

Self-Actualization

Figure 2. An approach to self-actualization deducted from
Maslow’s self-actualization theory

The contemporary literature on need-satisfaction is mainly based on selfdetermination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000), which like
Maslow (1968) regards needs as being innate and motivational (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
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SDT focuses on basic psychological needs, namely relatedness, competence, and
autonomy. Relatedness is “the desire to feel connected to other – to love and care, and to
be loved and cared for” (p. 231). Competence refers to “a propensity to have an effect on
the environment as well as to attain valued outcomes within it” (p. 231). Autonomy
refers to “volition-the organismic desire to self-organize experience and behavior and to
have activity be concordant with one's integrated sense of self” (p. 231). Relatedness is
equivalent to Maslow’s (1968) belonging needs, and competence and autonomy are
closely related to Maslow’s (1968) esteem needs. All three basic psychological needs are
considered deficit needs (i.e., failure in satisfying them results in deficits in human
optimal functioning; Deci & Ryan, 2000). Thus, they are placed below self-actualization
when aligned with Maslow’s (1968) hierarchy of needs. The present study employed
SDT’s conceptualization of basic psychological needs when examining need-satisfaction,
assuming that lower-level needs (i.e., physiological and safety needs) have been
relatively satisfied for all participants.
Rogers, actualizing tendency, self-regard, and psychological defensiveness.
Carl Rogers’ (1951, 1961) self theory is built upon one main concept which is the
actualizing tendency. It is defined as the natural tendency or built-in-desire in every
being to manifest and develop one’s abilities to the fullest potential possible. Like
Maslow (1968), Rogers (1961) argued that the actualizing tendency is not about survival
but about flourishing. Rogers believed that all beings have the desire of doing their very
best. For him, more complex creatures (e.g., human beings) and more complex
organization of creatures (e.g., society) have greater potential for actualization and are
more likely to recover from disasters compared to less complex creatures. The individual
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human being is a potentially complex being with an ability to intellectually resolve
problems that life presents. The complex organization of humans manifests itself in form
of a society or a culture. Although it is not always the case, society and culture in an
effort to survive as a group/organization may harm the individuals’ actualization. Rogers
(1961) explained this phenomenon in more detail, introducing concepts of value system,
real self, and ideal self.
Rogers (1961) considered two different and reliable value systems for human
beings: organismic valuing and positive regard. What we discriminate through senses
and what we usually call basic needs, such as food and sleep, belong to a low-level value
system, called organismic valuing, while the other feelings such as affection, love,
attention, and caring are referred to as positive regard. From the latter category, of
importance to personal growth and self-actualization is positive self-regard which
includes, but is not limited, to self-esteem, positive self-image, and self-acceptance.
An individual human being, by her/his very own nature, strives for what s/he
needs and what is good for him/her. However, society and culture make the attainment
of most of these needs depend on individuals’ worthiness which is usually determined by
some social-cultural stereotypical values and characteristics. The result of such a
judgmental system is that, instead of being led by our actualizing tendency, we have
eventually become responsive to what Rogers (1951) called conditional positive regard.
Following this pattern or learning contingency, our positive self-regard becomes
conditional to meeting the expectations of others, to pleasing other people.
According to Rogers (1951), conditional self-regard causes a struggle between the
real self (i.e., the self that would be the result of the actualization of one’s potentials) and
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the ideal self (i.e., the self that society imposes). The ideal self (versus the real self) is
imposed by external influences (i.e., society or culture), while the real self is the self that
one is both capable of being and willing to be. The ideal self can deviate or differ from
the real self. Experiencing such a deviation can lead to a constant struggle, the purpose
of which is to retain the positive self-regard and a positive sense of the self. High
frequency of such a struggle jeopardizes an individual’s psychological well-being by
placing the individual in a state of identity conflict, which, according to Rogers (1951),
leads to increasing self-incongruence and neurosis.
To cope with such incongruity, individuals develop defense systems or coping
mechanisms that help them psychologically escape what is threatening to their positive
regard. Such a situation is called a threatening situation. A threatening situation is a
circumstance that capitalizes the incongruence between the real self and the ideal self.
Frequent activation of the defense system (e.g., denial, perceptual distortion, etc.) adds to
the existing incongruence. It does not help develop an unconditional self-regard; it is
only a temporary remedy to pass the threatening situation. Despite all kinds of
suppression, the actualizing tendency is never completely extinguished. Rogers (1961),
like Maslow (1968), believed that:
This tendency may become deeply buried under layer after layer of encrusted
psychological defenses; it may be hidden behind elaborate facades which deny its
existence; but it is my belief that it exists in every individual, and awaits only the
proper conditions to be released and expressed. (p. 35)
The author of the present study argued that “the proper conditions” which Rogers (1961,
p. 35) mentioned in his statement can takes place if people can manage the activation of
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their defense mechanisms in a proper way, which is characterized by being less defensive
(i.e., controlling their defense mechanisms by using less of maladaptive defense
strategies) and adopting adaptive coping mechanisms more often. Figure 3 illustrates this
approach to self-actualization which has been deducted from Rogers’ (1951, 1961) self
theory.
Non-Defensiveness

Self-Actualization

Figure 3. An approach to self-actualization deducted from Rogers’ self theory

A full person. For Rogers (1961), a fully-functioning person who has an active
actualizing tendency is described by five characteristics: (a) Openness to experience; (b)
Existential living; (c) Organismic trusting; (d) Experiential freedom; and (e) Creativity.
Openness to experience refers to embracing the whole experience of life. It includes
experiencing reality as it is and experiencing oneself with all of one’s flaws and merits.
Developing accurate perceptions of one’s feelings in relation to reality is essential in
order to distinguish between our natural value system and the imposed conditional
positive regard. Existential living deals with living in the present, which means being
mindful and cognizant of the memory of the past and dreams of the future and being able
to focus one’s feelings and actions on the present. It allows the experience of the reality
as it is. Organismic trusting is about allowing one’s organismic valuing and one’s true
feelings (driven by one’s unconditional self-worth rather than by conditional self-worth)
guide our behavior. For a fully functioning person, the actualizing tendency is the
motivation that leads his/her behavior, perception, and attitude. Thus, organismic valuing
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can be safe to trust. Openness to experience and existential living are building blocks of
organismic trusting.
Experimental freedom is the fourth characteristic of a fully functioning person. It
refers to living with a sense of freedom in one’s choices and taking responsibility for
those choices, a characteristic which was referred to as autonomy in SDT literature and
was introduced as one of the basic psychological needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Creativity,
in Rogers’ (1961) view, is the engagement of a person at her/his highest potential in
shaping the world’s reality. This involvement requires shared efforts with others in the
process of actualization.
Rogerian therapy: Learning in a psychologically safe environment. Carl Rogers
viewed therapy as a mode of learning. He is known for proposing a non-directive
counseling approach to therapy and learning. He argued that his approach is clientcentered (Rogers, 1961), rather than being non-directive (i.e. providing no direction for
the therapy). The key component of client-centered therapy is mirroring the client’s
emotions and scaffolding self-reflection that is a metacognitive process. Self-expression
and self-reflection entails a psychologically safe environment in which the client does not
feel threatened. Such an environment requires the therapist’s emotional presence and
includes showing an understanding of the client’s feelings as well as helping the client be
in control of the emotional state by constantly self-reflecting on his/her expression of
emotions. For Rogers (1961), a therapist needs to build a genuine relationship with the
client, meaning, be genuinely congruent inside and out, understanding, empathic, and
respectful to the client to foster the development of unconditional positive regard.
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Rogers (1961), who had experience as a teacher, expanded his view of therapy to
teaching and learning. In his 1961 seminal work, On becoming a person: A therapist’s
view of psychotherapy, he frequently used the term “learning” for his own life
experiences as a therapist, as a teacher, and as a person. For him, learning is an ongoing
process that a therapist or teacher shares with the client or learner. He believed that the
learning process that occurs during a therapeutic session has implications for education as
well as family and community life. One of the interesting characteristics of Rogerian
learning is its independency from external motivations. In Rogers’ (1961) view,
actualizing tendency is the internal motivation for learning. The learning process occurs
by activating that tendency and giving it room to maneuver.
Rogers (1961) argued that learning and growth demand a psychologically safe
environment, a setting that minimizes threatening situations for learners. A
psychologically safe classroom is a classroom that does not provoke the learners’ defense
systems by avoiding the situations that make learners choose between the real self and the
ideal self. In order for actualizing tendency to come into play, the central focus of the
teacher should be on developing a genuine relationship with the learner. The question
that teachers ought to ask themselves is “how can I provide a relationship which this
person may use for his own personal growth?” (Rogers, 1961, p. 32). To develop such a
relationship the teacher needs to be genuine, understanding, and nonjudgmental (Rogers,
1961). With this, s/he can provides the learners with proper conditions for growth by
giving them freedom and peace of mind to explore their fears, zeal, weaknesses, and
strengths without feeling judged and threatened.
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Rogers (1961) acknowledged that this approach to learning and education by no
means is a conventional approach. It calls for rethinking the goal of education. He
argued that there is a culture of pampering our children that keeps them away from real
life issues. “Contact with problem” (Rogers, 1961, p. 286) is one of the essential
components of learning which such a culture denies from our youths. Rogers (1961) was
aware that this approach may be advantageous for achieving certain goals, but not others.
Thus, he suggested research-based adaption of Rogerian therapy for educational
purposes.
Summary. Carl Rogers’ (1951, 1961) self theory was driven by a key concept
which is the actualizing tendency. It is defined as the natural tendency of every being
(human or non-human) to enhance his/her performance to the fullest potential possible, to
do the very best s/he can do. Humans as complex creatures have greater actualization
potential, compared to other beings, and actually make more complex organizations (i.e.,
societies and cultures) that in turn affect their individualized actualizing power. These
complex organizations of humans have the potential to bring individuals’ self-regard
under the control of their conditioning power.
Such a conditioning power is a force that ties the sense of self-worth exclusively
to conditional positive regard (e.g., meeting the expectation of others) instead of intrinsic
positive regard. This chain of interactions tends to push people towards an ideal self that
usually distances them from their real self. The incongruity imposed by the society and
culture is dangerous to a human’s psychological well-being. In both therapeutic and
school settings, Rogers (1961) believed, this inconsistency can be overcome if the
therapist/teacher builds a real relationship with the clients. Such a relationship gives
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learners a safe place to activate their actualizing tendency and to express and explore
their inner selves without feeling threatened by judgmental reactions.
The purpose of Rogerian approach is to reduce defensiveness and help individuals
develop unconditional self-regard, which in turn emancipates their actualizing tendency
(Rogers, 1961). The focus of this approach is on providing a psychologically safe
environment as a requirement for self-actualization which is external to the person.
Investigating the relationship between such external requirements of self-actualization is
out of scope of this study. Instead, the present study focused on metacognition, an
intrapersonal element, in relation to self-actualization. As related to Rogers’ (1951,
1961) theory, metacognitive skills are argued to have the potential to help the person with
reducing her/his defensiveness, adopting more adaptive coping mechanisms when
encountering a threatening situation, and, in turn, self-actualization.
Concluding remarks on theories of self-actualization. Maslow (1968) and
Rogers (1951, 1961) elaborated on the concept of self-actualization and actualizing
tendency, characterized self-actualizing or fully functioning people, and shed light on the
possible pathways towards self-actualization. Rogers (1951, 1961) speculated that
unconditional self-regard that manifests itself as non-defensiveness (i.e., low level of
psychological defense and high level of adaptive coping) may allow the actualizing
tendency to come to play. Actualizing tendency functions as the main motivational factor
in human life for learning and self-actualization. Maslow (1968) also argued that the
satisfaction of lower level needs may facilitate the process of self-actualization. This
dissertation investigated Maslow’s (1968) theory of self-actualization and Rogers’ (1951)
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theory of actualizing tendency to see if need-satisfaction and/or non-defensiveness
contribute to self-actualization (see Figure 4).

Need-Satisfaction
Self-Actualization
Non-Defensiveness

Figure 4. Maslow’s (1968) and Rogers’ (1951, 1961) approach
to self-actualization
The present study also examined whether a relationship between metacognition
and self-actualization is mediated by need-satisfaction and/or non-defensiveness (Figure
5). The next section provides more detail on the rationale for the relationship between
metacognition and self-actualization and elaborates on self-actualization, needsatisfaction, and non-defensiveness as goals of metacognition.
Metacognition
John Flavell (1971), a Piagetian developmental psychologist who is considered
the father of the field of metacognition (Papaleontiou-Louca, 2008), in his theory of
metamemory, explained the ability of individuals in storing the information in the mind,
searching through it, and retrieving the contents of their own mind or memory. Flavell
(1976) first used the term metacognition and described it as “one's knowledge concerning
one's own cognitive processes or anything related to them” (p. 232). Later, when he
introduced his model of cognitive monitoring, he referred to metacognition as
“knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena” (Flavell, 1979, p. 906). His
account of cognitive phenomena, as it is evident in his definitions of metacognitive terms,
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included all psychological aspects of a cognitive enterprise including emotions, beliefs,
interests, and motivations as well as cognition (Papaleontiou-Louca, 2008).
Flavell (1979)’s model of cognitive monitoring was characterized by four
interacting facets: (a) Metacognitive knowledge; (b) Goal/Task; (c) Actions/Strategies;
and (d) Metacognitive experience. He argued that one’s competence in every one of
these areas affect one’s cognitive processes and subsequently one’s performance on a
cognitive task. Metacognitive knowledge revolves around three main variables: Person,
Task/Goal, and Strategy or Action (Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive knowledge of the
person variable is about recognizing oneself and all human beings as cognitive agents
who are different from one another in their cognitive performances and include being
aware of one’s beliefs, interests, emotions, and motivations. Metacognitive knowledge of
the task and strategy variable is knowledge about environmental and contextual factors
(e.g., task, physical environment, and resources) as well as metacognitive strategies (e.g.,
analyzing, evaluating, reflecting, and monitoring judgment). Goals or tasks are what
guide cognitive processes, and actions or strategies are what the person needs to do to
achieve the goals and accomplish the task. For instance, when one has memorizing a list
of words as a cognitive goal/task, using different memory techniques, such as repeating
the words, writing them down, and using mnemonics to store, retain, and retrieve the
information when needed, is the corresponding action.
In addition, cognitive monitoring involves being aware of and monitoring one’s
metacognitive experiences which also affect cognitive performance (Flavell, 1979).
Metacognitive experiences are “any conscious cognitive or affective experiences that
accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise” (Flavell, 1979, p. 906). A person
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involves a metacognitive experience when s/he notices that s/he is not able to follow the
logical argument just made in a discussion or finds out what s/he is doing doesn’t seem to
work in a certain occasion. Flavell (1979) elaborated on how affective and cognitive
experiences interfere with or improve metacognitive monitoring. In his conceptualization
of metacognition, Flavell (1979) insightfully recognized the role of emotion as well as
cognition in the performance of cognitive tasks; emotion is usually excluded from studies
of cognition.
Moreover, Flavell (1979) argued that development of metacognitive ability in
children makes them eventually learn to monitor and control (or regulate) their thinking
processes. Brown (1978) elaborated more on regulation of cognition. Taking an
information processing perspective, she highlighted the role of metacognitive skills and
executive functioning of the brain, such as planning, selecting goals, and tracking
progress, as the regulatory components of metacognition. Brown (1978) suggested a
two-component conceptualization of metacognition by making distinction between
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. Later, Nelson and Narens (1990)
elaborated on different levels of metacognitive regulation functioning (i.e., object-level
and meta-level) and the processes of metacognitive monitoring and control that connect
these two levels through a flow of information.
Accordingly, Metacognitive Regulation includes monitoring and controlling
processes (Nelson & Narens, 1990) during deliberate problem-solving (Brown, 1978;
Nelson & Narens, 1990). Metacognitive regulation includes using metacognitive skills
and executive functions such as interpreting the situation; identifying and characterizing
the problem; guiding, orchestrating, and supervising the emotional and cognitive
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processes; predicting the limitations of one’s cognitive capacity and knowledge repertoire
in a problem-solving situation; planning; selecting goals and strategies; tracking the
progress; and evaluating and revising strategy use if necessary (Brown, 1978).
Consequently, Nelson and Narens (1990) suggested a model of metacognition
which explained metacognitive skills as two interacting sets of metacognitive processes,
namely monitoring and control. They suggested two levels of functioning for
metacognitive processes, object-level and meta-level, which interact through the flow of
information by means of monitoring and control. They referred to the flow of
information from object-level to meta-level as monitoring. Meta-level is a higher level of
cognition than the object-level. Informed by monitoring, it develops a scheme of the
object-level, namely the problem-solving situation. This mental simulation of the
situation changes based on the on-going flow of information coming from the objectlevel (i.e., through monitoring). Control was defined as meta-level modifying the objectlevel. That is, based on the changes in the scheme of the situation, the meta-level
modifies the cognitive processes towards achieving the goal of problem-solving. This
metacognitive regulatory process produces changes at the object-level which can
manifests itself in form of continuing the action, modifying the action, terminating the
action, and/or initiating a new set of actions.
In sum, metacognitive regulation is about monitoring the object-level and
obtaining information about all different variables involved in the process of
metacognition (e.g., metacognitive knowledge, experiences, goal progress, and strategies
in action). Then, controlling the process by affecting the object-level through setting
goals, using strategies, and appropriately shifting between strategies to achieve goals
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(Brown, 1977; Efklides, 2001; Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993; Schraw, 2001) informed
by the executive function of monitoring. Among all metacognitive regulatory processes,
goal-setting has been identified as one of the key functions of metacognition (Tarricone,
2011) which requires knowledge and regulation of all three main variables of
metacognition: person, task, and strategy (Flavell, 1979).
Altogether, metacognition has been characterized as an interacting combination of
knowledge and skills, that involves monitoring and control processes during a deliberate
problem-solving situation. Almost any action or behavior which involves intentional and
conscious cognitive processing is explainable within a metacognitive framework. For
instance, self-actualization, identifying needs and ways to satisfy them, and relaxing
psychological defense mechanisms or choosing and employing an adaptive defense style,
each can be explained within a metacognitive framework. Developing metacognitive
competence has been argued to have implications in the variety of activities such as
reading, writing, communication, problem-solving, activating higher levels of thinking
(e.g., analysis, synthesis, and evaluation) and personal growth (Flavell, 1979). The wideranging implications of metacognition in goal-setting and problem-solving and its
capacity as teachable sets of skills (Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992; Gaskin &
Pressely, 2005) guided the author of the present study to suggest that general
metacognitive competence may help with the process of self-actualization, and needsatisfaction and non-defensiveness as potential precursors of self-actualization. The
present study examined the extent to which metacognition may contribute to the selfactualization process, need-satisfaction, and non-defensiveness.
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The recent section discussed the Aristotle’s (trans. 2004) theory of eudaimonia or
well-being, theories of self-actualization from Maslow (1968) and Rogers (1951), and
Flavell’s (1979), Brown’s (1977, 1978), and Nelson and Narens’ (1990)
conceptualization of metacognition. This section also addressed need-satisfaction from
Maslow’s (1968) theory of self-actualization and non-defensiveness from Rogers’ (1951)
theory of actualizing tendency as antecedents of the self-actualization process. The next
section will present a review of contemporary literature on variables of interest.
A Review of Contemporary Literature on Research Variables
Contemporary conceptualizations of human well-being and the ways well-being
has been measured are discussed in this section. This section addresses criticisms of the
theories of self-actualization and introduces the contemporary account of selfactualization which guided the measurement approach in the present study. The final
topic to discuss is contemporary discussions around the theories of metacognition and
how it is related to the literature on self-regulation and self-regulated learning. In this
review of theoretical literature, the author has presented findings from empirical research
as appropriate to further elaborate on the discussion.
Hedonic Well-Being
Eudaimonia, Aristotle’s ultimate good in his Nicomachean Ethics, was primarily
translated as happiness. The word happiness, however, carries several meanings both
among laypeople and in scholarly literature. In a general sense, happiness may merely
refer to a state of pleasure. For instance, Aristippus of Cyrene, a philosopher of the third
century BC, argued that physical, positive, momentary pleasure is the only good,
regardless of its cause (Tatarkiewicz, 1976, p. 317). In the happiness literature, the
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concept of happiness has been mainly used and interpreted in its hedonic aspects, a
subjective experience that includes “the belief that one is getting the important things one
wants, as well as certain pleasant affects that normally go along with this belief” (Kraut,
1979, p. 178). Waterman (1993) also interpreted hedonic enjoyment as a by-product of
the coincidence of pleasant affects and the satisfaction of physical, social, or intellectual
needs. Hedonic well-being has been referred to as Subjective Well-Being (SWB) in the
contemporary literature and has been operationally defined to include three different
aspects: positive affect, negative affect, and judgment of life satisfaction (Andrews &
Withey, 1976; Deci & Ryan, 2008; Diener, 1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999).
Several studies have used the combination of these components to assess SWB (e.g.,
Fowers et al., 2010; Schueller & Seligman, 2010).
Accordingly, measures of subjective well-being (SWB) are being widely used to
capture the subjective aspects of human well-being, including affective components and
cognitive components. The affective aspect of SWB addresses the presence of positive
affect as well as the absence of negative affect while the cognitive aspect of SWB deals
with the individual’s judgment about how satisfied one is with one’s life (Diener &
Lucas, 1999). In the present study, hedonic well-being was measured using two
measures of subjective well-being (SWB): (a) the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS;
Diener et al., 1985), measuring the cognitive aspect; and (b) the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) measuring the affective
aspect of subjective well-being.
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Eudaimonic Well-Being
Eudaimonic well-being (EWB) is derived from Aristotle’s (2004) eudaimonic
philosophy that considers EWB as the ultimate good. EWB refers to the quality of life
that is achieved through the actualization of a person’s best potentials, which is also
rewarded by subjective pleasure. Ryff (1989) was the first contemporary scholar who
operationally defined well-being in a fashion that was distinct from the hedonic tradition.
She challenged the traditional view of well-being as mere subjective pleasure and
satisfaction with life and argued that reporting a high subjective well-being does not
necessarily indicate that the person is living psychologically well. Ryff and her
colleagues (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995) developed a measure of Psychological
Well-Being (PWB) identifying six core dimensions necessary for a quality life: (a)
Positive Relationship with Others, (b) Autonomy, (c) Purpose in Life, (d) Environmental
Mastery, (e) Personal Growth, and (f) Self-Acceptance.
PWB is a broad concept that includes several constructs, some of which may be
argued to be precursors or outcomes of the others. For instance, autonomy,
environmental mastery, and positive relations may represent three basic psychological
needs conceptualized by Deci and Ryan (1991), which in the framework of this study are
considered precursors to personal growth, while purpose in life is identified as one of the
underlying constructs of eudaimonic well-being. On the other hand, some studies (e.g.,
Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002; Miquelon & Vallerand, 2008) considered PWB a
measure of self-realization reflecting “different challenges individuals encounter as they
strive to function positively” (Miquelon & Vallerand, 2008, p. 242). Other research (e.g.,
Sheldon, Kasser, Smith, & Share, 2002) used it as an indicator of personal or
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psychological growth. Waterman (2008) argued that PWB is viable in indicating some
aspects of individual being that are crucial for psychological health and optimal
functioning, but it is not necessarily in accordance with Aristotle’s (2004)
conceptualization of eudaimonia.
Furthermore, Waterman (1993) derived the conceptual framework of his work
from Aristotle (2004). He proposed the concept of personal expressiveness as a signifier
of eudaimonia. He referred to Aristotle’s (2004) eudaimonia as an “activity expressing
virtue” (p. 284). Consequently, Waterman et al. (2010) developed a measure of
eudaimonic well-being (i.e., the Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being, QEWB), the
content of which includes themes such as self-discovery, perceived development of one’s
best potentials, a sense of purpose and meaning in life, intense involvement in everyday
activities, investment of significant effort, and enjoyment of activities as personally
expressive. Their study showed that eudaimonic well-being as measured by QEWB
related positively to Psychological Well-Being (r = .23 for the Positive Relationship with
Others, r = .40 for Autonomy, r = .43 for Purpose in Life, r = .48 for Environmental
Mastery, r = .50 for Personal Growth, and r = .56 for the Self-Acceptance) and related
positively to Satisfaction with Life as an indicator of Subjective well-Being (r = .47). It
also accounted for 9% of the variance in self-esteem and 12% of the variance in internal
locus of control as two indicators of Positive Psychological Functioning.
According to Waterman et al. (2010), personal expressiveness occurs when one
gets involved in activities and actions which are oriented towards developing one’s
potentials and achieving one’s personal goals. In addition to personal expressiveness, the
content of QEWB addresses meaning and engagement, which were identified by Peterson
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et al. (2005) as eudaimonic aspects of well-being. Accordingly, the present study
employed a modified version of the QEWB to measure eudaimonic well-being alongside
some items adopted from Life Regard Index-Revised (Debats, 1998) to enrich the
meaning-oriented content of QEWB. The next section will discuss meaning and
engagement in more detail.
Well-Being in Positive Psychology: Pleasure, Engagement, and Meaning
Similar to proponents of the hedonic perspective of human well-being (pleasure
vs. pain), positive psychology espouses both relieving suffering and increasing happiness
as two distinct subjective aspects of well-being (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson,
2005), yet regards them as complementary to the eudaimonic aspects of well-being.
Positive psychology has taken a holistic approach to increase happiness (Seligman et al.,
2005) with a consideration of both hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives of human wellbeing (Vella-Brodrick, Park, & Peterson, 2009). Positive psychology has integrated the
scattered works and theories of researchers who attempted to identify different
components of human well-being as well as precursors of optimal functioning (Seligman
et al., 2005), including, but not limited to, works of Rogers (1951), Maslow (1962),
Jahoda (1958), Erikson (1963, 1982), Vaillant (1977), Deci and Ryan (1985), and Ryff
and Singer (1996). These works were focused, specifically, on those human
characteristics and pursuits which make life most worth living (Peterson & Park, 2003).
Studies of positive emotions, positive character traits, and positive institutions emerged
from these efforts (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).
In a novel holistic approach to human well-being, Seligman (2002) proposed three
different routes to happiness: (a) living a pleasant life in which one “successfully pursues
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the positive emotions [pleasure] about the present, past, and future” (p. 263), (b) living a
good life which is about “using your signature strengths to obtain abundant gratification
in the main realms of your life” (p. 263), and (c) living a meaningful life which involves
“using your signature strengths and virtues in the service of something much larger than
you are” (p. 264). Seligman (2002) used the term eudaimonia to refer to living a good
life (p. 112) and labeled a life containing all the three components as a full life. He
suggested that studies of human well-being should incorporate these three orientations to
happiness into their work.
Seligman’s (2002) concept of the full life was further expanded by Peterson et al.
(2005) with regard to achieving life satisfaction. Peterson et al. (2005) developed a
measure and offered empirical evidence on Seligman’s (2002) proposal that individuals
may attain life satisfaction in three different distinguishable ways: (a) pursuing positive
emotions and pleasure, (b) pursuing meaning, and (c) pursuing engagement. These three
life-satisfying ways were labeled as orientations to happiness. Pleasure orientation
reflects hedonic well-being; meaning orientation is considered a eudemonic approach to
well-being (Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002); engagement orientation, which emerged
from the work of Csikszentmihalyi (1990) on flow experiences, is also considered a
eudaimonic approach to well-being (Vella-Brodrick et al., 2009). These orientations are
compatible, and individuals can pursue all three of them simultaneously.
Pleasure. Maximizing pleasure and reducing pain is the foremost ambition of
hedonic well-being. The hedonic perspective supports engaging in pleasurable activities
as the way of achieving a happy life (Seligman et al., 2005; Vella-Brodrick et al., 2009).
Savoring and reminiscing (Bryant & Veroff, 2007) and counting one’s blessings and
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envisioning one’s best possible self (Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006) are examples of
positive psychology interventions which are intended to provide pleasurable experiences
in life. For instance, writing down three good things that happened each day (an
approach to savoring) and using signature strengths each day in a new way was found to
produce happiness and maintain it for at least 6 months (Seligman et al., 2005).
Although positive emotions are fundamental to human flourishing and to maintain
well-being (Fredrickson, 2001), they are insufficient to fulfill these goals. Aristotle
(2004) viewed the hedonic perspective of the good as a reductionist account of
eudaimonia. According to Aristotle (2004), people, who experience eudaimonia,
experience pleasure as well. But for him, pleasure is not the ultimate good; pleasure is
just one aspect of the daimon or inner nature (p. 14). Telfer (1980) also argued that
eudaimonia goes beyond mere pleasure and desire, and engages “what is worth desiring
and worth having in life” (p. 37).
For life to be full and satisfying it needs to be engaging and meaningful. Pursuing
meaningful engagements in life was found to support personality development and
promote a satisfying life (e.g., Peterson et al., 2005; Peterson, Ruch, Beermann, Park, &
Seligman, 2007). Studies have shown that engagement and meaning orientations were
more strongly correlated with character strength (i.e., humor, zest, curiosity,
perseverance, and religiousness) (Peterson et al., 2007) and more important in predicting
life satisfaction (Peterson et al., 2005) than pleasure orientation was. Peterson et al.
(2005) found that orientations to happiness individually contributed into life satisfaction
(normalized scores were used; β = - 0.11 for Pleasure, p < .001; β = - 0.24 for
Engagement and β = - 0.17 for Meaning, p < .05). In addition, living a full life (i.e.,
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pursuing happiness through all three routes together) significantly predict life satisfaction
above and beyond the individual contributions (β = - 2.50, p < .001). Adams, Bezner,
Drabbs, Zambarano, & Steinhardt (2000) also found that greater meaning in life is
associated with greater positive mental health.
Although the pleasure orientation is still relevant to the overall satisfaction in life
(Peterson et al., 2005), meaning and engagement in life are more under the deliberate
control of individuals (Frankl, 1963; Massimini & Delle Fave, 2000). Thus, the pursuit
of meaning and engagement is more likely to provide purposive and meaningful
enjoyable positive experiences, which is expected to maintain long-term pleasure or
happiness in life. Peterson et al. (2005) recommended that pleasure-enhancing
techniques (e.g., savoring) can be incorporated into interventions that are oriented
towards enhancing engagement and meaning. The following sections further explain the
concepts of meaning and engagement.
Meaning in life. Meaning in life is a factor which had been conceptually linked
to well-being (e.g., Frankl, 1963; Peterson et al. 2005). Frankl (1963) asserted that
defining meaning in life is a psychological need, and failure to attain this need leads to
psychological problems. Recent empirical evidence supported the notion that the lack of
meaning in life is associated with psychological abnormality. For instance, meaning in
life is negatively correlated with psychopathology (Debats, Van der Lubbe, & Wezeman,
1993). Yet it was not until recently that the importance of this concept was recognized,
and it became a focus of well-being studies, as a fundamental component of
psychological well-being (Ryff & Singer, 1998), as a predictor of subjective well-being
(e.g., Fry, 2000), and most recently as a route to happiness (Seligman, 2002).
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For Seligman (2002), only seeking the greater good, that transcend the self,
makes the life meaningful. Aristotle (2004), Wong (1998), and Seligman (2002) all
called for pursuing something in addition to and beyond personal projects, the greater
good that is valued universally by human nature. For Seligman (2002), seeking the
greater good (i.e., the meaningful life) was beyond and distinct from living a good life.
Accordingly, Peterson et al.’s (2005) Life of Meaning (a subscale of the Orientations to
Happiness measure) was primarily focused on the pursuit of a greater good. However,
Peterson et al. (2005) presented an account of eudemonic well-being which involved both
being all you can be and targeting a greater good (i.e., to make a difference in the life of
other people).
From an existentialist perspective (e.g., Frankl, 1963), meaning in life although
affected by society and culture, is fairly subjective. Daily decision-making constantly
gives direction to human life and gives it its special meaning (Maddi, 1998). The
decision-making may transcend the norm and, thus, make meanings that are more
subjective and peculiar to the individual (Frankl, 1963). Meaning in life is inevitably
bound to one’s goals. Everybody has things that are important to her/him, but actively
pursuing them as goals is what makes life meaningful (Klinger, 1998). Klinger (1998)
argued that seeking meaning is not a concern for “people who for any reason find
themselves persistently engaged in striving for valued goals” (p. 33). It seems such
people are already pursuing a meaningful life. In sum, personal goals or purposes give
direction to our decision-making and, thus, to our actions. Goal-setting and acting upon
one’s goals bring intentionality into life that, in turn, gives meaning to ones’ life.
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In a study (McMahan & Renkenof, 2011) of 275 adults (186 women) about their
conceptions of well-being, both self-development and contribution to a greater good were
rated as two eudaimonic conceptions of well-being. The study also tested the relationship
of such conceptions with meaning in life (i.e., having a meaningful life) and well-being
(including life satisfaction, affective well-being, and subjective vitality: feelings of
mental and physical vitality, aliveness, and vigor). The findings indicated that there is a
positive association between these eudaimonic conceptions of well-being and both living
a meaningful life and well-being itself.
Another study (Wong, 1998) investigated 289 participants from different age
groups (ranging from 18 to over 60 years old) defining an ideally meaningful life.
Individuals rated the extent to which they thought a given goal pursuit represented an
ideally meaningful life. Individuals’ self-ratings showed that achievement striving
accounts for 32.2 % of the variance in defining an ideally meaningful life. Achievement
striving involves “what the individual has accomplished or strives to achieve” (p. 118);
items include “successful in achieving one’s aspirations,” “seeks to achieve one’s
potentials,” and “striving to do one’s best in whatever one is doing” (p. 117). The items
reflect the actualizing tendency (i.e., inherent tendency to do one’s best), and the findings
indicated its subjective importance in defining the ideal life. On the other hand, selftranscendence that involves the greater good of making a difference in the world or
seeking higher values that benefit other people accounts for only 2.5% of the variance in
defining a meaningful life. Religion (8.8%), relationships (4.6%), fulfillment (4.3%),
fairness/respect (3.5%), self-confidence (2.7%), self-integration (2.5%), and selfacceptance (2.3%) all accounted for some portion of the variance in individuals’
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perceptions of meaning. Wong (1998) argued that fulfillment is an inevitable by-product
of a meaningful life.
Another phase of the same study (Wong, 1998) investigated the extent to which
individuals actually pursued goals that were in line with their perceived ideally
meaningful life (i.e., their orientation to a meaningful life). The findings indicated that
when individuals’ self-rating of goal pursuits approximated their perceived ideal
meaningful life, they showed higher levels of psychological well-being. Wong (1998)
found that meaning-seeking regardless of its context (i.e., whether it is focused on selfdevelopment or self-transcendent) was significantly and positively associated with PWB
(r = .34, p < .001) and negatively relates to depression (r = -.70, p < .001), implying that
happiness is a by-product of a meaningful life.
Human beings as meaning-seeking and meaning-making creatures have the ability
to develop a meaning-oriented mind-set (Maslow, 1968; Rogers,1961; Wong, 2011) that
gives the individual the ability to live according to Purpose, Understanding,
Responsibility, and Enjoyment (i.e., PURE way of living; Wong, 2010). Wong (2011)
highlighted understanding as a prerequisite for developing a meaning-oriented mind-set:
“Understanding refers to making sense of the self, life, and one’s place in the world” (p.
409). The definition of understanding as the constructor of the individual’s world view
resembles the notion of developing self-knowledge (Tarricone, 2011) and Hanlon’s
(1986) concept of the conceptual subsystem (discussed in Chapter 1), which have been
conceptualized to be prerequisites of optimal metacognitive functioning and selfactualization.
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The recent section addressed the concept of meaning in the contemporary
literature, as one of eudaimonic indicators of a full life which entails well-being. Its
relation to indicators of well-being, growth, and metacognition was discussed. The next
section discusses the concept of engagement, another eudaimonic orientation to
happiness.
Engagement. Engagement is another factor recognized to be important in
achieving a happy life (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Peterson et al., 2005). Csikszentmihalyi
(1990) referred to it as flow or optimal experience, “the state in which people are so
involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter” (p. 4), the state of “being fully
immersed in a specific activity” (Vella-Brodrick, et al., 2009, p. 166). Engagement or
flow occurs when the activity is “optimally challenging” (Wild, Kuiken, & Schopflocher,
p. 569); that is, the level of challenge matches the level of one’s skills.
Measures of flow are typically individuals’ ratings of their concentration,
involvement, and enjoyment during a specific activity. The stable core of optimal
experience is identified to be the (meta)cognitive activities, such as concentration and
control of the situation (Delle Fave & Massimini, 2005). Active involvement and skilluse are also determinant characteristics of an optimal activity (i.e., an activity associated
with optimal experience; Delle Fave & Massimini, 2005). Affective and motivational
factors, such as pleasure or willing to do the activity and to accomplish goals, differ from
one activity to another (Delle Fave & Massimini, 2005). Csikszentmihalyi, Abuhamdeh,
and Nakamura (2005) indicated that the involvement in flow experience is beneficial in
pursuing academic and sporting goals by enhancing students’ commitment, achievement,
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and persistence. In contrast, disengagement showed negative consequences in relation to
educational and developmental outcomes (Larson, 2000).
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) flow experience and Maslow’s (1961) peak
experience, which are characterized by absorption and involvement as their main features
(Privette, 1983), are both instances of experiential engagement (Wild et al., 1995). Not
all scholars consider them similar phenomena. For instance, Delle Fave and Massimini
(2005) made a distinction between optimal experience and peak experience (or as they
referred to it, feelings of extreme happiness). They described peak experiences as being
unusually fun, exciting, and amusing, which happen rarely, while optimal experience was
characterized as part of daily fluctuations of experiences, which primarily involves
concentration and engagement. Peak experience often involves no overt behavior and is
rather a receptive orientation of “highest happiness and fulfillment” (Maslow, 1968, p.
69). Flow also leads to enjoyment and pleasure; but, during flow experience people are
actively engaged in actions (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975).
Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being in the Present Study
According to the contemporary literature, eudaimonia or eudaimonic well-being is
conceptualized as personal expressiveness (Waterman, 2008; Waterman et al., 2010)
which manifests itself in the form of meaning-seeking and engagement in life (Peterson
et al, 2005). Personal expressiveness represents well-being at the personal level.
Meaning in life deals with abstract aspects of well-being, which can emerge from
pursuing valued goals that are either personal or transcend the self. Engagement
addresses more tangible aspects of well-being that arise from involvement in both
personal projects and humanely worthwhile activities. The present study employed
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Waterman et al.’s (2010) QEWB, to measure eudaimonic well-being, alongside some
items adopted from Life Regard Index-Revised (Debats, 1998) to enrich the meaningoriented content of QEWB. Hedonic well-being also was measured using the
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985) and the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The summation of scores
on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being was used as the overall well-being score.
The next section will discuss controversies around the conceptualization of selfactualization and its operational definition. It will also present a contemporary account of
self-actualization which has been employed by the present study. The present study
conceptualized self-actualization as goal-striving which involves pursuing both personal
projects and characteristics that are valued by human nature (i.e., virtues described by
both Aristotle [2004] and Seligman [2002]).
Criticisms around the Conceptualization of Self-Actualization
The concept of self-actualization has been criticized for being vague and not
being operationally defined (Jones & Crandall, 1991). Whitson and Olczak (1991)
attributed most of these criticisms to misconceptions about the nature and
conceptualization of self-actualization. Weiss (1991) argued that the construct of selfactualization lacks and needs a cohesive conceptual framework, which essentially
provides it with a well-established construct definition. Some other scholars believed that
the theory of self-actualization is, at best, vague and incomplete, and the understanding of
this phenomenon evolves as it reveals itself in form of a growth process (Daniel, 1988).
That is, exercising self-actualization is almost always experimental, exploratory, ever
changing, and, thus, incomplete (Ellis, 1991). Criticisms of self-actualization have been
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clustered under two main categories: criticisms of the construct and criticisms of its
measures. These two categories are discussed in detail in the following sections.
Controversies around the construct of self-actualization. Achieving selfactualization has been viewed as a set of arbitrary ideals to be met, partially based on
characteristics identified by Maslow (1968) in self-actualizing people. Self-actualization,
however, can be seen as a process (Rule, 1982, 1991), rather than some characteristics to
achieve; Maslow (1968) argued that people rarely achieve this state of development.
Self-actualization is a process of actualizing one’s potentials, a virtuous striving for
growth (virtuous in Aristotelian perspective), and dynamically exploring where one fits
best in the world.
In self-actualization literature, full-functionality and self-actualization refer to the
same phenomenon. However, Maddi (1973) argued that characteristics listed for selfactualizing people were in fact not normally functional in the real world. A
misconception here is that Maddi (1973) assumed that Maslow’s spontaneity was the
opposite of planning, openness was the opposite of critical judgment, and continual
change contradicted stability. He then argued that all these together ultimately produce
an “unreflective sense of well-being,” (Maddi, 1973, p. 27) which is anti-intellectual
(Smith, 1973a).
Too individualistic and antisocial, or ignorant of subjectivity. Maslow’s (1968)
theory of self-actualization has been questioned to be too individualistic and ego-centered
(Geller, 1982, Smith, 1973b). This critique is not relevant because Maslow (1968), in his
theory of self-actualization, took into account living according to universal values of
being, and pursuing goals that transcend the self and are oriented towards others as one of
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the characteristics of self-actualizing people. Human aspirations and goals are selfmotivated; but they are also socially motivated. Although Rogers (1961) emphasized the
negative effect of society on individuals’ perception of the self, he considered that the
solution lies in the development of honest and genuine interpersonal relationships based
on mutual understanding (particularly between teachers and students or therapists and
clients). In fact, from both Maslow’s (1968) and Rogers’ (1961) perspectives, selfactualizing people have already resolved the dichotomy of individuality and social
endeavors for themselves (Whitson & Olczack, 1991).
Yet some critics such as Maddi (1973) counterargued that self-actualization was
antisocial, aside from being individualistic. They (mis)understood that actualization
requires no socialization; that is, one can pursue self-actualization just by relying on
oneself and with no need for social input, and one does it just to pursue one’s personal
goals with no consideration of others. Some even took the discussion further, appealing
against the inclusion of self-transcendent and socially-oriented care and behavior as
characteristics of self-actualizing people, and asserting that self-actualizing people do
everything for their own satisfaction (e.g., White, 1973).
Morality. For ones who consider self-actualization being too subjective and
individualistic (e.g., Williamson, 1965; Smith, 1973b), the following question seems
pertinent: What if people actualize their evil potentials? However, within the Aristotelian
framework, self-actualization refers to actualizing one’s characteristic activity which
manifests in form of virtue and excellence. By definition, no virtue or excellence ever
harms others. Thus, the nature of self-actualization is not in line with actualizing one’s
evil potential, if such indeed exists.
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Universal values. There are some scholars who argued that self-actualization
does not allow for individuality (Patterson, 1974). It is individualistic insofar as it
implies individuals’ striving to actualize their potentialities and make the best of their
own lives. However, it does not allow for individuality because some universal
characteristics must be attained by all individuals in order for self-actualization to be
achieved. Maslow’s (1968) conceptualization of being values assumes that all cultures
share similar humanistic values (Ellis, 1991). Maslow (1968), however, affirmed that
people fulfill their self-actualization need in different ways which are unique to each
individual. While self-actualization involves the pursuits of excellence and gratification,
Geller (1984) argued that “only for some is the pursuit of excellence a legitimate end, and
even then, which excellence ought to be pursued will depend on each individual’s
particular situation” (p. 106). In this sense, self-actualization is subjective and relative.
This characteristic makes self-actualization to some extent individual-specific as well as
culture-specific. The source of the need for self-actualization though is not personspecific, but a universal built-in desire in every human being (Rogers, 1961; Weiss,
1991). All cultures share tendencies to pursue some similar humanistic universal values
(e.g., Maslow’s values of being) (Ellis, 1991).
Self-Actualization: Planned or spontaneous. Daniel (1988) questioned whether
or not the pursuit of self-actualization defeats the spontaneous way of living it (Ellis,
1991). This criticism is very relevant to the present study, since this study assumes that
self-actualization reflects both the way of living by merely being (a spontaneous being)
and living by pursuing a series of goals through personal experiences and educational
efforts (planned). Ellis (1991) argued that spontaneity and goal-seeking do not contradict

72

each other and one does not hinder the other if individuals take “an ‘and/also’ and not
merely an ‘either/or’ approach” (p. 2). They, in fact, complement each other in creating a
self-actualizing personality. For instance, the individual intentionally plan to overcome
her/his public speaking phobia by actually practicing speaking in public; then s/he starts
spontaneously enjoying speaking in public (Ellis, 1991). Through a self-actualizing
process, a skill can be developed and become spontaneous.
Perfectionism. Another criticism surrounding the conceptualization of selfactualization is that it is a perfectionist account of human well-being or flourishing,
which puts people in jeopardy of actualization neurosis (Schur, 1976; Whitson & Olczak,
1991), or the constant feeling of “we aren’t changing enough, there must be something
wrong with us” (Schur, 1976, p. 60). In responding to this criticism, Whitson and Olczak
(1991) argued that the possibility of harmful effects of overstressing growth, awareness,
and actualization is not merely the issue of actualization programs. Relative damaging
effects are the inevitable part of any progression or endeavors; they can be seen in
education, law, therapy, and medicine. However, potential worthwhile beneficial
outcomes of self-actualizing experiences are worth taking the effort to find preventive
ways to reduce the possibility of such negative effects and to assure healthy ways to
pursue self-actualizing experiences.
The issue of a culturally ideal self. Maslow (1968) and Rogers (1961) both
advocated the existence of a true self or an inner nature that individuals are able to
discover and actualize. Countering the argument that this inner nature, if it exists, is
genetically and biologically restricted (Daniel, 1988), Ellis and his colleagues (Ellis,
1991; Ellis & Dryden, 1990) argued that the inner self has the potential to change
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remarkably with experimentation/exploration (i.e., spontaneous goal-seeking) and hard
work (i.e., planned goal-seeking). In pursuing goals, individuals set some ideals to
achieve.
Setting the ideal self as the goal of personal growth is partly in line with selfactualizing personality and in some parts inconsistent with such a personality (Braun &
Asta, 1969). According to Braun and Asta (1969), the characteristics of a typical ideal
self includes: preferring lesser (as opposed to more) flexibility in the perception and
application of values, being less (as opposed to more) sensitive to their own needs and
feelings, being less (as opposed to more) accepting of the weaknesses of oneself, and
denying (rather than accepting) feelings of anger or aggression. These characteristics
reflect more of a culturally prescribed ideal than a self-actualizing ideal. Braun and
LeFaro (1969) showed that the responses for the ideal self on the items reflecting
aforementioned characteristics (i.e., flexibility of their perception and application of
values, sensitivity to their needs, accepting their weaknesses, and accepting their negative
feelings) were the same as responses on these items when participants wanted to fake
good adjustment on self-actualization inventory. The participants scored higher on all
these characteristics when they asked to complete the questionnaire for a real self (Braun
& Asta, 1969).
Braun and Asta’s (1969) study used Shostrom’s (1964) Personality Orientation
Inventory (POI; the widely used measure of self-actualization). The responses varied on
some items depending on whether participants completed the questionnaire from an
ideal-self point of view or with their perception of their real-self in mind. They suggested
that the answers of ideal self were culturally bounded. It has also been argued that if
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people are sincerely holding a culturally (prescribed) ideal self as their standards or goals,
it is unethical to insist on self-actualization standards as the outcome of therapy (Whitson
& Olczak, 1991), counseling, or education. Accordingly, Whitson and Olczak (1991)
recommended using more individualistic (idiographic) assessment techniques such as the
Q-sort (Stephenson, 1953) or the Role Construct Repertory Test (Kelly, 1955) to measure
self-concept and the outcomes of therapeutic settings.
Political and social-class bias. Maslow’s (1968) theory of self-actualization has
been criticized to be biased in the sense that it promotes the notion in which there exists
humanly superior or inferior people. It may imply that “social inequity is natural,” (Shaw
& Colimore, 1988, p. 66) partly because Maslow (1968) considered an inner nature for
human being that carries the tendency and motivation for growth and because he did not
hold that culture creates the human being.
In addition, the awareness movement criticized the personal growth movement for
excluding the poor. One simple instance of such a bias is that workshops for personal
growth, awareness, and actualizing human potentials are not readily accessible for the
poor, which in turn may contribute to the poor/rich gap in the society. It has been also
argued that the personality traits measured by Shostrom (1964) self-actualization
inventory did not take into account cultural differences which make self-actualization
culture-specific (Raanan, 1973). Raanan (1973) suggested that studies take cultural
differences into consideration at least when interpreting the results from the test.
Generally, psychological theories and tests are criticized for being developed upon the
norms of the white middle-class citizens (Tulkin & Konner, 1973).
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Furthermore, Geller (1982, 1984) rejected the self-actualization theory all
together as being dehumanizing by maintaining the discriminatory gap among different
social classes, being very subjective, lacking the universal applicability, and holding
trivial arbitrary goals as the highest end (i.e. “a value or set of values realization of which
constitutes the highest end or purpose of life” (Geller, 1984, p. 102). However, Maslow
(1968) argued that growth needs are innate needs which make them transcultural and
universal in nature. Whitson and Olczak (1991) also declared that Maslow’s later works
(1971) and more contemporary conceptualizations of self-actualization have a careful
consideration of macro-level social forces (social and organizational institutions as well
as political foundations). In fact, the self-actualization theories of Maslow (1968) and
Rogers (1951, 1961) have clear social implications which they both actually addressed in
their works.
Criticisms concerning the widely-used measures of self-actualization. The
issues of internal reliability and validity of the current widely used measures of selfactualization (Weiss, 1991) highlights the importance of developing an adequate measure
of self-actualization and being cautious about interpretations of the results of the existing
tests. Establishing an adequate estimate of validity for a measure is vital as it determines
to what extend the instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. Weiss (1991)
criticized the Personality Orientation Inventory (POI; Shostrom, 1964), Personality
Orientation Dimension (POD; Shostrom, Knapp & Knapp, 1976) and Short Index of SelfActualization (SISA; Jones & Crandall, 1986) for not being adequately validated. He
reported serious logical and methodological errors in validation attempts for these
inventories. Examples are using mean scores instead of score ranges (Weiss, 1991);

76

exclusively relying on the use of correlations of self-actualization measures with some
other validated measures that measure personality attributes different from selfactualization; or relatively small statistical power of validation tests for POI.
Weiss (1991) demonstrated that basic construct validity has not been adequately
conducted for POI. It has not been statistically shown that the test discriminate between
self-actualizing people and normal population or non-self-actualizing people especially
when not using the known-group technique (reviewed by Hattie & Cooksey, 1984) used
by Shostrom (1974) in original validation of the measure (cf. Weiss, 1987).
Unrepresentative or small samples or means of the groups should not be used with this
technique, each of which has been used in different efforts to validate self-actualization
measures. A reexamination of Shostrom (1974) data showed that it failed the two-tailed
t-test for 8 of the 12 subscales (Weiss, 1991) to discriminate between self-actualized and
normal people. All 12 POI subscales also showed overlapping membership ranging from
62 to 86% of combined members of both self-actualized group and non-self-actualized
group. The same problem witnessed for unknown-groups; the meta-analysis of 107
groups (over 11000 participants) using POI indicated that POI may only measure some
correlates of self-actualization, not self-actualization itself (Weiss, 1991). POD, which
introduced to be a refinement and extension to POI, suffers from the same validation
problems (Weiss, 1991) and its development has not been theoretically justified (Hattie,
Hancock, & Brereton, 1984).
SISA (Jones & Crandall, 1986) is the short modified version of POI and POD
(15-item test compared to POI’s 150 item). Jones and Crandall (1986) used the same
improper implementation of known-group technique to validate SISA (Weiss, 1991).
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Weiss (1991) retested it, and the discriminant analysis of SISA showed about the same
overlap range (61%) as POI’s. Crandall and Jones (1991), accepting these flaws, justified
that they chose items that provide more breadth of content. It meant that the new
measure may have high content validity but it was not internally reliable. They suggested
adding items and developing new subscales to fix the problem.
Weiss (1991) and Tucker and Weber (1988) indicated that although SISA reflects
factors that are appropriate to self-actualization construct, the construct validity is weak
and items need to be modified (strengthened or replaced). Interpretations of an
exploratory discriminant analysis of SISA implied that “some weighted combination of
response pattern and total score, rather than scores alone” (Weiss, 1991, p. 281) may be
used to measure degrees of self-actualization. Weiss (1991) also found that an 8-item set
SISA produce similar results as 15-item test.
Although both measures (i.e., POI and SISA) showed some discriminant capacity
to indicate people who are near the high or near the low end of self-actualization, this is
not sufficient to claim validity for these measures (Weiss, 1991). Validity of a measure
can also be checked by correlating the measure with other established high-standard
measures that measure other personality attributes, but important is that those attributes
needs to be theoretically related to the self-actualization construct. Unfortunately, most
correlational studies that may be referred to as evidence of construct validity for selfactualization do not satisfied this requirement (Weiss, 1991). They correlate selfactualization to constructs such as anxiety, optimism, self-esteem, boredom proneness,
perfectionism, depression, and creativity (e.g., Richard & Jex, 1991; McLeod &
Vodanovich, 1991; Flett, Hewitt, Blanksteim, & Mosher, 1991; Runco, Ebersole, &
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Mraz, 1991). These sorts of problems with validity and reliability of self-actualization
measures are partly due to the lack of a unified operationalized conceptualization of selfactualization. If self-actualization measures are solely validated through their correlation
with other valid tests of other construct, not self-actualization and if a high correlation
achieved, it only means that the test (namely self-actualization measure) measures a
construct (not necessarily self-actualization) that is highly correlated with those other
constructs and self-actualization. In such a case, a battery of these already accepted and
validated measures can replace the new measure (i.e., there is no need to invent a new
measure; Weiss, 1991).
In sum, Weiss (1991) concluded that existing measures are indirect and
correlative and does not meet the requirements of a good measure which should show a
high estimate of validity. Weiss (1991) recommended that, in order to overcome these
issues of validity, self-actualization researchers should revise the analysis of the data
using the same methods or select the new analytical methods, or incorporate major
changes in overall research design and strategies. Weiss (1991) suggested designing a
self-report test on participants’ external or internal experiences in certain situations which
is supplied by “how would you react (feel) if …?” questions, that responses to them could
be guided by participants’ past or potential experience in life. Weiss (1991) also
suggested the use of a continuous interval Likert-type scale (e.g., 1 to 7). The responses
can take different forms such as “a decision, judgment, or selection of an outcome or
action; or it may be an emotion either belonging to the respondent or perceived to be the
reaction of someone in the narrative” (p. 285). In order to capture the gist of selfactualization, the questions may need to reflect some level of complexity in the situation
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they narrate. The next step is expert rating of the items as being conceptually valid to
measure self-actualization (Weiss, 1991).
Subscales of POI as the index of self-actualization. Some studies only use one
subscale on POI as the sole index of self-actualization. For instance, Wills (1974) used
only the Inner-Directedness scale of POI based on the argument made by Knapp (1965)
and Damm (1969) that this subscale is the best sole indicator of the level of selfactualization among all POI subscales.
Openness to experience as self-actualization. In a study of the relationship
between self-actualization and subjective well-being, Vittersϕ, (2004) used openness to
experience (OE), a subscale of the Norwegian Big Five Inventory (Engvik, 1993) to
measure self-actualization. Openness to experience, however, is only one of the
characteristics of self-actualizing people, described by Maslow (1968). Mittelman (1991)
presented an account of the relationship between self-actualization and openness. He
argued that self-actualization is nothing more than a manifestation of openness and the
concept of openness explained all in Maslow’s (1968) list of characteristics for selfactualizing people. Thus, it can substitute the concept of self-actualization altogether.
Tobacyk and Miller (1991), however, rejected this argument stating that self-actualization
is a higher-order multidimensional construct. Openness although is a central
characteristics of self-actualizing people, it is only one lower-order dimension of it
(Tobacyk & Miller, 1991).
Psychological maturity as self-actualization. Bauer, Schwab, and McAdams
(2011) used Loevinger’s (1976) theory of ego development as the model of psychosocial
maturity. Loevinger (1976) in his model considered the higher stage of ego development
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(i.e., the integrated stage) conceptually equal to Maslow’s (1968) self-actualization.
They reanalyzed three studies of autobiographical memories and personality development
including 320 participants in total. The study revealed that people at the highest stage of
Loevinger’s ego development (i.e., self-actualizing people) showed higher levels of wellbeing and reported a more growth-focused self-identity than people at all other stages.
Self-actualization in Emotional Intelligence (EI) framework. Bar-On (1997)
had self-actualization as a subscale on the Bar-on Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-I;
1997), and defined it as “the ability and drive to achieve goals and actualize out
potential” (Bar-on, 2001, p. 87). Later in the book chapter, “Emotional Intelligence and
Self-Actualization,” Bar-on (2001) viewed self-actualization as an independent construct
and tried to indicate how emotional intelligence influences self-actualization. He argued
that the position of self-actualization in Maslow’s (1968) hierarchy of need implies that
self-actualization is achievable “only after you are socially and emotionally effective in
meeting your needs and dealing with life in general” (p. 85). He argued that these needs
include the development of emotional intelligence (EI) as well. He explained that EI is to
be effective in managing one’s life, and that self-actualization is a higher level of
effectiveness. His definition of self-actualization has relied on earlier conceptualization
of self-actualization:
Self-actualization is the process of striving to actualize one’s potential capacity,
abilities, and talents. It requires the ability and drive to set and achieve goals. It is
characterized by being involved in and feeling committed to various interests and
pursuits. Self-actualization is a life-long effort leading to the enrichment of life.
(p.89)
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Bar-on (2001) used this definition to develop the EQ-i self-actualization scale.
This scale consists of nine items that captures the four main themes of self-actualization
including (1) “the ability and drive to set and achieve goals;” (2) “being committed to and
involved with our interests;” (3) “actualizing our potential;” and (4) “enriching our life”
(p. 88). Bar-on cited these works as evidence of validity and reliability estimate of the
measure: Bar-on (1997, 2000), Dawda and Hart (2000), Plake and Impara (1999).
Studies investigating the association of EQ-I and EQ-i self-actualization scale indicated
that EI differentiates between people who score high or low on EQ-i self-actualization
scale (the scores on the self-actualization subscale of EQ-i was not used in these studies
to avoid any artificial correlation).
Unfortunately, there are not many strong points to be noted about aforementioned
measures and approaches to operationally define self-actualization. Despite all the
controversies surrounding the concept of self-actualization and limitations of selfactualization movement, implications, applied values, and potential positive impacts of
theories of self-actualization in therapy, counseling, education, and business have been
acknowledged (Burger, 1990). Theories of self-actualization as conceptualized by
Maslow (1968) and Rogers (1961) has been identified as possessing great heuristic values
(Ryckman, 1989; Whitson & Olczak, 1991); focusing on positive aspects of human
behavior and personality (Feshbach & Weiner, 1986); and dramatically influencing the
field of psychology (Peterson, 1988), as well as social arena of human life (Whitson &
Olczak, 1991) and has been expanding our understanding of human nature. All the
previous efforts to operationally define self-actualization view this phenomenon merely
as a set of personality traits. The present study took a new approach to self-actualization,
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guided by Rule (1991), which conceptualizes this phenomenon as a goal-oriented
process. This approach guided the present study to operationally define self-actualization
as a combination of actualizing-self (i.e., self) and actualization-striving (i.e., the
actualization process).
Goal-Oriented Actualization: Self-Actualization as a Process
Researchers (Rule, 1991; Weiss, 1991) acknowledged that self-actualization is a
complex concept to be investigated and evaluated. To add insight to studies of selfactualization and in rejecting the mere personality view of self-actualization, Rule (1991)
proposed a goal-oriented framework for the conceptualization of self-actualization. With
this framework, he presented a more holistic view of the concept than other personalityfocused research on self-actualization has ever offered. Rule (1991) argued that the
concepts, self and actualization need to be recognized as entirely as possible in measuring
self-actualization. From this viewpoint, self-actualization research needs to work with
three variables: the concepts of the self (X; e.g., self-awareness, self-image); goals or
purposes that are not represented in self-awareness (Y); and a third variable that deals
with behavior or emotion that precedes, follows or accompanies either first or second
variable (Z). These variables can be viewed in the contexts of present, past or future,
allowing for capturing the dynamic nature of actualization.
Rule (1991) took a holistic view of the self by proposing that the concept of the
self can include several self-factors (e.g., self-awareness, self-regards, self-acceptance,
etc.). In his view of the self, X is basically measured by self-reported Likert-scale
inventories that record the relevancy of items to the person. Rule (1991) suggested the
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Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory (Hansen, & Campbell, 1985) to measure the self
variable.
Furthermore, actualization denotes the process of growth, change, unfolding,
developing, and transcending, none of which are static, frozen in time (Rule, 1991).
Human beings as much as they are growth-oriented, they are also goal-oriented (Rule,
1991). In fact, growth or self-actualization is the goal for the self. Rule (1991) stated
that goals are “functions of the broader concept(s) of self” (p. 252). Rule (1991)
recommended the Adlerian Lifestyle approach (Mosak, 1989) which combines
observational and individual narrative methods to assess individuals’ goals. Among more
general and objective indices of goal pursuits, he suggested, a more developed version of
Time Competence scale of Personal Orientation Inventory (Shorstrom, 1964). Rule
(1991) however argued that to capture the growth-nature of actualization cross-sectional
methods, longitudinal methods, or sequential methods need to be employed in studies of
self-actualization. Determining how to measure goals and what to measure as goals of
self-actualization is not an easy decision. Some questions to be asked are, Should “only
those goals that the subject is aware of, i.e. operational ones, be investigated? Should
consciousness of the striving or the quest be assessed?” (Rule, 1991, p. 259).
The self-determination theory account of eudaimonia provides a reliable working
ground for measuring self-concordance in goal pursuits (i.e., autonomous pursuits of
intrinsic goals) and can be employed to partially capture the goal-oriented aspect of selfactualization. The concepts of goal aspirations presented by Kasser and Ryan (1996) and
constitutive or instrumental goal orientations proposed by Fowers et al. (2010) have been
also guided the conceptualization of self-actualization in the present study. The present
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study operationally defined self-actualization primarily based on Rule’s (1991) goaloriented conceptualization of self-actualization employing all aforementioned studies to
frame the actualization striving (i.e., a goal-oriented striving towards actualizing one’s
individual and humane potentials).
Eudaimonic living: A self-determination theory account of eudaimonia. Selfdetermination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000) is one theoretical
framework that nicely integrates all the different orientations of happiness presented by
positive psychologists (i.e., pleasure, engagement and meaning) and partially intersects
with both Aristotelian eudaimonia and the motivational account of actualizing tendency
set forth by both Rogers (1961) and Maslow (1968). SDT has satisfying basic universal
psychological needs in its conceptualization of eudaimonic living, which was also
theorized by Maslow (1968) as a precursor to self-actualization. SDT is primarily a
theory of human intrinsic motivation (i.e., the pursuit and engagement in an activity
“because of its inherent interest and enjoyability” (Ryan et al., 2008, p. 146). This
characteristic gives this theory a great potential to explain Rogers’s (1951, 1961)
conceptualization of the actualizing tendency as an intrinsic motivational force. It also
integrated the new approaches to well-being through engagement and meaning-seeking.
Eudaimonic living. Ryan et al. (2008) proposed a model of eudaimonia based on
self-determination theory by an emphasis on eudaimonia as a process of living well (i.e.,
eudaimonic living; p. 140), rather than an end as proposed by Aristotle (trans. 2004). The
four pillars of eudaimonic living were introduced as (1) pursuing intrinsic goals/values
such as personal growth, relationships, community, and health for their own sake; (2)
acting autonomously, willingly, and intentionally; (3) acting with a sense of awareness
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and mindfulness; (4) acting in a way that satisfies basic psychological needs (as identified
by SDT: competence, relatedness, and autonomy). The model was intended to provide a
working ground for empirical research on eudaimonic living which, they stated, “requires
engaging one’s best human capacities by actively pursuing virtues and excellences” (p.
143).
Ryan and his colleagues (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan et al., 2008) referred to
eudaimonia as “living a complete human life” (Ryan et al., 2008, p. 140). They
elaborated on it by specifying that ‘it is a way of living that is focused on what is
intrinsically worthwhile to human beings” [emphasis in the original] (p. 147). Aristotle’s
eudaimonia, however, is the ultimate good; that is, it is what is intrinsically worthwhile to
human being and people may achieve it through living a life that is focused on it.
Therefore, within the framework of the present study eudaimonic living outlined by SDT
is more consistent with the self-actualization process which is hypothesized to lead
people to eudaimonia or well-being.
Autonomous pursuits of intrinsic goals for a eudaimonic end. In line with
Maslow (1968) and Rogers (1961), Ryan and his colleagues (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan et
al., 2008) believed in an inner human nature that appreciates certain intrinsic universal
values. Intrinsic values are “first-order values” (Ryan et al., 2008, p. 148) which are not
reducible to other values and their existence is not dependent to other values.
Eudaimonia, from SDT’s perspective, is focused on pursuing intrinsic goals and acting
according to first-order values.
According to this premise, the extent to which people live a eudaimonic living
partly depends on the degree to which they pursue these first-order values or intrinsic
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goals such as personal growth (Ryan et al., 2008). Higher level of well-being is
associated with achieving intrinsic goals rather than extrinsic goals (Kasser & Ryan,
2001; Sheldon & Kasser, 1998; Ryan, et al., 1999). SDT explains that in addition to the
content of the goal (being intrinsic or extrinsic) why the goal is being pursued is also
important in determining a eudaimonic living. That is, some extrinsic goals may be
pursued for a right end or a eudaimonic end, especially when the value of them is
integrated into one’s value system (i.e., integrated regulation), and thus they may be
pursued more autonomously (Ryan et al., 2008). This implies that personal growth and
anything that indirectly may lead to it or pave the way to make it happen (e.g., needsatisfaction and reducing defensiveness) can be pursued intrinsically and autonomously if
the person is cognizant of its eudaimonic end.
Goal orientations. Fowers et al. (2010) introduced the construct of goal
orientation within the Aristotelian tradition. From their perspective, there are two types
of orientation toward goals, each corresponds to one of the hedonic or eudaimonic
tradition of well-being: (1) Constitutive orientation, which is a eudaimonic orientation
and (2) Instrumental orientation which is a hedonic orientation. Constitutive orientation
is when people’s way of goal pursuit is by itself worthwhile. Instrumental orientation is
when the means people use or the key activity they get involved in does not have value
by itself and are only to pursue other goals. One example they presented is that travel can
be a mean for achieving a goal or it can be a goal by itself. Fowers et al.’s (2010)
description of these two orientations was focused on the relationship between
individuals’ activities or actions and their goals. While in the constitutive orientation
means are inseparable from the goals and enacting them “directly constitute[s] the goal”
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(Fowers et al., 2010, p. 140), the instrumental orientation makes people strive “for goals
that are means to other goals” (Fowers et al., 2010, p. 140).
Goal aspirations. Kasser and Ryan (1996) studied intrinsic and extrinsic goal
aspirations in relation to several indices of well-being (e.g., self-actualization, depression,
positive and negative moods, etc.). Kasser and Ryan (1996) conceptualized intrinsic
goals as those that are congruent “with growth and actualizing tendencies and thus those
that provide satisfaction of inherent psychological needs” (p. 285). Their set of intrinsic
goals included self-acceptance or growth, affiliation or relatedness, community feelings
or helpfulness and physical fitness or health. They also conceptualized extrinsic goals as
“typically means to some other end and … focused on obtaining external rewards or
praise from some other person” (p. 285). Their category of extrinsic goals consists of
financial success or money, social recognition or fame and appealing appearance or
image.
Kasser and Ryan’s (1996) definition of extrinsic goals is closely related to Fowers
et al.’s (2010) conceptualization of instrumental goals. Fowers et al. (2010) argued that
intrinsic goals may be pursued constitutively, and extrinsic goals are most likely to be
pursued instrumentally. Kasser and Ryan (1996) found that intrinsic aspirations (i.e.,
both the importance and likelihood of pursuing the intrinsic goal) and guiding principles
(i.e., how important each goal is or how much it is a guiding principle of one’s life) were
positively associated with self-actualization (βimportance = .40, βlikelihood = .59, βguiding principles
= .34, p < .01) and vitality (aliveness) (βimportance = .46, βlikelihood = .64, p < .01) and
negatively related to depression (βimportance = -.35, βlikelihood = -.45, p < .01; βguiding principles =
-.19, p < .10), physical symptoms (βimportance = -.35, βlikelihood = -.37, p < .05; βguiding principles
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= -.27, p < .01), and anxiety (βguiding principles = -.17, p < .10). Conversely, extrinsic
aspirations and guiding principles of goal-pursuit were negatively associated with indices
of well-being (Self-Actualization: βimportance = -.52, βlikelihood = -.57, βguiding principles = -.34, p
< .01; Vitality: βimportance = -.60, βlikelihood = -.62, p < .01) and positively related to indices
of distress (Depression: βlikelihood =.44, p < .05; βguiding principles =.18, p < .10; Physical
symptoms: βimportance = .46, p < .01, βlikelihood = .36, p < .10, βguiding principles = .26, p < .01).
Self-Actualization according with SDT: Outcomes and precursors. Seeking
goals and engagement in activities with eudaimonic motives (i.e., “seeking to use or
develop the best in oneself, whether or not these aims are achieved;” Huta & Ryan, 2010,
p. 736) were found to be positively related to several measures of meaning in life (Huta
& Ryan, 2010). A sense of meaning and purpose in life is considered one of the
outcomes of eudaimonic living (McGregor & Little, 1998). Engagement also follows
such autonomous pursuits of goals and meaning by getting involved in the integration of
motivational forces and goal-relevance activities. Thus, an engaged and meaningful life
can be considered as outcomes of eudaimonic living or self-actualization. Because both
of these criteria are emerged from the eudaimonic perspective, they may be credited as
indices of eudaimonic well-being. Waterman’s (2010) QEWB embeds these two indices
of eudaimonic well-being.
Developing a sense of meaning in life and living an engaged life involve pursuits
of intrinsic goals and an exercise of reflectiveness and awareness (Ryan & Deci, 2004).
The present study considered the pursuits of intrinsic goals part of the process of selfactualization. It also regards metacognition as an exercise of awareness, reflectiveness,
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and integrated regulation and as a prerequisite to the process of self-actualization and, in
turn, to developing a sense of meaning and engagement (i.e., eudaimonic well-being).
The present study regarded the two first characteristics of eudaimonic living (i.e.,
autonomously pursuing intrinsic goals or pursuing self-concordant goals) as one of the
indices of self-actualization. The third characteristic (i.e., acting with a sense of
awareness and mindfulness) was represented by the construct of metacognition as a
possible precursor to the process of self-actualization. The fourth characteristic (i.e.,
acting in a way that satisfies basic psychological needs) was used as another precursor to
self-actualization as implied by Maslow’s (1968) hierarchy of needs.
Maslow’s (1968) and Rogers’s (1961) accounts of self-actualization provided
researchers with a vast amount of new concepts to entertain. Their theories have
conceptualized self-actualization and actualizing tendency as a need or a source of
motivation (in Rogers’ (1961) view, it is the source of motivation for learning and
growth). Maslow (1968) listed some characteristics for self-actualized people, which
current measures of self-actualization have all relied on. Maslow (1968) and Rogers
(1961) also discussed some conditions and requirements, such as receiving positive social
support, developing a sense of belonging, need-satisfaction, and less defensiveness, for
making this motivating force readily accessible for individuals. They suggested ways to
emancipate the tendency or motivation for growth. Nevertheless, they did not explain
what may help with achieving these requirements and conditions.
To fill this conceptual gap, the present study identified metacognition, which is an
underlying factor in developing awareness and self-regulatory behaviors, as a pillar of
individuals’ striving towards emancipating self-actualizing tendency, and tested it as a
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precursor to the process of self-actualization and, also, in relation to need-satisfaction and
non-defensiveness. The next section provides a review of contemporary literature on
metacognition and its similarities and differences with self-regulation and self-regulated
learning.
Metacognition, Self-Regulation and Self-Regulated Learning
After Flavell (1976) first introduced the concept of metacognition, the theory of
metacognition evolved over the years, that followed, while researchers taking many
different approaches to studying this concept. A variety of terms and ideas have emerged
in reference to different aspects or activities of metacognition, such as metamemory,
metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive awareness, and metacognitive judgments
(Schraw, 2009). Some new terms such as self-regulated learning or self-regulation,
which emerged in the late 80s (Zimmerman & Schunk, 1989), address phenomena and
goals similar to those addressed by metacognition. They both primarily pursue the
development of effective independent learners as their goal. These new concepts rapidly
developed into independent lines of research.
With the developing research perspective on cognitive and metacognitive
phenomena, terms such as metacognition, metacognitive regulation, self-regulation, and
self-regulated learning have often been used interchangeably in the literature. However,
Dinsmore, Alexander, and Loughlin (2008) have recommended that researchers be
cautious about using such terms interchangeably and be aware of the conceptual and
operational definitions of constructs under study. In agreement with Dinsmore et al.
(2008) and to clarify why the use of the term metacognition is more appropriate for the
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present study, the concepts of metacognition and self-regulation/self-regulated learning
are explained through the lens of the scholars and researchers of both fields.
Metacognition: A contemporary overview. Tarricone’s (2011) book, The
Taxonomy of Metacognition, covered a broad range of works on metacognition and
related concepts, starting with the pioneering works of Flavell (1976, 1979) on
metamemory and metacognition and continuing to the contemporary expansion of
research on metacognition and related concepts by contemporary scholars. Aggregating,
analyzing and synthesizing extensive amounts of literature in the field, Tarricone (2011)
was convinced that an integration of Flavell’s (1979, 1981a) model of metacognition and
cognitive monitoring, Brown’s (1978, 1981) conceptualization of metacognition, Kuhn’s
(1999) metaknowing, and the Good Information Processing model which emerged from
the works of Borkowski, Pressley, and their colleagues during mid and late-80s, 1990s,
and 2000s would provide a well-defined conceptual framework and well-organized
taxonomy of metacognition (Tarricone, 2011, pp. 142-147).
Despite the evolving nature of the field, metacognition is still generally referred to
as thinking about thinking, or cognition about cognition and cognitive processes (Flavell,
1979; Lin & Zabrucky, 1998; McCromick, 2003). Kuhn (2000) presented the concept of
meta-knowing as “any cognition that has cognition (either one’s own or others’) as its
object” (p. 302), which is fairly in line with Flavell’s (1979) definition of metacognition:
“knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena” (p. 906). It is also generally
agreed upon that metacognition includes two primary facets: metacognitive awareness
and metacognitive regulation (Brown, 1978; Efklides, 2001; Flavell, Miller, & Miller,
1993; Schraw 2001; Tarricone, 2011). Metacognitive knowledge is knowledge and
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awareness about all different variables involved in the process of metacognition, and
metacognitive regulation is about monitoring, controlling, and regulation of
metacognitive actions through setting goals and selecting and using appropriate strategies
to achieve those goals (Tarricone, 2011).
The following sections on metacognition will focus on these two main
components of metacognition (i.e., metacognitive knowledge and regulation), originally
derived from Brown (1978, 1981), and discuss Flavell’s (1979) person, goals/tasks, and
actions/strategies variables interacting with each other. The person deals with her/his
own metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experiences to select and refine
cognitive goals or tasks and choose and modify metacognitive actions or strategies
(Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive experience (introduced by Favell, 1979) will also be
discussed as an interacting factor with metacognitive knowledge and regulation.
Knowledge of cognition or metacognitive knowledge. Metacognitive knowledge
is the knowledge, understanding, and beliefs about oneself and others as cognitive agents
and about situations, environments, tasks, and strategies and their interactions, knowing
that these all can affect one’s metacognitive knowledge and experiences (Flavell, 1979,
1981a, 1981b). Brown (1977) labeled metacognitive knowledge as knowledge of
cognition and described it as a form of self-awareness (Brown, 1977; Brown & Smiley,
1977) which informs the regulatory process (Tarricone, 2011). Knowledge of cognition
is about “when, how, and why to engage in various cognitive activities” (Baker, 1991, p.
2) based on one’s declarative and procedural knowledge of person as a cognitive agent
(including the individual and others), tasks/goals (including the context), and strategies
(Efklides, 2003; Flavell, 1979).
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Like Flavell (1979) and Borkowski and his colleagues (e.g., Borkowski, 1996;
Borkowski, Chan, & Muthukrishna, 2000), Kuhn (2000) took into account the person
factor discussing variables such as one’s personal beliefs about one’s cognitive capacity,
knowing capacity, and dispositions. However, Kuhn’s (2000) account of meta-knowing
considers two distinct components for meta-knowing: metacognitive knowing/operations
(as declarative knowledge) and metastrategic knowing/operations (as procedural
knowledge) (Kuhn, 2000; Kuhn & Udell, 2001). Metacognitive knowing involves
knowledge about objects of knowing, beliefs about knowing, and reflections on knowing.
Objects of knowing, for Kuhn (2000), go beyond Flavell’s (1979) person, task, and
strategy variables and include “epistemological metaknowing” (Kuhn, 2000, p. 302),
which is the “individual’s broader understanding of knowledge and knowing” (Kuhn,
1999, p. 18). Metastrategic knowing refers to awareness of, understanding of, and
monitoring one’s strategic performance (Kuhn, 2001) and includes procedural knowledge
about tasks and their objectives (i.e., “metatask”) and strategies (i.e., “metastrategic”) (p.
6). This component is the equivalent of specific and general metacognitive knowledge of
strategies in the Good Information Processing Model introduced by Borkowski and his
colleagues (e.g., Borkowski, 1996; Borkowski, Chan, & Muthukrishna, 2000).
Nevertheless, metacognitive knowledge is not always consciously and explicitly
retrieved and intentionally employed. It may be evoked implicitly by the task and the
influences of the present situation. Intentional or unintentional activation of
metacognitive knowledge results in a metacognitive experience (explained in the next
section) which brings the metacognitive process to a level of consciousness (Flavell,
1979). Self-knowledge then develops through the conscious purposeful reflection of the
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self which involves self-awareness and a reflective consciousness (Wheeler, Stuss, &
Tulving, 1997). Metacognitive knowledge represents the core of metacognition
(Tarricone, 2011).
Metacognitive experience. Metacognitive experience was introduced by Flavell’s
(1979) model of cognitive monitoring and refers to any affective and cognitive
experiences that emerge during a problem-solving situation. It informs metacognitive
knowledge and influences the regulation of cognition. Metacognitive experiences, in
Tarricone’s (2011) words, are “conscious affective or cognitive states which involve
awareness, unexpected awareness, thoughts, intuitions, perceptions, feelings and selfjudgments of oneself as a cognisor during problem solving and task completion” (p. 130).
The process of cognitive monitoring as presented by Flavell (1979) involves such a
“reflective awareness” (Tarricone, 2011, p. 128), which informs and influences
metacognitive knowledge.
Regulation of cognition, metacognitive regulation or metacognitive skills.
Regulation of cognition is the secondary process of metacognition (Brown, 1978) which
involves the “evaluation and control of ones’ own cognitive processes” (Brown, 1977, p.
79). It includes all metacognitive activities and regulatory processes that facilitate
monitoring, evaluating, and controlling cognitive processes in a deliberate problemsolving situation. Brown (1987) drew his conceptualization of regulation of cognition
from information processing models and attributed the process to the executive
functioning of the brain. The functions which are considered executive functions
include: interpreting, guiding, orchestrating, supervising, predicting the limitations of
one’s cognitive capacity, knowledge repertoire in problem-solving situation, identifying
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and characterizing the problem, planning, selecting goals and strategies, tracking,
evaluating, revising, and in general monitoring and controlling processes during
deliberate problem-solving. Brown (1987) labeled executive functions as metacognitive
skills.
Further, Nelson and Narens (1990) presented a model of metacognition by
focusing on monitoring and control as two overarching metacognitive regulatory
processes. In their model, monitoring and control functions through the flow of
information between two levels of cognition, the object-level and the meta-level.
Monitoring is when the meta-level observes the object-level and when the flow of
information is from the object-level to the meta-level. Control occurs when this
observation changes the scheme of the object-level (i.e., the representation of the
task/goal in progress) within the meta-level and, consequently, influences the action or
strategy at the object-level. Metacognitive control refers to “any instance of cognitive
control that is informed by metacognitive knowledge and monitoring” (Serra & Metcalfe,
2009, p. 290). Metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experience both may be used
as sources of information and judgment for metacognitive monitoring and control and
help in modifying goals and strategies or even setting new goals to accomplish the
cognitive enterprise (Flavel, 1979; Tarricone, 2011).
Metacognition and self-regulated learning: Differences. In the literature of
self-regulated learning, metacognition is considered a vital subprocess of self-regulation
(Zimmerman, 1989). Self-regulated learning (SRL) refers to “self-generated thoughts,
feelings and actions for attaining one’s learning goals” when learning by one’s own, and
is best manifested in the form of using “key metacognitive processes such as strategy use

96

and self-monitoring” (Zimmerman & Moylan, 2009, p. 299). It has been argued that selfregulated learners are independent active learners who are metacognitively,
motivationally, and behaviorally committed to learning (Wolters, 2003). In other words,
the self-regulation literature has viewed motivation and behavioral change as phenomena
outside the realm of metacognition. They view metacognition only as “decision-making
processes that regulate the selection and the use of various forms of knowledge”
(Zimmerman, 1989, p. 329) and as subordinate to self-regulation.
However, similar to the self-regulated learning model (Zimmerman, 2011;
Zimmerman & Maylon, 2009), the models of metacognition (Flavell, 1979; Brown, 1978,
1981) have taken into account self-factors (i.e., personal beliefs and feelings) such as
self-efficacy, motivation, and locus of control. They highlighted the interaction of these
factors in influencing metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experience, and
metacognitive regulation. They discussed these interacting person variables as important
underlying facets of metacognitive processes in problem-solving situations. The SRL
literature considered self-factors as motivational factors, rather than metacognitive
variables.
Tarricone (2011) asserted that the logical argument that “metacognitive aspects of
self-regulation are a subprocess of metacognition” (p. 168) and that metacognition is
subordinate to self-regulation is open to discussion. The researcher argue that motivating
oneself, boosting self-efficacy, or volition control can be set as a metacognitive goal and
followed by a metacognitive process. Taking this mindset, one of the assumptions of the
present study was that need-satisfaction and reducing defensiveness can be set as
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metacognitive goals and that the metacognitive process can be arranged to achieve those
goals.
Self-Regulated learning and metacognition: Intersections. Zimmerman (2011)
and Zimmerman and Maylon (2009) viewed the intersection of SRL and metacognition in
the performance phase when “a self-regulation event” (Zimmerman & Moylan, 2009, p.
305) occurs; any incident of strategy use is referred to as a self-regulation event. Selfregulation, like metacognition, involves all kinds of regulatory processes, such as
planning, organizing, controlling, and monitoring, and specifically regulation of learning
processes as well as self-monitoring, self-evaluation, and self-instruction (Baumeister &
Vohs, 2004; Zimmerman & Schunk, 2001).
However, there are more commonalities between SRL models (Zimmerman,
2011; Zimmerman & Moylan, 2009) and models of metacognition. For instance, the
forethought phase of SRL includes goal setting, strategy planning, and self-motivation
beliefs (e.g., self-efficacy, task interest, etc.). This phase evidently requires
metacognitive knowledge and a reflective awareness of one’s beliefs about one’s ability
and interest, task complexity, and applicability of the strategies. With the inclusion of
goal setting and strategy planning, this phase also involves some aspects of metacognitive
regulation (executive monitoring and control).
Another commonality is Zimmerman and Moylan’s (2009) self-control. Although
their self-control is limited to regulating social and environmental resources for boosting
one’s control over the situation, task or strategies, it is not deniable that self-control
requires metacognitive knowledge and regulation to intentionally seek and control these
social and environmental resources. Some scholars of metacognition (e.g., Gaskin &
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Pressley, 2007) explicitly considered self-control of social and environmental resources
as metacognitive strategies required to accomplish the goal or task in hand.
Another intersection of metacognition and SRL is evident in the self-reflection
phase of SRL that includes self-judgments (i.e., self-evaluation and causal attribution)
and self-reaction (e.g., self-satisfaction/affect and adaptive or defensive decisionmaking). This phase echoes Flavell’s (1979) concept of metacognitive experience.
Flavell (1979) explained that metacognitive experience occurs during the metacognitive
process in a problem-solving situation and informs metacognitive knowledge, and
consequently metacognitive regulation, during the process. The operation of
metacognition is based on monitoring the metacognitive process and continuous
conscious reflection on each component of the process; such a reflection then informs
regulatory processes towards accomplishing the task. This is in line with the “personal
feedback loop” (p. 300) in Zimmerman and Moylan’s (2009) model of self-regulated
learning.
Advantages of developing metacognition. There are metacognition scholars
who assume that it is through the development of metacognition that we will have
independent effective learners (Gaskin & Pressley, 2007); the same promise is held for
self-regulated learners by the SRL literature (Zimmerman & Maylon, 2009). For Gaskin
and Pressley (2007), keeping oneself interested in the task in hand and motivated to
accomplish the task is a metacognitive skill. Also, behavior change is supposed to follow
if metacognitive strategies are being used effectively. Being goal oriented and being
aware of one’s beliefs and volitions (Butler & Winne, 1995; Zimmerman, 1989), strategy
initiation (Wolters, 1998), and having a strong sense of self (e.g., self-efficacy, self-
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esteem, self-control; Zimmerman, 2000), which are qualities listed for self-regulated
learners, have been claimed for metacognitive individuals as well (Gaskin & Pressley,
2007).
Metacognitive research has primarily been interested in students’ academic
learning as the object of cognition or metacognition. Nevertheless, the target of
metacognition could be any cognitive enterprise, even metacognition itself (Dunlosky,
Serra, Matvey & Rawson, 2005) or psychological and behavioral self-regulation. Selfbeliefs about one’s competence, one’s perception of her/his regulatory learning abilities,
and internal and external comparisons and evaluations are all person variables
influencing ones’ regulatory processes (Miller, 2000; Winne, 1995). Volitional control
and internal verbalization, which are effective for self-control or control of strategies, are
regulatory processes or metacognitive skills that aid the development of self-regulation
(Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, 2000; Schunk, 1986).
Nevertheless, metacognition is not always effective and adequately performed.
Metacognition is prone to error (Serra & Metcalfe, 2009). The metacognitive process can
be successful or unsuccessful in solving problems due to the accuracy level of
metacognitive knowledge and the interactional effects of all internal and external factors
involved in the process. However, such errors can be reduced and controlled if the
individual is aware of them and knows how to deal with them (Serra & Metcalfe, 2009).
Optimizing the accuracy of metacognitive knowledge and monitoring enhances the
performance of the cognitive enterprise and the effectiveness of metacognitive regulatory
processes that follow (Azevedo & Cromey, 2004).
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Goal setting as a metacognitive process. A study of students’ writing
(Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1999) indicated that the use of high quality SRL produces
satisfactory results in problem-solving situations and enhances motivation. The key high
quality feature in self-regulation processes is being a proactive self-regulator as opposed
to a reactive one (Zimmerman & Moylan, 2009). Reactive self-regulators are those who
engage in the problem-solving situation during the performance phase, and their
reflectivity is directed by the outcome of this phase. In contrast, proactive self-regulators
are productively involved in the forethought phase (i.e., planning). They analyze the
problem, set the goals, and plan an effective strategy schedule (Zimmerman & Moylan,
2009). That is, proactive self-regulators are initially focused on the problem-solving
process instead of the outcome of the process (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996). Setting
goals and subgoals and planning strategy use in a way that eventually leads to the desired
outcome are required regulatory processes for an effective problem-solving approach
(Annacone, 2008). These are especially important in complex problem-solving situations
(Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997).
Similar to SRL, an effective metacognitive process involves setting and
performing cognitive goals. Tarricone (2011) highlighted goal setting as a regulatory
process. Goal setting refers to “specifying the outcomes that one expects to attain” (p.
301) which is a dynamic process and may be modified based on one’s metacognitive
knowledge and one’s monitoring of the clarity and the accuracy of the process of goal
specification (Marzano, 2001). Goal setting skills include the ability to clarify unclear or
explicit goals, set and adopt goals intentionally, deliberately pursue goals whether they
are self-selected or not, and pursue multiple goals at once (Flavell, 1979, 1981a, 1981b).
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The processes of goal setting and goal-pursuit are influenced by the accuracy of
metacognitive knowledge, deliberate activation of metacognitive knowledge and
regulation, and continuous evaluation and regulation of person, goal, and strategy
variables.
Problem identification. The possibility of setting personal behavioral and
psychological goals (e.g., self-actualization, need-satisfaction, and defensiveness) as
objects of cognition was one of the leading arguments of the present study. Research
studies on real-life problem-solving situations are scarce. The focus of metacognition
research and self-regulation research has been on problem-solving in the domain of
academic learning. Furthermore, in the metacognitive literature, it is commonly assumed
that the problem is identified beforehand and the task of metacognition begins with
setting goals/tasks to solve the problem. As such, empirical research usually provides
participants with a set of problems to solve to assess their metacognition.
However, in a real-world situation, problems are neither merely academic nor
explicitly defined and recognized. This reality suggests that the accurate recognition of
the problem may need to be addressed metacognitively by the individual, and thus
introduces problem identification as an additional metacognitive skill. Flavell (1981a)
discussed the cognitive problem or problem setting as another component of his cognitive
monitoring model. This addition brings into play knowledge of the situation (i.e., the
context of the problem) and the monitoring skills that lead one to ask the right question
and identify the problem solving which help the situation.
Tarricone (2011) did not consider identifying and situating the problem as one of
the metacognitive processes; rather, she counted it as a process that precedes the task of
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metacognition (p. 132). However, when discussing Flavell’s (1979) model of
metacognition, she explained that cognitive goals and subgoals “aim to facilitate the
initiation [italics added], progression and completion of the problem or ‘cognitive
enterprise’ [emphasis in the original]” (pp. 128-129). This statement implies that
recognizing, situating, and selecting the problem, which facilitate the initiation of the
cognitive enterprise, are cognitive goals themselves. Addressing whether identifying,
situating, and setting the problem are parts of the metacognitive process or if they only
precede the process is beyond the scope of the present study. Future research should be
oriented toward investigating the operation of metacognition in more realistic situations,
in which accurate recognition of the problem is included as a necessary step towards
making appropriate actions to solve the problem.
Given this, the present study drew its interpretations and implications from the
assumption that recognizing the problem can intentionally be set as a goal in a
metacognitive process and then subgoals can be set to solve the identified problem.
Individuals can engage in a metacognitive process to identify a problem and in a
metacognitive process to effectively solve a problem. Being actively cognizant of the
situation, people are more likely to accurately recognize the problem they have to address
at the moment.
Examples of the problems of interest for the present study are individuals being in
a situation that is threatening to their self-regard which activates their defense
mechanisms, or having unsatisfied needs that distract them from striving towards selfactualization or limit their motivation for personal growth. Recognizing these sorts of
problems begins with a metacognitive experience; then solving that specific problem is
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set as the goal of a metacognitive process. The individual then proceeds to monitor and
evaluate her/his knowledge of the person and the situation and purposefully defines and
sets goals and subgoals that are oriented toward solving the problem at hand. The
metacognitive process continues by monitoring and regulating the strategies being used
and the goal-striving process until one accomplishes the goal and solves the problem.
Metacognition and Self-Actualization: Concluding Remarks
The present study was not intended to focus on the metacognitive strategies which
are related to self-regulatory behaviors. Therefore, acknowledging the close conceptual
relationship between self-regulation and metacognition, the researcher came to this
conclusion that for the purposes of the present study it was more prudent to use the term
metacognition. The present study measured general metacognitive competence as a
combination of metacognitive knowledge and regulation in a general problem-solving
situation.
The task of metacognition has generally been defined as to make purposeful use
of the metacognitive knowledge and the two main executive function processes of the
brain, monitoring and control of cognitive processes (Efklides, 2008; Tobias & Everson,
2009). Metacognitive skills such as self-reflection, goal setting or goal selection, and
self-regulation strategies come to play to fulfill these tasks. Nevertheless, the conjunction
between concepts of agency, self-aware agent, and metacognition, emerging from both
self-concept research and research on metacognition, has given a richer and broader
perspective of the intended task of metacognition as:
comprehending the world and knowing that we [human beings] comprehend, selfregulating and monitoring our thoughts, evaluating our current cognitive status in
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pursuit of self-imposed goals, revising our goals in light of developing cognitive
and affective states, motivating ourselves, developing strategies and heuristics to
make ourselves more capable of adapting to changing situations, and
understanding others to gain understanding of ourselves. (Hacker, Dunlosky, &
Graesser, 2009; p. 2)
This quote insightfully portrays metacognition as a required factor for sustainable growth
and self-actualization. Metacognition help develop the system (consisting of conceptual,
climate and environmental subsystems) which Hanlon (1968) conceptualized as being
required for self-actualization. Comprehending the world provides the individual with a
worldview required for equipping the conceptual subsystem for selecting goals and
planning. The climate and environmental subsystem is also fueled by being evaluative of
cognitive and affective states of oneself and others, motivating oneself, and changing
strategies upon reflective understanding of the situation while maintaining control and
motivation.
Setting self-actualization as the goal, the person needs to (a) recognize her/his
personally-expressive interests and pursuits (knowledge of the person variable); (b) know
her/his habits and styles of problem-solving (knowledge of the person variable); (c)
prioritize her/his goals and identify the possible ways to approach them by setting
subgoals to achieve the main goal (regulation of the task variable); (d) have knowledge of
alternative strategies to approach her/his goal (knowledge of the strategy variable); and
(e) select and switch between strategies that are appropriate for the task and for her/him
(regulation of strategy, task, and person variables).
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Need-Satisfaction or employing more adaptive defense mechanisms can be
considered subgoals in the self-actualization process. Each subgoal then is a separate
metacognitive task. Assuming need-satisfaction as the task, the action is to identify
personal needs and to think of adaptive ways to fulfill those needs. Furthermore,
metacognition may help prevent the abundance of defensiveness and select the adaptive
coping mechanisms when dealing with threatening situations (i.e., the cognitive task). In
this experience, the person needs to recognize that a threatening situation has occurred
(the task variable), identify the typical automatic reaction of his or her mind to the
situation (his typical defense mechanism as the person variable), believe that s/he can
control the situation (person variable), have knowledge of alternative strategies/adaptive
defense/coping mechanisms (strategy variable), and select a strategy that is appropriate to
tackle the task and works for her/him (strategy, task, and person variables). The present
study hypothesized that individuals who are more developed in their metacognition are
more advanced in the process of self-actualization, they also may appear to be more
successful in need-satisfaction and in adopting more adaptive defense/coping strategies
(see Figure 5).

Need-Satisfaction
Metacognition

Self-Actualization
Defensiveness

Figure 5. The hypothesized mediations in predicting self-actualization
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The previous sections discussed mainly conceptual and theoretical literature on
variables of interest, namely human well-being, self-actualization, and metacognition.
Controversies around the conceptualization of self-actualization and similarities and
differences between metacognition and self-regulated learning were addressed. Previous
sections also highlighted the approach taken by the present study in conceptualizing and
operationally defining each research variable. The next section will provide a review of
empirical literature which investigated the variables involved in the present study in
relation to each other.
Empirical Review of Literature
The literature search resulted in finding empirical research that addressed the
relationship between some, not all, constructs of interests, including the relationships
between well-being and self-actualization, well-being and need-satisfaction, selfactualization and goal pursuits, and defense mechanisms and self-regard related
constructs. Thus, the following literature review provides empirical evidence to further
support the arguments made by the researcher for the present study and highlights the
gaps in the literature.
Well-Being and Self-Actualization
Bauer et al. (2011) argued that in the frame of developmental theories the highest
stage of human development (e.g., Loevinger’s [1976] integrated stage, Kegan’s [1982]
interindividual self-understanding, or Erikson’s [1959] ego integrity) is paralleled with
Maslow’s (1968) self-actualization. He argued that the highest stage in these theories is
descriptive of psychologically mature individuals whose lives may be best examples of
well-being.
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However, previous studies investigating the relationship between an individuals’
maturity level and their level of well-being did not found any significant increase in wellbeing as the maturity level increased (e.g., Bauer & McAdams, 2004a, 2004b). One
explanation is that well-being measures may not capture the difference in people’s quality
of life as they mature (from lower level to higher level of psychological maturity).
Research on well-being represented well-being as a personality characteristic that is
relatively stable within a person, rather than a characteristic that changes incrementally as
a person matures (Diener et al., 2006).
Nevertheless, the highest stage of human development in developmental theories
may be qualitatively different from the other lower stages. For instance, Bauer et al.
(2011) examined if people who are in the highest stage of ego development (Loevinger,
1976) score higher on well-being compared to people in lower stages of development.
They found that the highest stage of ego development might involve higher levels of
well-being (PWB and SWB) and the development of a more growth-oriented self-identity
(demonstrated through personal narratives) than other stages of ego-development. The
study was able to preliminarily portray an optimal development that is comprised of the
capacities to involve in a complex contemplation about one’s life, to feel good about
one’s life, and to identify closely with processes of both intellectual and experiential
growth, characteristics that according to Aristotle (2004) are indicators of an activity of
daimon (i.e., inner nature) towards eudaimonia.
Goal variables, Self-Actualization, and Well-Being
Kasser and Ryan (1996) found that self-actualization (as measured by SISA;
Jones & Crandall, 1986) and well-being variables (i.e., vitality: feelings of physical and
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mental vigor and aliveness, low depression, low anxiety, and physical health) are
positively related to personal importance and individuals’ attainment efficacy of intrinsic
aspirations. Intrinsic aspirations included growth/self-acceptance (i.e., “achieve
psychological growth, autonomy and self-regard”), affiliation/relatedness (i.e., “have
satisfying relationships with family and friends”), and community feeling/helpfulness
(i.e., “improve the world through activism or generativity”) (Kasser & Ryan, 1996, p.
281). Carver and Baird (1998) also found that helpfulness aspiration was positively
predicted self-actualization while financial success as an extrinsic aspiration negatively
predicted self-actualization. The finding was supported across cultures, for working
population, and for college students (Ryan et al., 1999; Vansteenkiste et al., 2004).
Comparing intrinsic and extrinsic goal attainment, Kasser and Ryan (2001) found
that the relationship between goal attainment and well-being is positive for intrinsic
goals. No relationship was found between attaining extrinsic goals and well-being. In
other words, attaining extrinsic goals did not add to the psychological well-being of
individuals. However, an increase in well-being and self-actualization was observed by
progressing on either intrinsic or extrinsic goals (Sheldon & Kasser, 1998).
Pursuit of autonomous (vs. controlled) goals or autonomous goal motives
significantly predicted self-realization measured by PWB (Miquelon & Vallerand, 2008).
It was also positively and significantly associated with happiness/SWB (Sheldon, Ryan,
Deci, & Kasser, 2004). Sheldon et al. (2002) found that pursuing self-concordant
(intrinsic and autonomous) goals was positively associated with vitality, PWB and
positive/negative affect (measured by PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). General goal
progress also was associated with higher level of self-actualization (measured by SISA;
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Sheldon et al., 2002). In general, (academic) goal motives (autonomous vs. controlled)
found to possess a predictive validity with regard to well-being (measured by SWB and
PWB) while the reverse case did not hold (i.e., well-being did not predict goal pursuits;
Miquelon & Vallerand, 2008).
Goals, Well-being, and Need-Satisfaction
There are limited studies which explored the relationship between needsatisfaction and well-being. The satisfaction of each basic psychological need (i.e., needs
for competence, autonomy, and relatedness; Deci & Ryan, 1991) was found to uniquely
contribute to well-being measured on a daily basis (e.g., Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996;
Reis, Sheldon, Ryan, Gable, & Rosco, 2000). Sheldon and Elliot (1999) studied needsatisfaction as a moderator of the relationship between goal attainment and well-being,
arguing that for goals which are congruent with basic psychological needs, goal
attainment leads to positive change in well-being. The study showed that needsatisfaction contributes uniquely to increase concurrent subjective well-being. Needsatisfaction was also associated with changes in well-being; this association was more
likely to appear when individuals pursue more self-representative or self-concordant
goals.
However, Sheldon & Elliot (1999) argued that a direct path between goal
attainment and well-being better predict changes in well-being than having needsatisfaction as the moderator. Yet, this finding does not allow one to confidently argue
that goal attainment leads to well-being independent from the satisfaction of selfcongruent needs. For instance, Niemeic, Ryan, and Deci’s (2006) findings in one-year
longitudinal study of college graduates supported SDT’s hypothesis on the mediational
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effect of need-satisfaction on the relationship between intrinsic goal attainment and wellbeing.
Some studies used indices of mental distress and psychological malfunctioning as
(reverse) indicators of well-being. For instance, Baard, Deci, and Ryan (2004), who
focused their research on the workplace, expected that the satisfaction of intrinsic needs
on the job will predict psychological well-being of employees. To measure well-being
the study used the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg & Hillier, 1979; as
cited in Baard et al., 2004) that unravels four types of psychiatric symptoms: depression,
anxiety, somatic symptoms, and social dysfunction. Depression and anxiety were found
to be negatively correlated with intrinsic need-satisfaction. Another study (Wei, Shaffer,
Young, & Zakalik, 2005) indicated that basic psychological need-satisfaction is
negatively correlated with distress (i.e., shame, depression, and loneliness) predicting
21% of variance in shame, 41% in depression, and 56 % in loneliness. Again, distress is
an indicator of psychological health which itself is only one dimension of psychological
well-being. This reverse one-dimension approach to measure well-being is not usually
used in psychological research on well-being but in mental health research. Well-being
rather is measured by combining scores from psychological health, the absence of
negative affect, the presence of positive affect, and usually one or more other components
such as life-satisfaction.
Self-Actualization and Self-Awareness
Culbert, Clark, and Bobele (1968) used Shostom’s (1963, 1964) Personal
Orientation Inventory (POI) to capture self-actualizing personalities in typically
developing university students (they called the variable, self-actualizing perceptions).
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The POI scales reflect constructs such as Time Competence, Inner Directedness, Self Actualizing Value, Existentiality, Feeling Reactivity, Spontaneity, Self-Regard, SelfAcceptance, Nature of Man, Synergy, Acceptance of Aggression, Capacity for Intimate
Contact. Participants were receiving self-actualizing treatments such as sensitivity
training which focuses on authentic interactions and self-awareness. The study showed
that the self-awareness interventions increased student’s perception of their selfactualization. A few recent studies (e.g., Bar-On, 2001, 2006) also provided support for
the relationship between self-awareness – understanding of who one is, what one is
willing and wishing to do, is able to do, and enjoys doing – and self-actualization.
Furthermore, Culbert et al. (1968) investigated whether an increase in selfactualizing perceptions was associated with an increase in self-aware verbal behaviors
measured by the Problem Expression Scale (PES) of Van Der Veen and Tomlinson
(1967). The result showed no increase in self-aware verbal expressiveness about
increased self-actualizing perceptions. This finding implies that although treatments,
such as sensitivity training, increase individuals’ self-actualizing perceptions (i.e.,
primary cognition), this change in perceptions does not necessarily lead individuals to
gain or employ the metacognitive knowledge (i.e., self-awareness) of their selfactualization (i.e., secondary cognition). One can argue that, in order to manifest
themselves in individuals’ behavior, established self-actualizing values need to be
brought into consciousness.
In other words, knowledge about the self to be effective in guiding and regulating
one’s responses and behaviors needs to be dealt with in consciousness (i.e., it is only then
that knowledge of the self becomes self-awareness). Self-awareness (i.e., understanding
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oneself in terms of motives and forming an adequate dynamic self-concept that constantly
portrays the self in progress) is also crucial for achieving psychological well-being
(Wilson, 2009). Taking into account the intentionality and consciousness that
metacognition offers in problem-solving situations, in the present study the researcher
hypothesized that metacognition is positively correlated with self-actualization and wellbeing.
Except for a few studies that investigated the relationship between self-awareness
( which is closely related to metacognition) and self-actualization, none of the previous
studies focused on the role of metacognition in self-actualization or in need-satisfaction
and controlling psychological defensiveness as precursors to self-actualization. The
question here is that if individuals who are better in metacognitive knowledge and
regulation are better in identifying and satisfying their needs and interests, if they are
better in regulating their defense mechanisms when encountering psychologically
threatening situations, and if they are better in their self-actualization. The present study
undertook the task of addressing these research questions.
High Self-Regard and Low Defensiveness
Reducing defensiveness or employing more mature and adaptive coping
mechanisms are expected to be precursors to emancipate self-actualizing tendency
(Rogers, 1951, 1961). These relationships have been rarely investigated in selfactualization literature. However, low defensiveness is argued to be conceptually related
to unconditional positive self-regard (Rogers, 1951, 1961). Thus, a review from selfregard literature is presented here.
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Traditionally, coping and defense has been considered similar concepts.
Berzonsky and Kinney’s (2008) study, which was based on Gleser and Ihilevich’s (1969)
conceptualization of psychological defense, considered coping strategies as defense
mechanisms. Some coping strategies or emotion regulation strategies such as the use of
distraction, denial, suppression, rumination, and cognitive reappraisal or positive
reframing (Strain, D’Mello, & Graesser, 2011) could be fairly considered synonymous
with Rogers’ (1951) concept of defense mechanisms. People activate different defenses
to maintain and retain their self-concept and self-regard in threatening situations (Rogers,
1951; DeMarree & Marrison, 2011). Individuals’ efforts to develop, maintain, or
enhance self-regard or a positive self-view have been acknowledged by different studies
(Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Diener & Diener, 1996).
However, there is a debate about universality of the need for self-regard. For
instance, Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) argued that the mainstream
research on positive self-regard has been used samples of North American populations.
They presented that seeking positive self-regard is not valued by, for instance, Japanese
culture. Japanese seeks self-affirmation through chronic self-criticism as opposed to
seeking self-regard. In their review of some cross-cultural studies they found that
Japanese participants were inclined towards more effort and self-improvement after a
negative feedback (criticism) while North Americans were not.
Findings of this sort, however, do not necessarily contradict the universal need for
self-regard and can fairly be interpreted in line with the paradigm of coping and
maintaining self-regard. Japanese response to criticism and negative feedback can be
considered a completely different type of coping which is guided by cultural preferences.
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Another interpretation is that Japanese may culturally possess higher level of
unconditional self-acceptance; meaning, their self-acceptance may be independent of
criticisms they receive, thus negative feedback does not threat their self-regard. Rather, it
is used as a source of information to enhance their abilities and qualities.
Unconditional self-acceptance as an indicator of positive self-regard found to be
negatively correlated with depression and anxiety and positively correlated with state
mood (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001). It, however, showed no relationship with life
satisfaction (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001). Carson and Langer (2006) argued that
unconditional self-acceptance is achievable true exercise of mindfulness. Mindfulness
was shown to be positively correlated with unconditional self-acceptance (Thompson &
Waltz, 2008). Carson and Langer (2006) emphasized that their reference to mindfulness
is according to the cognitive theories rather than the Buddhist tradition, and it includes
“the ability to view both objects [of cognition] and situations from multiple perspectives”
and “the ability to shift perspectives depending upon context” (p. 30). They emphasized
the importance of mindful self-evaluation for developing self-acceptance. Selfevaluation is one of the key processes in metacognition. This description of mindfulness
is closely related to theories that conceptualize the task of metacognition.
Defensiveness and Well-being
Research (Kling, Seltzer, & Ryff, 1997; Park & Adler, 2003) provided empirical
evidence for a positive relationship between adaptive style of defense (i.e., vigilant
coping) and both subjective and psychological well-being and a negative relationship for
less adaptive ones (i.e., avoidant coping). Miquelon and Vallerand (2008) found that
self-realization (measured by PWB) was a significant predictor of vigilant (academic)
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coping strategy use and significantly and negatively predicted avoidant (academic)
coping strategy use. They suggested that feelings of self-realization (PWB) may provide
individuals with “sufficient psychological resources” to adopt more adaptive coping
strategies (p. 247).
Defensiveness and Metacognitive Processes
Defense mechanisms in some people involve high cognitive processes while in
others are mostly an emotional process (Berzonsky & Kinney, 2008). Although
psychological defenses mainly occur naturally and unconsciously, bringing them to one’s
consciousness – by identifying them and understanding them – would help the conscious
use of effective strategies and discarding ineffective defense mechanisms, the frequent
activation of which, according to Rogers (1951), would lead to the increasing
incongruence, neurosis, and the shattered self. The process of self-reflection and
bringing psychological experiences to the consciousness allows individuals to become
aware of the limitations and remain open to alternatives (Ihilevich & Gleser, 1986).
Therefore, ways people respond to the potential psychological threats can partly
be explained by metacognitive constructs and processes (DeMarree & Marrison, 2011).
For instance, contingent individuals, by definition, are those who “have metacognitive
knowledge about how success or failure in a domain will impact their self-evaluation”
(DeMarree & Marrison, 2011; p. 111) and, in turn, their self-concept. Contingent
individuals attribute their self-worth to their competence in certain domains, to
possessing certain characteristics, or to their success in certain tasks (i.e., their
“contingencies of worth”; DeMarree & Marrison, 2011; p. 111). Consequently,
threatening these attributions (e.g. repeated failure) is most likely to trigger their defense

116

mechanisms (Crocker & Knight, 2005; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Being aware of what
are one’s important contingencies of self-worth and by what sort of negative affection or
psychological state the individual may respond to them is critical to regulate and relax the
defense mechanism.
Furthermore, individuals with different identity processing styles employ different
defense mechanisms. For instance, individuals with informational identity style rely on
problem-focused strategies and search for different but relevant options (Berzonsky,
1992; Soenens, Durie, & Goossens, 2005). In tough situations, they also try cognitive
reappraisal to cognitively reinterpret the stressful events in a way that reduces the
psychological pressure on them (Berzonsky, 1990). Their style is mainly associated with
cognitive processes, self-awareness of internal states (both cognitive and emotional
states), self-reflection, and the control of emotional pressures such as anxiety (Berzonsky
& Kinney, 2008).
On the other hand, individuals with normative identity style seek social support
and reaffirmation from others to maintain their positive self-views in threatening
situations. Their style demands working in a structured environment that reduces
ambiguity. They also lack openness to information or situations that may threat core
areas of the self (e.g., belief systems) (Berzonsky, 1990, 1992; Soenens et al., 2005).
Consequently, normative individuals’ defense mechanism is to distort, negate, or deny
reality (Berzonsky & Kinney, 2008). This lack of openness is evidently not in line with
the characteristics of self-actualizing people.
However, individuals with diffuse-avoidance identity style are very impulsive in
their decision-making because of their high level of negative emotional reactions; they
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defend themselves by shirking the responsibility from themselves and blame others or
circumstances. They try withdrawing or distracting themselves from the stressful
situation (Berzonsky, 1990, 1992; Soenens et al., 2005). Most important to the purpose
of this literature review, they are identified as those who possess limited self-awareness
(Berzonsky, 1990, 1992; Soenens et al., 2005)
Berzonsky and Kinney (2008) studied patterns of defense mechanisms as
measured by the Defense Mechanism Inventory (Ihilevich & Gleser, 1986). They
concluded that both normative and diffuse-avoidance identity styles employ maladaptive
defense mechanisms that limit their self-awareness and consciousness by having them
involve in distracting and irrelevant, sometimes aggressive behaviors, denying, or
distorting the reality. Empirical research (Hussain & Langer, 2003) indicated that when
individuals use deceptive pretenses in order to avoid threatening situations (e.g.,
receiving criticisms from others) they experience lower self-esteem afterward, although
they did so to maintain their self-regard.
Psychological Threats, Self-Regard, and Goal Pursuits
Some experimental studies suggested a causal relationship between psychological
threats and extrinsic goal selection. Examples of psychological threats in these studies
included reminding people of their death (Kasser & Sheldon, 2000; Sheldon & Kasser,
2008); triggering their self-uncertainty (Chang & Arkin, 2002); and making them imagine
financial or professional insecurity or a relationship which only conditionally support or
accept them (Sheldon & Kasser, 2008). These studies indicated that psychological
threats affect goal-selection by increasing the likelihood of extrinsic goal motives
compared to intrinsic goal motives.
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This finding suggests that people with high level of experiencing psychological
threats, who feel disregarded or negatively regarded by the external world, tend to pursue
extrinsic goals such as appealing appearance, popularity/status seeking, or financial
success/consumerism in order to maintain their self-regard. In other words, exposing
people to psychologically threatening situations that activate their defense mechanisms
may lead them to select less self-actualizing goals. This finding supports the thesis set
forth by the present study that effective management of threatening situations through
reducing defensiveness may provide individuals with a psychological security to be
inclined towards selecting growth-oriented goals.
Other examples of psychological threats include a sense of social isolation or
inclusion (Twenge & Baumeister, 2005), threats to self-esteem (Crocker & knight, 2005),
or a sense of being controlled (Kofta, Weary, & Sedek, 1998). Individuals who live with
controlling parents (Williams, Cox, Hedberg, & Deci, 2000), live in a divorced family
(Rindfleisch et al., 1997), or spend their days in a highly controlling school environment
(Sheldon & Krieger, 2004) were found to be more interested in pursuing extrinsically
motivated goals such as an attractive appearance or more materialistic goals.
Summary
In accordance with the purpose of this dissertation, the review of theoretical and
empirical literature reported and analyzed existing theories and research on topics related
to constructs involved in the present study. The review of literature indicated that there is
a lack of theoretical conceptualization as well as empirical research that links Maslow’s
(1968) and Rogers’s (1961) theories of self-actualization to metacognition and to wellbeing. No theoretical or empirical literature directly and comprehensively conceptualized
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or examined possible relationships of metacognition with need-satisfaction,
defensiveness, self-actualization, or human well-being. No previous studies explored
self-actualization as a process and as conceptualized by the present study. The review of
empirical literature found no research investigating need-satisfaction and defense
mechanisms in relation with the self-actualization process. There was also a scarcity of
research in exploring the relationship between self-actualization and individuals’ wellbeing as separate constructs and in relation to each other.
Furthermore, the empirical literature discussed self-awareness as being essential
in developing an adequate self-concept and recognizing person, task, and strategy
variables that hinder one’s personal growth (e.g., maladaptive defense mechanisms;
Berzonsky, 1990, 1992; Berzonsky & Kinney, 2008; Soenens et al., 2005). However, the
effort put into self-awareness would be more worthwhile if its intent is not limited to just
knowing oneself, but to enhancing and actualizing one’s excellence. In order to fulfill
this purpose, a comprehensive metacognitive experience needs to be made that pairs selfawareness with self-regulation. Metacognition needs to be oriented towards becoming
who you are, identifying your true potential, and demonstrating the most and the best of
your capacities. Yet the empirical research did not address metacognitive regulation
which is complementary to self-awareness and metacognitive knowledge in forming a
comprehensive metacognitive process. The present study used a measure of
metacognition, Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994),
which encompasses both aspects of metacognition (e.g., knowledge and regulation).
The path towards self-actualization and a fulfilling life is by no mean a clear path
and it is plausible that it may not be ever clarified entirely due to its complexity. Yet,
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because historically it has been the greatest struggle for individuals, research into its
possible components and contributors will be enlightening. In order to bridge the gap in
the literature, the present study examined theoretical antecedents and outcomes of selfactualization. Metacognition (including both awareness and regulation) was also argued
to be essential for recognizing the person’s psychological defense mechanisms, and
consequently for facilitating the regulation of defense mechanisms. It was also argued to
be a precursor for identifying unsatisfied needs and weaknesses – which may hinder
personal growth and self-actualization. The next chapter will discuss the research design
and the measures used in the present study.
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CHAPTER III
METHOD
This study examined the relationship between metacognition, self-actualization
and individuals’ well-being. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methodology
that was employed in the present study. This chapter begins by highlighting the study’s
purpose. The next section describes the population that was examined in this study. The
last section explains the instruments that were used and the statistical analyses that were
employed in this study.
Figure 6 summarizes the conceptual framework proposed in this study for
antecedents and outcomes of self-actualization. Metacognition, need-satisfaction, and
non-defensiveness were identified as antecedents to the process of self-actualization, and
well-being as the outcome of self-actualization, noting that for this study all relationships
were interpreted as correlational rather than causal because it was not an experimental
study:

Need-Satisfaction
Metacognition

Self-Actualization

Well-being

Non-Defensiveness
Figure 6. A conceptual model presenting possible antecedents and outcomes of self-actualization

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between
metacognition, self-actualization, and well-being. This study also investigated the
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mediating effect of need-satisfaction and non-defensiveness on the association between
metacognition and self-actualization. The present study examined ways general
metacognitive competence may facilitate a holistic development of human beings
towards self-actualization (either directly, or through need-satisfaction, or through
reducing their defensiveness) and whether self-actualization may contribute to
individuals’ well-being. With this it is hoped that this study will bridge the gulf between
the literature on positive psychology, humanistic psychology, and cognitive psychology,
as well as shed light on possible ways to enhance individuals’ potentials through skills
(e.g., metacognitive skills) which are teachable at school.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Following the statement of purpose, the main questions are to what extent
metacognition may contribute to a holistic development of human beings towards selfactualization and to what extent self-actualization contributes to individuals’ well-being.
More detailed research questions are listed below, all hypotheses were tested while
controlling for some demographic variables (e.g., gender and age):
1. Is self-actualization associated with human well-being?
H1: There is a positive relationship between self-actualization and human wellbeing.
2. Is an adaptive style of psychological defense associated with self-actualization?
H2: There is a positive relationship between adoption of more adaptive styles of
psychological defense (i.e., non-defensiveness) and self-actualization.
3. Is need-satisfaction associated with self-actualization?
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H3: There is a positive relationship between need-satisfaction and selfactualization.
4. Is metacognition associated with need-satisfaction?
H4: There is a positive relationship between metacognition and need-satisfaction.
5. Is metacognition associated with the style of defense mechanisms adopted by an
individual?
H5: There is a positive relationship between metacognition and adaptive style of
psychological defense (i.e., non-defensiveness).
6. Does metacognition predict self-actualization over and above need-satisfaction
and styles of defense mechanism?
H6: There is a positive relationship between metacognition and self-actualization
independent of need-satisfaction and styles of psychological defense.
7. Is metacognition associated positively with well-being?
H7: There is a positive relationship between metacognition and well-being.
8. Does need-satisfaction mediate the relationship between metacognition and selfactualization?
H8: Need-Satisfaction mediates the relationship between metacognition and selfactualization?
9. Does adopting more adaptive defense mechanisms mediate the relationship
between metacognition and self-actualization?
H9: Non-Defensiveness mediates the relationship between metacognition and
self-actualization.
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Research Design and Methodology
The design of this research was non-experimental or ex post facto. In such a
research design, there is no manipulation of variables or randomization of samples
(Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). In this type of research design, the researcher
approaches the phenomenon as it exists. In other words, “inferences about relations
among variables are made, without direct intervention, from concomitant variation of
independent and dependent variables” (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 379). Thus, a causal
relationship may not be inferred when doing an ex-post facto design:
When one does correlational (ex post facto) research, causation cannot be
inferred. . . . Some people have the propensity for assuming that one variable is
likely to be the cause of another because it precedes it in occurrence, or because
one variable is highly correlated with another. … However, while a correlated and
preceding relationship is necessary, it is not sufficient for inferring causal
relationship. (Newman & Newman, 1994, p. 122)
Although, ex post facto design has low internal validity, it is useful to identify variables
related to the dependent variable or variable of interest for future experimental
manipulation (Newman & Newman, 1994, p. 124).
Population and Sample Size
The target population for this study was undergraduate and graduate levels
university students who are considered emerging adults (Arnett, 2000). This choice was
made because emerging adults are assumed to be more advanced in different aspects of
their development (e.g., cognitive [Reio & Sanders-Reio, 2009] and metacognitive
[Pressley, Levin, Ghatala, 1984] development) than grade school students. Self-
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actualization is a process that involves change and growth, dynamic goal selection (Rule,
1999), and discovering oneself (Waterman et al., 2010). Emerging adults are in a period
of frequent change and explorations (Arnett, 1994; 2000), which demands targeting
different goals and exploring a variety of strivings. The present study was an exploratory
study which employed a convenience sample of undergraduate and graduate classes in a
public university in South Florida. Participants were mainly-education-major students.
There are very different recommendations and approaches to determine the
sample size, concerning with the stability of the findings and power and effect size of the
analysis. Some approaches rely on the number of variables and use that as the criterion
to determine the number of participants. Green (1991) recommended a sample size of at
least five participants per variable for analytical methods such as correlational analysis.
Given that this study deals with five research variables (i.e., metacognition, needsatisfaction, non-defensiveness, self-actualization, and well-being) and, at least, four
demographic control variables (i.e., age, gender, immigration status, and academic
major), a minimum total sample size of 45 was recommended (Green, 1991). Stevens
(2002) suggested a minimum of 15 subjects per predictor variable for regression analysis
in social science. This study deals with well-being, as the criterion variable, and with
four research variables, as predictors (i.e., metacognition, need-satisfaction, nondefensiveness, and self-actualization) and four demographic variables as control
variables, which make a total of eight independent variables. Stevens’ (2002)
recommendation suggests recruiting at least 90 participants.
Further, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) highlighted that sample size should be
determined with several considerations such as desired power, alpha level, expected
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effect size, and the number of predictors. They, however, introduced two rules of thumb
for calculating the sample size. To test individual predictors, Tabachnick and Fidell
(2007) suggested N ≥ 104 + m, where m is the number of independent variables. With
eight independent variables in this study, Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2001)
recommendation entails a minimum of 112 participants. Another formulation by
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommended N ≥ 50 + 8m responses to test regression
with multiple predictor variables. This approach suggests a sample size of at least 114
responses. They recommended calculating both and choosing the one that is larger.
From a power analysis perspective, Hinkle, Wiersma, and Jurs’ (2006)
recommendations for a power analysis of .80 with an effect size of .15 and an alpha of
.05 is a sample size of 120. The average undergraduate class size was 30 and the
graduate class size was at least 10. To recruit participants, this research targeted 14
undergraduate and 8 graduate classes in the university. The number of participants who
completed, both, Part I and Part II questionnaires was 513, which is greater than the
recommended sample sizes.
Procedure
An Internal Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained prior to recruiting
participants. The researcher followed the approved research protocol. The study
involved no treatment or intervention. The data collection was through self-ratings of a
battery of questionnaires and the participation was on a voluntary basis. In the data
collection sessions, the researcher briefly explained the purpose of the study for the
students, stated that the participation was voluntarily, and asked them to respond to the
questions honestly and accurately, if they were participating.
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The survey battery contained questions on background information and five
different questionnaires to measure participants’ general metacognitive competence,
well-being, self-actualization, need-satisfaction, and non-defensiveness. The battery of
questionnaires was piloted with a small number of graduate students to estimate the
completion time of the questionnaire and to fix any ambiguity within the survey
statements before the main data collection. As a result, a few modifications were made to
the statements, and to manage the length of the response time, the researcher decided that
participants respond to the survey battery in two separate 30-minute sittings, Part I and
Part II, within 2- to 4-week intervals.
Ethical standards in regards to privacy, confidentiality, and data preservation were
followed. To ensure confidentiality, random numbers were assigned to students’ names,
and a file with the name of participants and their numbers remained with only the
principal investigator to match the answers in Parts I and II. After pairing the data, this
file was deleted from the record to assure that participants would remain unidentifiable.
Procedural Considerations to Avoid Common Method Biases
Common method variance is the variance that can be attributed to the
measurement method, instead of the constructs being measured (Podsakoff, MacKenzie,
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), which is not desirable. It produces biased parameter estimates
that weaken the validity of the study (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Reio, 2010). In the present
study, some procedural considerations were taken to avoid systematic measurement
errors and common method biases as much as possible.
For instance, the ambiguity of instructional statements, questions, and scales were
detected and resolved using the comments from the small pilot study which took place
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before the main data collection. In addition, in this study, the researcher guaranteed the
confidentiality of the participants, asked participants for their honest response, used
different scaling and endpoints for criterion and predictor variables, avoided the use of
bipolar numerical scale (e.g., -5 to +5), and provided verbal labels for different scale
points, which all are considered procedural remedies for common method biases
(Podsakoff et al., 2003; Reio, 2010).
Moreover, well-being, general metacognitive competence, the global sense of
need-satisfaction, non-defensiveness, and demographics were measured in Part I, while
self-actualization and goal-related need-satisfaction were measured in Part II, within 2- to
4-week intervals. In this study, self-actualization was the main direct predictor of wellbeing and the criterion variable for five out of nine hypotheses. Thus, measuring it
separately from other variables would control the common contextual bias on criterion
and predictor variables if they would be measured in the same time or context (Podsakoff
et al., 2003). Well-Being as the main criterion variable was placed before all other
measures in the Part I battery of questionnaires to reduce the effect of responses to
measures of predictor variables on responses to measures of well-being. Measures for
other predictor variables were presented in different order to different participants to
counterbalance the response set bias (Hinkle et al., 2006; Ruble & Stout, 1990, 1991).
Instrumentations
This section introduces the original measures which were adopted, modified,
developed, and used for data collection in this study. The details of total scores
computation for each construct under the study is explained in Chapter 4 because as a
result of exploratory factor analysis (EFA), which was conducted to provide estimates of
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validity for these measures (reported in Chapter 4), items which did not load on any
factors were eliminated from the subsequent calculations. Thus, when calculating the
total scores in Chapter 4, the number of items in each measure was different from what is
presented in this chapter. Subscales were also changed based on identified factor
structures. The details of EFA and total scores computations for each measure are
presented in Chapter 4.
Demographic Measure
Socio-Demographic information was collected including age, gender, ethnicity,
parenthood, participants’ country of origin, years of living in U.S., their educational level
(freshman, sophomore, junior, senior, graduate), and their academic major. The
demographic information was collected to identify characteristics of the sample and to
allow for controlling the effects of these factors on the main variables. Their possible
differentiating effects on variables of interest (i.e., metacognition, need-satisfaction, nondefensiveness, self-actualization, and well-being) were analyzed using linear regression
analyses. Accordingly, demographic variables with significant regression weights were
used as control variables (or covariates) and grouping variables, as appropriate, in testing
the hypotheses.
Measures of Well-Being
To measure well-being, measures of eudaimonic and hedonic well-being were
used (Table 1). The details on the measures of eudaimonic well-being and hedonic wellbeing are presented in Appendix A. The overall well-being scores were calculated
summing the standardized scores on eudaimonic well-being and hedonic well-being.
Higher total score represent experiencing higher level of overall well-being.
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Eudemonic well-being. Eudaimonic well-being, as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2,
involves personal expressiveness (Waterman et al. 2010) which manifests itself in form
of meaning and engagement in life (Peterson et al., 2005). A questionnaire consisting of
a slightly modified version of 21-item Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being
(QEWB; Waterman et al., 2010) and seven items borrowed from Life Regard IndexRevised (LRI-R; Debats, 1998) was used to measure eudaimonic well-being.
Table 1
Measures of Well-Being
Research variable

Original measures

Well-Being

#of Items used a

Modifications
to items

52*

(1) Eudaimonic

27*
Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being

20 out of 21

Slightly
modified

7 out of 28

No
modification

(QEWB; Waterman et al., 2010)
Life Regard Index-Revised (LRI-R; Debats,
1998)
(2) Hedonic/
Subjective

25*
Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule

20 out of 20

No
modification

5 out of 5

No
modification

(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988)
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener,
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985)
a

# of items that was originally used for the data collection. After exploratory factor analysis for validation
study, some items were eliminated and the total scores were computed excluding those items.
*Total number of items in each scale or subscale

LRI was developed by Battista and Almond (1973) and was modified by Debats
(1998) as a measure of personal meaning. Only seven items from a pool of 28 were used
as part of the measure of eudaimonic well-being. Thus, the reliability and validity of the
measure is not reported here. They were added to the QEWB to enrich the meaning-
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oriented content of the measure of eudaimonic well-being. The items on LRI-R were
rated on a 3-point scale 1 being Do not Agree, 2 being No Opinion, and 3 being Strongly
Agree. Example items are “I have real passion in my life” or “I feel that I’m really going
to attain what I want in life” (Debats, 1998, p.250). The scale points for these items were
changed to match the QEWB scale points.
The QEWB was developed by Waterman et al. (2010) and claimed to measure
well-being in a manner consistent with Aristotelian conceptualization of eudaimonia.
Aspects of eudaimonic well-being assessed by the QEWB include self-discovery,
perceived development of one’s best potentials, a sense of purpose and meaning in life,
intense involvement in activities, investment of significant effort, and enjoyment of
activities as personally expressive (Waterman et al., 2010). The measure was a 5-point
Likert scale, 0 being Strongly Disagree and 4 being Strongly Agree. Example items are
“my life is centered around a set of core beliefs that give meaning to my life” or “I believe
I know what my best potentials are and I try to develop them whenever possible.”
Waterman et al. (2010) reported reliability and validity estimates for the QEWB.
Confirmatory factor analysis supported the unifactorial structure of the QEWB (factor
loadings ranged from .60 to .87 in two samples). The internal consistency of the scale
was high; Cronbach’s alpha was approximately .86 in two samples. Convergent validity,
discriminant validity, construct validity, and incremental validity of the QEWB were
supported by Waterman et al. (2010) across two samples. The convergent validity of the
scale was strongly supported by testing the relationship between QEWB and identity
commitment (r ranging from .41 to .69 in magnitude for different subscales), with
Psychological Well-Being (r ranging from .23 for the Positive Relationship with Others
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Subscale to .56 for the Self-Acceptance Subscale) and with Satisfaction with Life (r =
.47). To support the discriminant validity of the measure, they relied on the modest
relationship of QEWB with identity exploration (in breadth and depth; r ranging from .14
to .27) compared to its strong relationship with identity commitment, and the modest
relationship of QEWB with personality traits (r ranging from .20 to .29 in magnitude on
Big Five Personality Traits; r = .05 on sensation seeking) compared to its strong
relationship with PWB and SWB (i.e., Subjective Well-Being). The construct validity of
QEWB was supported demonstrating on average a moderate correlation with different
variables representing positive or negative psychological well-being (i.e., self-esteem [r =
.64], internal locus of control [r = .38], anxiety [r = -.41], and depression [r = -.33]).
Further, incremental validity was supported by examining how much of the
unique variance EWB accounted for over and above SWB and PWB in predicting
identity commitment, positive psychological functioning (e.g., self-esteem) and negative
psychological functioning (e.g., anxiety). All correlations were significant at p <.001.
Waterman et al.’s (2010) study showed SWB was better predictor of negative
psychological functioning than EWB while EWB was better than SWB and PWB in
predicting positive psychological functioning and identity commitment. The unique
variance explained by EWB in predicting identity commitment and positive
psychological functioning exceeded (at least 3 times above) the amount of variance
accounted for by SWB and PWB (except for one subscale of identity commitment in
which it was equal to the variance accounted for by SWB).
Modifications. The QEWB was slightly modified in terms of wordings of two
items to enhance clarity. Item 14 was eliminated because its content reflects actualizing
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attitude, one component which was intended to be measured in the present study when
measuring self-actualization. To enhance clarity of the content, items 13 and 17 were
modified in terms of their wordings. Item 13, “I believe it is important to know how what
I’m doing fits with purposes worth pursuing” was changed to “I believe it is important to
know what I’m doing is something worth pursuing.” Item 17, “I find a lot of the things I
do are personally expressive for me” was changed to “I find a lot of the things I do are
aligned to who I really am.”
From LRI-R, only seven items from a pool of 28 were identified by the researcher
as statements that possibly account for variance in eudaimonic well-being in addition to
the variance accounted for by the QEWB. Thus, those items interspersed among the
QEWB’s items to measure eudaimonic well-being. The same instruction as presented in
Waterman et al. (2010) was used for rating these statements. The measure of eudaimonic
well-being (i.e., a combination of the QEWB and LRI-R) with the full instructional guide
to answer the questionnaire has been provided in Appendix A.
Scoring. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale, 0 being Strongly Disagree
and 4 being Strongly Agree. Items labeled (R) were reversed coded. Thus, higher sores
reflect higher level of eudaimonic well-being. Scores for all items on the validated
measure were added to create a total score for eudaimonic well-being.
Hedonic well-being. Hedonic well-being or subjective well-being (SWB) has
been known by three general components: (a) Positive Affect, (b) Negative Affect, and
(c) Judgment of Life Satisfaction (Andrews & Withey, 1976; Deci & Ryan, 2008; Diener,
1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Several studies have used the combination of
these components to assess SWB (e.g., Fowers et al., 2010; Sheldon & Elliot, 1991).

134

Accordingly in the present study, hedonic well-being was measured (total of 25 items)
using two measures of subjective well-being (SWB), The Satisfaction with Life Scale
(SWLS; Diener et al., 1985) measuring the cognitive aspects of SWB (5 items) and the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) measuring the
affective aspects of SWB (20 items).
Scoring. Taking the approach used in Sheldon and Elliot’s (1991) study, the total
scores on each measure were standardized. Then, scores on negative affect were
subtracted from the sum of scores on life-satisfaction and positive affect to create total
scores for hedonic well-being. Higher total scores reflect higher level of subjective wellbeing.
The Satisfaction with Life Scale. The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS;
Diener et al., 1985) was used to measure the cognitive component of subjective wellbeing. Several studies used this scale as a measure of SWB (e.g., Waterman et al., 2010).
The SWLS consists of five statements reflecting contentment and life satisfaction to be
answered on 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly
Agree). One example of items is “In most ways my life is close to my ideal.” Cronbach’s
alpha reported for SWLS scores was around 0.87 (Diener et al., 1985; Waterman, et al.,
2010). Test-retest reliability coefficients obtained over a 2-month period (Diener et al.,
1985) and over a 4-year period (Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 1993) were .82 and .54
respectively. Pavot and Diener (1993) reported its convergent validity with regard to
other measures of life satisfaction and SWB. Its discriminant validity was also supported
when tested in relation to anxiety, depression and general psychological distress
(Arrindell, Meeuwesen & Huyse, 1991).
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Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. The affective component of subjective
well-being was measured with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson et al., 1988), a well-validated measure of the intensity of positive and negative
emotional experiences. Several studies used this measure or other measures of
positive/negative affect as an indicator of SWB (e.g., Sheldon et al., 2002). PANAS
includes 20-item, 10 items representing positive affect (PA) and the other 10 items
representing negative affect (NA). Examples are interested, upset, distressed, and
excited. Participants were asked to answer “to what extent you generally feel this way”
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The
internal consistency of this scale was reported ranging from .86 to .90 for positive affect
and from .84 to .87 for negative affect (Watson et al., 1988). The test-retest reliability
over an 8-week period showed that when the participants were instructed to rate their
affects for a longer period (e.g., year or general) the responses were more stable (r = .68
for PA; r = .71 for NA) compared to shorter period (e.g., today; r = .47 for PA; r = .39 for
NA; Watson et al., 1988). Strong convergent and discriminant validity was reported for
the PANAS. NA showed moderate positive correlations with other measures of negative
affect (e.g., The Beck Depression Inventory; r = .58), and PA showed moderate negative
correlation (r = -.36).
Measures of Self-Actualization
Rule (1999) challenged the mere personality-oriented view of self-actualization
suggested by Shostrom (1964) and Jones and Crandall (1986). In the present study, selfactualization was measured taking Rule’s (1999) goal-oriented approach and with a
consideration of self-actualization as a process that takes into account the concept of
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actualization, as a goal-oriented process, as well as the concept of self, as a personality
trait. For measuring self as a construct, two concepts were measured: (a) Actualizing
Disposition and (b) Actualizing Initiation. For measuring the process of actualization,
three concepts were measured: (a) Goal Attribution/ Goal Self-Concordance (4 items per
goal), (b) Goal Aspiration (11 items per goal), and (c) Goal Striving (6 items per goal).
Table 2 presents measures and supporting literature used to make up the measures of selfactualization. The details for the measures of self-actualization are presented in
Appendix B. The total scores for actualizing-self and actualizing-striving were
standardized and summed to construct a single score for self-actualization.
Measure of Actualizing-Self. Self or Actualizing-Self was measured by 29 items
as two components: (a) Actualizing Disposition (27 items) and (b) Actualizing Initiation
(2 items). A total score for Actualizing-Self was obtained summing the item scores of
validated Measure of Actualizing-Self (MASelf; see Chapter 4).
Actualizing Disposition. The present study approached self in self-actualization
by measuring Actualizing Disposition using the Measure of Actualization of Potentials
(MAP; Leclerc, Lefrançois, Dubé, Hébert, & Gaulin, 2002). MAP includes 27 sentencecompletion items that intended to capture typical traits of self-actualizing individuals.
Participants use 5-point Likert scale (worded differently for different set of items. For
example, for the item “I am a person who values him/herself _______,” responses are
ranging from 1 (very little), to 5 (enormously); for another item, for instance, “I _______
give my life meaning by the way I look at things,” responses are ranging from 1 (very
rarely) to 5 (very often). Some details for MAP are presented in Appendix B.
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Content validity of the measure was established using “Delphi technique
involving an international panel of 28 scientific and clinical experts” (Lefrançois,
Leclerc, Dubé, Hébert, & Gaulin, 1998, p. 875). An initial factor analysis (Lefrançois et
al., 1997) yielded two main dimensions for MAP, Openness to Experience (17 items) and
Self-Reference (10 items). Openness to Experience is comprised of three subdimensions:
Openness to Others, Openness to Life, Openness to Self. Leclerc, Lefrançois, Dubé,
Hébert, and Gaulin (1999) recommended using the overall score or score on two main
dimensions (which was calculated by averaging item scores), rather than subdimensions.
They advised that the validity of subdimensions needs to be supported by further research
before they can be confidently used in interpreting the data (Leclerc et al., 1999).
The measure also showed acceptable reliability. Test-retest reliability showed an
acceptable stability of the results (the Pearson correlation coefficient ranging from .67 to
.88). Cronbach’s alpha for the overall-scale was .90 and the intraclass coefficient was
.87. For criterion validity, moderate correlations were found between clinical
psychologists' ratings and self-report rankings of participants (.62 for the overall-scale
and between .61 and .53 respectively for Openness to Experience and Reference to Self
subscales).
Actualizing Initiation. Actualizing Initiation was measured using two statements
adopted from the 9-item Personal Growth Initiative Scale (PGIS; Robitschek, 1998): “If I
want to change something in my life, I initiate the transition process,” rated on a 5-point
scale ranging from 1 (not me at all) to 5 (definitely me) and “I have a plan for making my
life more balanced,” rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
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Scoring. Higher scores on actualizing disposition items indicate higher level of
actualizing disposition, except for items 6, 11, and 21 which were reverse coded for the
purpose of scoring. Higher rating scores on actualizing initiation items indicate higher
level of actualizing initiation. Detailed scoring for the Measure of Actualizing-Self
(MASelf) is presented in Chapter 4.
Measure of Actualizing-Striving (MAStriving). The process of actualization
was labeled as Actualizing-Striving and measured by 20 items per goal as threecomponent construct: (a) Goal Self-Concordance or Goal Attribution (4 items per goal);
(b) Goal Aspiration (11 items per goal), and (c) Goal-Striving (6 items per goal). Table 2
presents the measures and supporting literature that made up the Measure of ActualizingStriving. Participants were asked to list five personal goals (the number five was chosen
according with Sheldon (2004) stating that self-concordance studies ask participants to
list 5 to 15 goals). Participants were asked: Please think of your personal projects you
want to accomplish, your goals you are concerned about when planning for your future,
and goals that inspire you in your everyday life. Personal goals might involve various life
areas, as for example study, family, friends, your own personal growth, leisure time,
health, jobs, housing conditions, etc. Focus on long-term goals (e.g., to improve the
relationship with a friend) rather than on single behavioral acts or short-term pursuits
(e.g., to buy a present for a friend next week). Then they were asked to rate some
statements and answer some questions for each goal about their goal striving and why
they are pursuing these goals. Questions and statements are presented in Appendix B.
Goal Self-Concordance/Goal Attribution. Statements 1 to 4 in the Measure of
Actualizing-Striving (MAStriving) are based on Ryan and Connell’s (1989) studies of
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Table 2
Measures of Self-Actualization
Research variable

Original measures

Self-Actualization

# of Items used a

Modifications
to items

29 + (21 per goal)*

(a) Measure of Actualizing-Self

29*

(1) Actualizing Disposition

The Measure of Actualization
of Potentials (MAP; Leclerc et
al., 2002)

(2) Actualizing Initiation

Personal Growth Initiative
Scale (PGIS; Robitschek,
1998)

(b) Measure of Actualizing-

27 out of 27

No
modification

2 out of 9

No
modification

21 per goal*

Striving
List of 5 Personal Goals
(1) Goal Self-Concordance
(2) Goal Aspiration

An instructional guide was
developed
Sheldon (2004)/Ryan and
Connell (1989)
Developed guided by the
concepts of:
constitutive versus
instrumental goal orientations
(Fowers et al., 2010)
Intrinsic and extrinsic goal
aspirations (Grouzet et al.,
2005; Kasser & Ryan, 1996)
Virtue and strength (Seligman,
2002)
Personal expressiveness
(Waterman et al., 2010)

(3) Goal Striving

4 out of 4

No
modification

11*

6*
Importance & Effort
(Emmons, 1999)

2 out of 2

Slightly
modification

Clarity (PGIS; Robitschek,
1998)

2 out of 9

No
modification

Inspiration (Milyavskaya,
2 out of 2
Slightly
Ianakieva, Foxen-Craft,
Modified
Colantuoni, & Koestner, 2012)
a
# of items that was originally used for the data collection. After exploratory factor analysis for validation
study, some items were eliminated and the total scores were computed excluding those items.
*Total number of items in each scale or subscale
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perceived locus of causality and internalization and were used or referred to by Sheldon
and his colleagues (Sheldon, 2002; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Houser-Marko,
2001) to measure goal self-concordance and used by Emmons (1999) to measure
attribution in his Striving Assessment Scale. These statements ask participants: To what
extent you pursue the goal: “because you endorse it freely and value it wholeheartedly”
(identified motivation), “because of the enjoyment or stimulation which that goal
provides you” (intrinsic motivation), “because somebody else wants you to or because the
situation seems to compel it” (external motivation), and “because you compel yourself
because you would feel ashamed, guilty, or anxious if you didn’t” (introjected
motivation). The rating was made on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all for
this reason) to 7 (very much for this reason). The two last statements were reverse coded
because they represent goal pursuits that are not self-concordant. Scored were summed
for each goal and were averaged across five goals.
Goal Aspiration. Statements 5 to 15, developed for this study, are primarily in
accordance with three conceptualization of goal pursuits: (a) An Aristotelian view of
constitutive versus instrumental goal orientations proposed by Fowers et al. (2010), (b)
Intrinsic and extrinsic goal aspirations (Grouzet et al., 2005; Kasser & Ryan, 1996), (c)
Seligman’s (2002) conceptualization of virtue and strength (which is partially based on
Aristotelian perspective of eudaimonia), and (d) personal expressiveness (Waterman et
al., 2010). Constitutive orientation of goal pursuits is when one pursues a goal for its
own sake and its own value. Instrumental orientation of goal pursuit is about pursuing
the goal as a means in order to gain some other goals. The items also represent different
intrinsic (e.g., growth, helpfulness, meaning-seeking) and extrinsic (e.g., image, fame,
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popularity, or money) aspirations consistent with Kasser and Ryan (1996) and Grouzet et
al. (2005). Although this latter concept was discussed in the literature (Grouzet et al.,
2005; Kasser & Ryan, 1996) as goal content or “what” of the goals (Ryan et al., 2008),
aspirations may reflect why of the instrumental goals. There is also one statement which
represents personal expressiveness conceptualized by Waterman (1993). It was
categorized as intrinsic aspiration in this study. These statements were designed to assess
whether pursuing a goal is guided by a constitutive or instrumental orientation, and if the
goal orientation is instrumental, whether or not it is directed by intrinsic or extrinsic
aspirations. Statements are presented below.
Participants were asked to what extent they pursue each goal: “because it is good
by itself” (constitutive orientation); “because it makes you a better person”
(growth/character); “because it makes you look better among your friends, family, or
other people in general” (image aspiration); “ because it makes other people’s lives
better” (helpfulness); “ because it makes you well-known” (fame); “ because it helps you
with financial success” (money); “because people will like you more” (popularity);
“because it makes your life more meaningful” (meaning-seeking); “because it makes you
use and build upon your potentials” (growth); “because it reflects who you are” (personal
expressiveness); and “because it makes you learn new things about yourself and/or the
world.” The same scale as goal self-concordance was used to rate these statements. The
rating was made on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all for this reason) to 7
(very much for this reason). The statements reflecting instrumental orientations (i.e.,
image, fame, popularity, and money) were reverse coded. Scores were summed for each
goal and were averaged across five goals.
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Goal Striving. Goal striving was measured by six items measuring three
dimensions: Importance, Effort, Inspiration, and Clarity. Two questions (items 18 and
21) were borrowed from Emmons’ (1999) Striving Assessment Scales (SAS) which is
part of the Personal Striving Assessment Packet (PSAP). The one addressing Importance
asks participants about the importance of the goal and how committed they are to their
goal pursuit. Participants answered this question on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to
6 (extremely important). The other one addressing Effort asks participants about their
time and effort they usually invested in attaining each goal. Participants answered to this
question on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much). Although Emmons (1999) was
interested in how much effort or energy is required to accomplish a goal, the present
study was interested in how much effort and energy one generally invests in pursuing
one’s goal. The present study used the theme of the questions presented for Importance
and Effort in Emmons (1999; pp. 184-185).
Inspiration was measured (items 19 and 20) using a 2-item goal inspiration
measure developed by Milyavskaya, Ianakieva, Foxen-Craft, Colantuoni, and Koestner
(2012): “How inspiring is this goal to you?” and “How inspired are you to pursue and
reach this goal?” Participants were asked to answer to these questions on a 7-point
Likert scale (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). Milyavskaya et al. (2012) reported that
inter-item correlation was equal or greater than .75 for p < .001. Cronbach’s alpha was
.80 at baseline and .78 at the follow-up.
Also two statements (items 16 and 17) were borrowed from PGIS to find how
clear one is about how to pursue one’s goal (i.e., Clarity; the idea of clarity however has
been taken from Emmons, 1999): “I know what I need to do to get started toward
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reaching my goals,” and “I have a specific action plan to help me reach my goals.”
These statements were used instead of Emmons’ (1999) question about clarity because
they are more concrete and specific. Following Emmons’ (1999) rating scale, four items
were rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The questions
and their full instructions are presented in Appendix B.
Scoring. For goal self-concordance and goal aspirations, the items (1, 3, 5, 6, 8,
10, 12, 14, 15; see Appendix B) representing more eudaimonic aspects of goal pursuits
(i.e., identified motivation, intrinsic motivation, constitutive orientation, growth,
helpfulness, meaning-seeking, and personal expressiveness) were coded as they were
rated. The other items that reflect instrumental orientations, extrinsic aspirations (i.e.,
image, fame, popularity, and money), and controlled motivations (i.e., external
motivation and introjected motivation) were reverse coded. For obtaining a total score on
Actualization-Striving, item scores were averaged across five goals and summed.
Measures of Need-Satisfaction
Need-Satisfaction was measured taking two approaches used in Sheldon and
Elliot (1999). Table 3 presents measures and supporting literature that were used to
compose the measures of need-satisfaction.
General Need-Satisfaction. The first approach was to measure need-satisfaction
in general sense (3 items) asking participants to rate “the extent to which you are having
each of these three types of experience in your life, at present” (p. 488). Then the three
types of experience were presented based on conceptual definition of basic psychological
needs (i.e., competence, autonomy, and relatedness) by Deci and Ryan (1991): “feeling
generally competent and able in what I attempt” (Competence); “feeling generally
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autonomous and choiceful in what I do” (Autonomy); “feeling generally related and
connected to people I spend time with” (Relatedness). Participant were asked to rate
their experience on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (very much).
Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction. The second approach asked participants (6
items per goal) about their need-satisfaction experience in relation to each goal, which
Table 3
Measures of Need-Satisfaction
Research variable

Original measures

Need-Satisfaction

Sheldon and Elliot’s
(1999) approach

(a) General Need-Satisfaction

Competence, Autonomy,
Relatedness

(b) Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction

# of Items useda

Modifications to
items

33*
3 out of 3

No modification

6 per goal*

Competence

Goal-related Competence

1 out of 1

No modification

Autonomy

Self-concordant goals

4 out of 4

No modification

Relatedness

Support in SAS (Emmons,

1 out of 1

Slightly
modified

1999)
a

# of items that was originally used for the data collection. After exploratory factor analysis for
validation study, some items were eliminated and the total scores were computed excluding those items.
*Total number of items in each scale or subscale

they had already listed on the questionnaire (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). For competence (1
item), participants rated how competent they feel while striving for each goal. The same
rating as general need-satisfaction ratings were used for competence. Autonomy score
was obtained from 4-item measure of goal self-concordance. This measure is mainly
known as the measure of goal self-concordance. Self-concordance is referred to “the
feeling that one’s goals are internally caused” (Sheldon, 2004, p. 105), which is also
congruent with more autonomy in goal pursuits. In accordance with Sheldon and Elliot’s
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(1999) approach, the score on each autonomy item was calculated by averaging ratings
for external motivation, introjected motivation, identified motivation, and intrinsic
motivation across five goals (no reverse coding; all ratings were coded from 1 to 7 for all
statements). Then external and introjected motivation scores were subtracted from the
sum of identified and intrinsic motivation scores.
Relatedness during actualization striving was measured using support dimension
(1 item) of Emmons’ (1999) SAS asking “what impact do the important people in your
life have on each striving?” (p. 188), Keeping in mind the person who has the most
impact on their goal striving (either positive, negative, or both), participants rate this
question on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 7 (extremely supportive of my efforts at
achieving this goal) to 1 (an extremely hindrance to my efforts at achieving this goal).
The question was adopted from Emmons (1999) and slightly modified to fit the intent of
the present study (Appendix C).
Scoring. Scores for each need (i.e., competence, autonomy, and relatedness) in
general and across five goals were averaged. A total score for need-satisfaction then
obtained summing all these average scores across three basic needs. All items used in
measuring need-satisfaction are presented in Appendix C.
Measures of Non-Defensiveness
Non-Defensiveness was measured using the 28-item Brief COPE (Carver, 1997).
The Brief COPE was formed by reducing the size of the COPE inventory (Carver,
Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989) in an attempt to make a feasible scale in terms of length and
completion time. There are 14 subscales (i.e., Active Coping, Planning, Positive
Reframing, Acceptance, Humor, Religion, Using Emotional Support, Using Instrumental
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Support, Self-Distraction, Denial, Venting, Substance Use, Behavioral Disengagement,
Self-Blame) each consists of two items. To develop the Brief COPE, the selection of
items for each subscale was based on their high loadings on that subscale in the original
version of COPE inventory and their clarity and ease of communication (Carver, 1997).
The items for each subscale are presented in Appendix D. A small modification was
made to Substance Use items by substituting the verb use by think about using.
For the purpose of the present study, items on Substance Use, Behavioral
Disengagement, Venting, Self-Distraction, Denial, and Self-Blame were formed the
Measure of Defensiveness; and items on Humor, Religion, Use of Emotional Support,
Use of Instrumental Support, Planning, Active Coping, and Positive Reframing were
used as the Measure of Adaptive Coping. Participants rated each items on a 4-point
Likert scale using a dispositional response format, 1 (I usually don’t do this at all), 2 (I
usually do this a little bit), 3 (I usually do this a medium amount), and 4 (I usually do this
a lot). Participants were instructed as follows:
We are interested in how people respond when they confront difficult or stressful
events in their lives. There are lots of ways to try to deal with stress. This
questionnaire asks you to indicate what you generally do and feel, when you
experience stressful events. Obviously, different events bring out somewhat
different responses, but think about what you usually do when you are under a lot
of stress (Adopted from Carver et al., 1989, p. 271). Think about what you do,
not what most people do.
Scoring. Item scores on Defensiveness were reverse coded. Total scores for
Non-Defensiveness then were calculated summing all item scores on Measures of
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Defensiveness and Adaptive Coping. Higher scores indicate use of more functional or
adaptive defense/coping mechanisms (lower defensiveness) and lower scores reflect
higher defensiveness or more use of dysfunctional/ maladaptive defense/coping
mechanisms.
The Measure of General Metacognitive Competence (MGMC)
General metacognitive competence was measured using a modified version of the
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994). MAI is a 52item instrument developed to measure metacognition. Schraw and Dennison’s (1994)
confirmatory factor analysis of the instrument supported the two-component model of
metacognition including metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation (Brown,
1987, Flavell, 1987, Jacobs & Paris, 1987). Schraw and Dennison (1994) investigated
the reliability and validity of MAI. Internal consistency for two subscales of this
inventory, knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition, was ranged from .88 to
.93 and a high coefficient alpha for the entire instrument was reported ranging from .93 to
.95.
Examples of items in each subscale respectively are “I understand my intellectual
strength and weaknesses,” or “I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I
finish a task.” The factors appeared to be strongly intercorelated, (r = .45 and r = .54,
from two different studies). However, this relationship was not compensatory as each
subscale made a unique contribution to cognitive performance (Schraw & Dennison,
1994). Convergent validity of MAI was tested investigating the predictive validity of
MAI with regard to other measures of metacognitive awareness and performance (e.g.,
judgment of monitoring ability and test performance; Schraw & Dennison, 1994). The
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average completion time reported for this instrument was approximately 10 min (Schraw
& Dennison, 1994).
Modifications. The questionnaire starts with a guiding statement (added to the
original instrument) and followed by actual statements for participants to rate them:
“When problem-solving, whether I am in an academic setting (e.g., learning, studying,
taking a test, etc.) or in a real-world situation (e.g., planning, finding my way in a new
town, looking for a job, giving advice to a friend on a personal problem, dealing with an
emotional distress, etc.).” Items 4, 15, 16, 41, and 46 were eliminated due to their
specificity to the academic setting. As a result the modified version of this instrument
consists of 47 items, 34 of them represent metacognitive regulation and the rest (13
items) represent metacognitive knowledge. Some modifications on how the statements
are worded were made to make them suitable for assessing metacognition in a more
general sense. The original items of MAI and the modified version of them are presented
in Appendix E. The Measure of General Metacognitive Competence, used in this study,
is presented in Appendix F.
Scoring. In the original instrument, the scores on each item is obtained from
rating marks made on a 100-mm, bi-polar scale adapted from the multidimensional
scaling literature, the right end indicated that the statement is completely false about the
participant and the left end indicating it is completely true. To make the utilization of the
scale more feasible, the modified version used an 11-point Likert scale 0 being not at all
and 10 being all of the time, 5 is a middle point indicating half of the time. Previous
studies (e.g., Kleitman & Stankov, 2007) also used Likert scales instead of bi-polar scale.
Kleitman and Stankov (2007) used a 6-point Likert scale. This study uses an 11-point

149

Likert scale which better resembles the bi-polar 100-mm scale of Schraw and Dennison
(1994).
Although the two-factor solution on MAI supported the two-component model of
metacognition (metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation; Brown, 1987),
the analysis showed some overlaps on loadings of items between the two subscales
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Accordingly, the present study used Schraw and
Dennison’s (1994) approach in scoring and obtained scores on each subscale (i.e., factor)
based on the results of a forced oblique two-factor solution for the construct. That is,
items with factor coefficients above the cut-off point (.30) on each factor (i.e.,
Knowledge of Cognition or Regulation of Cognition) were summed to create scores on
each subscale. A total score for General Metacognitive Competence was constructed by
summing up the scores on all items loaded on Factor I and II.
Analytical Procedures
The research variables in this study were General Metacognitive Competence,
Non-Defensiveness, Need-Satisfaction, Self-Actualization, and Well-Being. All data
were entered into the SPSS database (version 18.0 for Windows). The data were assessed
to find the flaws at the entry level. The values which were out of range and the missing
data were checked against and were corrected according to the hard data. Prior to starting
the analyses, missing values within each scale/subscale for each subject were replaced
using mean imputation technique for the given scale/subscale (Osborne, 2013).
Statistical analyses started with a frequency analysis for sample demographics.
Next, preliminary evidence for construct validity of each measure was provided using
exploratory factor analysis. Accordingly, some items were eliminated from the measures
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to enhance the stability of the identified factor structures. Then, total scores for each
construct were calculated using the remaining items in the validated measures. In the
next step, demographic variables were tested for their possible differential effect on the
constructs of interest and used accordingly as control variables or grouping variables in
the main analyses for hypothesis testing.
The hypotheses were tested for statistically significant relationships between
constructs under the study using correlational and hierarchical regression analyses (Aiken
& West, 1991; Hinkle et al., 2006). An alpha level of .05 (one-tailed) was used to test all
nine directional hypotheses. Correlational analysis produces a correlation coefficient that
indicates both strength and direction of relationships between variables of interest
simultaneously (Hinkle et al., 2006). Hierarchical Linear Regression analysis was used
to test Hypotheses 1 to 7. Hierarchical Linear Regression Analysis is an advanced form
of linear regression and is used for assessing the unique variance contributed by different
independent variables (Aiken & West, 1991; Hinkle et al., 2006).
To test mediations in Hypotheses 8 and 9, Shrout and Bolger’s (2002) Bootstrap
procedure (using Structural Equation Modeling by AMOS 18.0) was employed as an
alternative to Baron and Kenney’s (1986) and to MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman,
West, and Sheets’ (2002) mediation methods. The limitations of Baron and Kenney’s
(1968) and of MacKinnon et al.’s (2002) methods is that they assume a normal
distribution of sample and they both are applied in the case of a single independent,
single dependent, and single mediator variables, which does not allow for instance the
inclusion of covariates in the study. Structural equation modeling allows for any number
of mediators, dependent, and independent variables (Jaccard, Guilamo-Ramos, &
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Blanton, 2006). Of interest in this study was the inclusion of covariates in the model in
predicting human well-being.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This chapter presents the result of analyses for the study in five parts:
demographics of the sample, preliminary validation of the measures and computation of
total scores for constructs of interest, testing the assumptions of parametric statistics,
demographic differences in constructs of interest, hypothesis testing, and summary of the
chapter. Following the first section on demographic characteristics of the sample,
measures were validated using exploratory factor analysis. Measures used in this study
(except for the measures of Subjective Well-Being) are considered new measures due to
the modifications applied to them. The Measure of Actualizing-Striving, in particular,
was first developed for this study by adopting some items from different measures of goal
pursuits and forming some new items guided by literature. Thus, the construct validity of
the measures was investigated prior to computation of total scores and some items were
eliminated as a result of the exploratory factor analysis. Total scores for constructs of
interest then were calculated based on remaining items. Then, assumptions of parametric
testing (i.e., multicollinearity, normality, linearity and homoscedasticity) were tested to
make sure that the data were appropriate for regression analysis. Next, sample
demographics were explored to determine its relationship with the constructs under study.
Finally the hypotheses were examined to answer the research questions of the study.
Demographics of the Sample
Five hundreds and thirteen university students participated in this study.
Demographics measure was taken on age, gender, marital status, parenthood, ethnicity,
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level of education, and immigration status (immigrant or U.S. citizen). Table 4 provides
a frequency table of all demographic variables.
Age. Age was measured as a continuous variable. The mean age for the sample
was 25.07 with a minimum of 17 and maximum of 60 years of age (SD = 7.21). A
frequency analysis indicated that 83.4% of participants (n = 428) were aged between 17
and 29. It is the age range which is typically regarded as emerging adulthood (Arnett,
2000). The remaining 16.6% of participants whose ages were between 30 to 60 years of
age (n = 85) were referred to as adults in this study.
Table 4
Frequency Table of Demographic Variables (N= 513)
Variables

Frequency

Percent

Emerging-Adult (17- 29)
Adults (30- 60)
Gender
Male
Female
Marital Status
Married
Single
Level of Education
Graduate
Undergraduate
Parenthood
Parent
Non-Parent
Non-Respondent
Major
Education
Non-Education
Ethnicity
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
Immigration status
Immigrant
Non-Immigrant
Non-Respondent

428
85

83.4
16.6

183
330

35.7
64.3

89
424

17.3
82.7

143
370

27.9
72.1

61
356
96

11.9
69.4
18.7

312
201

60.8
39.2

330
183

64.3
35.7

171
270
72

33.4
52.6
14.0

Age
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Gender. All participants reported their gender. Out of 513 participants, 330 of
them were female (64.3%) and 183 of them were male (35.7%) (dummy coded: Male =
1.0, Female = 0.0).
Marital status. A frequency analysis indicated that 17.3% of participants (n = 89)
were married and 82.7% (n = 424) were single (dummy coded: Married = 1.0, Single =
0.0).
The level of education. A frequency analysis revealed that 27.9% of participants
(n = 143) were graduate students while 72.1% were undergraduate students (dummy
coded: Undergraduate = 1.0, Graduate = 0.0).
Parenthood. While 18.7% of data (n = 96) were missing for this demographic,
11.9% of participants (n = 61) reported being a parent and 69.4% of them (n = 356) had
not experienced parenthood yet (Parenthood included three groups: Parent; Non-Parent;
Non-Respondent, each of which were dummy coded, 1.0 representing membership to the
group and 0.0 representing membership to the other two groups).
Major. Roughly 61% of participants (n = 312; 60.8%) were education majors
while 39.2 % (n = 201) were studying in other majors (science and engineering or
international relations, etc.; dummy coded: Education = 1.0, Non-Education = 0.0).
Ethnicity. Approximately 64.3% of participants (n = 330) identified with Hispanic
ethnicity while 35.7% (n = 183) reported being Non-Hispanic (dummy coded: Hispanic =
1.0, Non-Hispanic = 0.0).
Immigration status. Whether the participants were immigrant was determined
based on their country of origin and comparing their age with the duration they were
living in the United States. Participants whose country of origin was not the United
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States of America were coded as immigrants. In addition, participants who were born in
U.S., but whose reported time of living in U.S. was less than their age were considered
immigrants as well. A frequency analysis indicated that 14% of participants did not
respond to this question while 33.3% of participants (n = 171) were immigrants and
52.6% of them (n = 270) were non-immigrants (Immigration status included three
groups: Immigrant; Non-Immigrant; Non-Respondent, each of which were dummy
coded, 1.0 representing membership to the group and 0.0 representing membership to the
other two groups).
Preliminary Validation of the Measures and
Computing Total Scores for the Constructs of Interest
Before computing the final scores on constructs of interest, Exploratory Factor
Analysis (EFA) was conducted on the different measures. This approach was taken
because the measures, except for measures of SWB and Need-Satisfaction, all included
modified or newly presented items or were combinations of some new and some adopted
items from other measures. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) using the maximum
likelihood extraction technique with Promax oblique rotation was performed to identify
redundant items which contribute poorly into the variance of the construct being
measured (factor coefficients < .30) and can be excluded from the measures. To find
supporting evidence for the accuracy of analyses (i.e., cross-validation), the same factor
analyses was run on a random split-half sample extracted out of the original sample using
SPSS Select (Random Sample of ) Cases function.
The researcher also ran factor analyses before and after replacing the missing
values to check for consistency of the EFA results. A few items shifted loadings on
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factors but no significant discrepancy was observed between results of EFA before and
after missing data replacement. That is, items which loaded on none of the components
in incomplete dataset did not load on any of components in the complete dataset (factor
coefficients ≥ .30 was used as cut-off point). As a result, the items which were subject to
exclusion for total score computation were the same before and after the replacement of
missing data. The procedural details of EFA for each measure are presented in the
following sections.
EFA on the Measures of Well-Being
Measures of subjective well-being (i.e., PANAS and SWLS) and the Measure of
Eudaimonic Well-Being (MEWB) were used to measure overall human well-being in this
study (see Appendix A).
Measures of Subjective Well-Being. As it was expected, EFA on the measures
of subjective well-being (PANAS and SWLS) confirmed the three-component structure
of the construct: Negative Affects, Positive Affects, and Life Satisfaction (minimum
factor coefficient was .46). Because the exact original measure was used with no
modification and the measure was already well-validated, no further analyses were
deemed necessary to provide evidence of validity. Internal consistency of the scales was
good (.70 < α < .80 is a respectable range and .80 < α < .90 is considered very good range
of internal consistency; DeVellis, 2012): α =.84 for Satisfaction with Life; α =.86 for
Positive Affect; and α = .82 for Negative Affect. Considering Subjective Well-Being as
the composite of all three measures, Cronbach’s alpha for the overall measure was .87.
Computation of total score for Subjective Well-Being. Item-ratings on each
measure were summed up to calculate the total score for (10-item) Positive Affect (M =
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38.41, SD = 6.21), (10-item) Negative Affect (M = 19.83, SD = 6.04), and (5-item) Life
Satisfaction (M = 24.76, SD = 6.31). To compute the total score for SWB, according to
Sheldon and Elliot (1999), scores on each variable were standardized and a composite
score was computed adding the standardized scores for Positive Affect and Life
Satisfaction and subtracting standardized scores on Negative Affect from them,3 M = 0.0,
SD = 1.61.
The Measure of Eudaimonic Well-Being (MEWB). For the measure of
eudaimonic well-being, this study used 20 items from QEWB (Waterman et al., 2010)
plus seven items from LRI-R (Debats, 1998) (see Appendix A).
Data screening on MEWB prior to the factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO test) showed an excellent sample adequacy for
factor analysis (.914). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity also was significant (p < .001)
indicating that factor analysis was appropriate for this sample. To check for normality in
large samples (n > 200), the absolute values of skewness and kurtosis should be
examined rather than relying on significant test for normality (Field, 2009; Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007). For large samples, extreme non-normality is commonly detected by
absolute value of skewness and kurtosis larger than 3.0 and 10.0 respectively (Kline,
2009) while moderate non-normality is evident if |skewness| > 2.0 and |kurtosis| > 7.0
respectively (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). For 27 variables (items) in MEWB,
maximum skewness value was 1.895 and maximum kurtosis value was 4.815, both less
than the critical values.

3

To be consistent throughout the study, the standardization of scores for each measure was continued
where the total score on the construct of interest was a combination of scores on different measures.
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Moreover, linearity was tested using random pairwise scatterplots of the variables.
Although the plots departed from linearity, there was no evidence of curvilinearity. Thus,
the linearity assumption was not a problem (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Furthermore,
because the number of outliers for none of the variables exceeded 2% of the cases, it was
decided not to exclude outliers from the subsequent analyses (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
Multicollinearity was examined between the 27 items in MEWB and no multicollinearity
was detected (all VIFs < 3.0).
Identifying item-candidates for elimination. In the EFA output, the Kaiser’s rule
of eigenvalues above 1.0 identified six components. However, the scree test highlights
two to three components. In addition, an a priori criterion based on theory (Peterson et
al., 2005) implies two eudaimonic routes to happiness: Engagement and Meaning. Using
the maximum likelihood extraction, EFA was run for both two and three-factor solutions.
The two-factor solution accounted for a greater amount of variance in the construct
(37.41%) with fewer numbers of items (21 items) compared to the three-factor solution
(26 items; 36.31%).4 The pattern matrices resulted from Promax oblique rotation for both
the full sample and the random split-half sample identified 6 items (5, 8, 10, 13, 14, and
17) that did not load on any of the factors. Item 8 which loaded only in the split-half
sample on Factor I by the lowest factor coefficient (.32) was eliminated because its
elimination improved the amount of variance accounted for by 1.14%.
Preliminary evidence of validity and reliability. The maximum likelihood
extraction with a Promax oblique rotation was used to provide evidence for the construct
4

The variance accounted for by the two-factor solution for MEWB was 10.23% greater than the variance
accounted for by the two-factor solution for QEWB (27.18%), the original measure of eudaimonic wellbeing. It implies that items from LRI-R can be considered meaningful additions to the measure.
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validity of the measure. After eliminating items 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, and 17, the factor
solution matched the hypothesized factor structure for the construct of Eudaimonic WellBeing. Items 9, 20, 24, 2, 25, 11, 26, 6, 16, 21, 27, 15, 4, and 1 (14 items) formed Factor
I, Meaning in Life and items 19, 18, 12, 22, 7, 3, and 23 (7 items) formed Factor II,
Pleasure of Engagement. The total variance in the construct accounted for by the two
factors before rotation was 37.41%. The result of EFA for the MEWB is presented in
Table 5.
Reliability. Internal consistency of the scale was examined by calculating the
Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha for the new 21-item MEWB was .89, for Meaning
in Life α = .90, for Pleasure of Engagement α = .70. All Cronbach’s alphas were at or
above .70 which is evidence of acceptable internal consistency (.60 < α < .70 is
considered the minimal level of acceptability; Hair et al., 1998).
Discriminant validity. As preliminary evidence of discriminant validity, the
correlation coefficient between the factors equals .53 which did not reach the critical
value of .8 or .85 (i.e., indicators of poor discriminant validity; Cabrera-Nguyen, 2010;
Kline, 1998). There was also no cross-loading of items (except for item 15 in the splithalf sample/validation sample). These results indicated that the factors were not
considered highly correlated and discriminated among items.
Convergent validity. All items were correlated to the factors with factor
coefficients above .30, which is high enough for a sample size over 350 as the
preliminary evidence of convergent validity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).
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Computation of total score for Eudaimonic Well-Being. The total score for
MEWB was computed summing the item-ratings on 21 remaining items (M = 61.52, SD
= 12.24). Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for MEWB.
Table 5
Factor Coefficient Based on a Maximum Likelihood Extraction with Promax Oblique
Rotation for the Measure of Eudaimonic Well-Being (MEWB) (N = 513)
Scale
Meaning in Life
Pleasure of Engagement
9
.884 (.866)
20
.872 (.808)
24
.828 (.834)
2
.718 (.710)
25
.666 (.700)
11
-.638 (-.557)
26
.601 (.646)
6
.598 (.622)
16
.558 (.561)
21
.543 (.443)
27
.468 (.476)
15
-.415 (-.353)
(.303)
4

.409

(.459)

1

.349

(.364)

19
18
12
22
7
3
23
Extraction SSLa
Rotation SSLa
Percent of Variance explainedb

6.615
6.465

(6.484)
(6.279)

.635
.617
.491
.429
.419
.385
.330
1.241
3.671

(.588)
(.635)
(.535)
(.465)
(.457)
(.436)
(.444)
(1.344)
(3.828)

31.498 (30.874)
5.911 (6.401)
Cumulative percent of variance
explainedb
31.498 (30.874)
37.409 (37.275)
Note. Factor coefficients for Split-half sample are presented in parentheses. Factor
coefficients below .30 were suppressed.
a
Sum of Square loadings b Only values
before rotation were reported here because variance explained after an oblique
rotation are not accurate due to correlated factors.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for the Measure of Eudaimonic Well-Being (N = 513)
(Sub)Scales
No. of items
Subjective Well-Being
Positive Affect
10
Negative affect
10
Life Satisfaction
5
Total
25

Minimum

Maximum

M (SD)

Cronbach’s alpha

17.00
10.00
7.00
-4.68

50.00
46.00
35.00
4.55

38.41 (6.21)
19.83 (6.04)
24.76 (6.31)
0.0 (1.61)

.86
.82
.84
.87

Eudaimonic Well-Being
Meaning in Life
Pleasure of Engagement
Total

14
7
21

7.00
3.00
18.00

56.00
28.00
84.00

40.83 (9.42)
20.70 (4.43)
61.52
(12.24)

.90
.70
.89

Overall Well-being

46

-6.03

4.32

0.0 (1.74)

.92

Computation of the overall score for Well-being. Total scores on SWB and
EWB were standardized and summed to form a composite score for overall Well-Being
(Ranging from -6.03 to 4.32, M = 0.0, SD = 1.74).
EFA on the Measures of Self-Actualization
This section has two parts. The first part is focused on the Measure of
Actualizing-Self (MASelf) and the second part is on the Measure of Actualizing-Striving
(MAStriving) (see Appendix B).
Measures of Actualizing-Self (MASelf). Actualizing-Self was measured by the
Measure of Actualization of Potentials (MAP; Leclerc et al., 2002) plus two items
adopted from Personal Growth Initiative Scale. The first measure was used with the
intention of measuring Actualizing-Disposition, and the two items were added to bring
the concept of Actualizing-Initiation (intentionality and purposefulness) to the construct
of Actualizing-Self. MAP (measuring Actualizing Disposition) has been already
validated and identified with a two-factor structure with five subscales (Leclerc et al.,
2002; Lefrançois et al., 1997). The initial EFA ran on MAP for the sample of this study
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did not conform to either the initial two-factor or five-factor model for MAP; the fifth
factor included only one item; five items did not load on any of the factors and the ones
that did were not in accordance with already identified factors. Therefore, all 29 items
(Actualizing-Disposition and Actualizing-Initiation; see Appendix B) were entered
together for EFA.
Data screening on MASelf prior to the factor analysis. The KMO test in the
EFA output indicated a good sampling adequacy for factor analysis (.884). Bartlett’s
Test of Sphericity was significant (p < .001) indicating that factor analysis was
appropriate for this sample. Most variables were skewed negatively, but none of the
skewness exceeded the absolute value of 1.0 (maximum skewness value = .905).
Maximum kurtosis value was 1.065. Therefore, the researcher can be confident that the
sampling distribution did not reach the critical values of skewness and kurtosis for
moderate non-normality (absolute values larger than 2.0 and 7.0 respectively; West et al.,
1995, p. 68). Linearity was tested using random pairwise scatterplots of the variables.
Although the plots departed from linearity, there was no evidence of curvilinearity. Thus,
the linearity assumption was not a problem (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). No substantial
number of outliers was observed for any items in MASelf (i.e., no more than 2%).
Multicollinearity was examined between the items and no multicollinearity was detected
(all VIFs < 3.0).
Identifying item-candidates for elimination. The Kaiser’s rule of eigenvalues
above 1.0 identified seven components. The scree test suggested between three to five
underlying components. Using The Maximum Likelihood technique, EFA was run for
forced three-, four- and five-factor structure. In the three-factor model, items 3 and 7 did
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not load on any factors and no problematic complex (i.e., cross-loaded) variable was
observed; the model accounted for the 28.89% of variance in the construct. In the fourfactor model, items 3, 7, 9, 14, and 15 did not load on any factors and there were two
complex variable involved (item 21); the model accounted for 31.07 % of variance in the
construct. In the five-factor model, items 3, 9, and 14 did not load on any factors and
there were only one problematic complex variable (item 24) involved; the model
accounted for 33.79% of variance in the construct. The EFA on a random half sample of
the original dataset indicated that the four-factor solution was steady across samples.
After eliminating items 3, 7, 9, 14, and 15, there was an improvement in the amount of
variance accounted for by the factors from 31.07% to 33.57% in the full sample and
31.85% to 34.29% in the split-half sample (before rotation). In the split-half sample,
item 25 did not load on any factor by factor coefficient above .30, and item 1 was loaded
on Factor II (.31) rather than on Factor III (.34). Like in the full sample, item 21 crossloaded on Factors III and IV but loaded more highly on Factor IV. The result of EFA for
the MASelf is presented in Table 7.
Preliminary evidence of validity and reliability. The results for the full sample
are reported here. After eliminating items 3, 7, 9, 14, and 15, items 13, 19, 29, 24, 18, 28,
23, 25, 8, 27, 10, and 16 (12 items) formed Factor I. Items 2, 26, 17, 12, and 22 (5 items)
formed Factor II. Items 20, 5, 4, 1 (4 items) formed Factor III, and Factor VI was formed
by items 11, 6, and 21 (3 items). The tentative labels for extracted factors are as follows:
Factor I, Meaning-Making Mindset; Factor II, Openness to Self; Factor III, SelfAssurance; and Factor VI, Independent Mindset. The total variance in the construct
accounted for by the four factors before rotation was 33.57%.
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Reliability. Internal consistency of the scale was examined by calculating
Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha for the new 24-item Measure of Actualizing-Self
(MASelf) was .85, for Meaning-Making Mindset α = .80, for Openness to Self α = .69,
for Self-Assurance α = .64, and for Independent Mindset α = .66. All Cronbach’s alphas
are above .60 indicating low yet acceptable internal consistency (.60 < α < .70 is
considered the minimal level of acceptability; Hair et al., 1998).
Discriminant validity. As preliminary evidence of discriminant validity, the
correlation coefficients between the factors (i.e., the correlations between Factors I and II
= .59, between factors II and III = .57, and between Factors I and III = .67) were below
.70 and did not reach the critical value of .8 or .85 (i.e., indicators of poor discriminant
validity; Cabrera-Nguyen, 2010; Kline, 1998). There was only one cross-loading of
items; item 21 loaded on both Factor III (.38) and Factor VI (.54). The difference
between loadings was larger than .10 (i.e., .16) which is acceptable to keep the item in an
exploratory factor analysis (Gefen & Straub, 2005). The factors were not considered
highly correlated and fairly discriminated among items.
Convergent validity. All items were correlated to the factors with loading
coefficients above .30, which is high enough for a sample size over 350 as the
preliminary evidence of convergent validity (Hair et al., 1998).
Computation of total score for Actualizing-Self. The total Score for MASelf was
computed summing the item-ratings on 24 items (M = 91.79, SD = 10.01). Descriptive
statistics for MASelf are presented in Table 9.

165

Table 7
Factor Coefficients Based on a Maximum Likelihood Extraction with Promax Oblique Rotation for the Measure of
Actualizing-Self (MASelf) (N = 513)
Scale

Meaning-Making
Mindset

13 try to understand others

.704 (.614)

19 make meaning by the way I look

.601 (.680)

Openness to Self

Self-Assurance

Independent
Mindset

at things
29 plan to make my life balanced

.529 (.516)

24 succeed at giving meaning to life

.521 (.514)

18 make sense of past experiences

.447 (.531)

28 initiate the changes I want in life

.438 (.456)

23 get involved in important causes

.428 (.439)

25 remain true to myself
8

responsible for my life

27 genuinely care about people’s

.406 (--)
.389 (.373)
.386 (.396)

problem
10 know my strength and limitations

.345 (.517)

16 make my own decisions

.339 (.343)

2

express emotions

.799 (.717)

26 express my opinion

.665 (.721)

17 share emotions with a confident

.481 (.429)

12 listen to my emotions

.477 (.530)

22 show the real me

.346 (.521)

20 get over major setbacks

.814 (.848)

5

adapt to change

.557 (.520)

4

believe life is good

.398 (.311)

1

value myself

(.305)

.339

11 am inclined to follow others

.660 (.701)

6 have conditional self-worth

.608 (.665)

21 negatively impacted by criticism
Extraction SSLa

5.289 (5.170)

1.342 (1.578)

.379(.346)
.838 (.924)

.536 (.589)
.588 (.716)

Rotation SSLa

4.597 (4.381)

3.597 (3.734)

4.000 (3.372)

1.760 (1.994)

22.036 (21.541)

5.590 (6.577)

3.493 (3.852)

2.450 (2.983)

% of variance explainedb
Cumulative % of variance explainedb

22.036 (21.541)
27.626 (28.118)
31.119 (31.970) 33.569(34.953)
Note. Factor coefficients for the split-half sample (n = 257) are presented in parentheses. Factor coefficients below .30
were suppressed.
a
Sum of Square Loadings b Only values before rotation were reported here because variance explained after an oblique
rotation are not accurate due to correlated factors.
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The Measure of Actualizing-Striving (MAStriving). The Measure of
Actualizing-Striving, partially developed by the researcher, consisted of a list of five
personal (self-reported) goals and 21 statements which should be rated for each goal.
Item ratings for each statement were averaged across five goals and these mean scores
were used in the subsequent exploratory factor analyses. As proposed earlier, items for
this questionnaire were developed based on an in-depth review of literature on selfactualization, optimal functioning, goal pursuits, and goal motivation (Table 2). It was
expected that three components underlies the construct, Actualizing-Striving: Actualizing
Aspirations; Non-Actualizing/Extrinsic Aspirations; and Goal Striving.
Data screening on MAStriving prior to the factor analysis. There is a good
sampling adequacy according to the KMO test (.887) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p
< .001). Because examining all pairwise scatterplots were impractical, linearity was
tested using random pairwise scatterplots of the variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Although some plots depart from linearity, there was no evidence of curvilinearity. Thus,
the linearity assumption was not a problem (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Some of the
variables were negatively skewed, but none of the skewness values were above the cutoff points for moderate (2.0; West et al., 1995) or extreme non-normality (3.0; Kline,
2009). Therefore, non-normality was not a problem. Moreover, multicollinearity was
examined between the items in Actualizing-Striving. No Variance Inflation Factors
(VIFs) were detected to be higher than 10.0 (all VIFs < 5.0), which means no problematic
multicollinearity among items (Green, 1991). Subsequently, the correlation matrix was
checked for any high correlations. There were five correlation coefficients above .70 but
none above .90 (i.e., critical r value to detect multicollinearity; Green 1991). Therefore,
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no multicollinearity was detected. Furthermore, data was screened for possible outliers.
The number of outliers for one of the variables (item 5) exceeded 2% of the cases and
some extreme outliers were detected. Thus, after screening the data, 21 cases were
selected for elimination to lower the number of outliers to 9 (i.e., 2% of the cases which
is an acceptable percentage of outliers; Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Exploratory factor
analysis was conducted on both the new dataset and the original dataset and no difference
was observed in identifying underlying factors.
Identifying item-candidates for elimination. The Kaiser’s rule of eigenvalues
above 1.0 identifies four components while three factors were identified by the scree test.
Because an a priori criterion also suggests a three-factor solution, EFA was run for this
solution. All items (Appendix B) loaded above the cut-off point (.30) on each factor and
there was no candidate for elimination.
Preliminary evidence of validity and reliability. The maximum likelihood
extraction with an oblique rotation was used in searching for the evidence of construct
validity for MAStriving. The result confirmed a three-factor structure of ActualizingStriving and showed that three factors accounted for 56.24% of the variance before
rotation. Despite one close cross-loading in the full sample (item 1) and a close one in
the random split-half sample (item 10), the results of factor analysis on both
aforementioned datasets and on the dataset excluding outliers confirmed the same threefactor structure of the construct. Factor I, Actualizing Aspirations, was formed by items
1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15 (9 items); Factor II, Goal Striving, was formed by items 16 to
21 (6 items); and Factor III, Extrinsic Aspirations, was formed by items 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13
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(6 items). To be adequate, the EFA results for the sample excluding outliers were
reported in Table 8.
Table 8
Factor Coefficients Based on a Maximum Likelihood Extraction with Promax Oblique Rotation
for the Measure of Actualizing-Striving (MAStriving) (Sample Excluding Outliers: n = 492)
Scale

Actualizing
Aspirations

12

.815 (.765)

15

.741 (.763)

8

.740 (.741)

6

.718 (.734)

14

.658 (.702)

3

.651 (.608)

5

.605 (.496)

1

.528(.474)

10

.418 (.343)

Goal Striving

(-.313)

17

.843 (.777)

20

.842 (.905)

21

.816 (.778)

16

.807 (.788)

18

.765 (.823)

19

Extrinsic Aspirations

.323

.662 (.738)

9

.895 (.887)

7

.862 (.868)

11

.776 (.835)

2

.716 (.710)

4

.610 (.656)

13
Extraction SSLa
Rotation SSLa
% of variance explainedb
Cumulative % of variance
explainedb

6.700 (6.443)
6.020 (5.647)
31.903 (30.681)
31.903 (30.681)

3.697 (3.992)
5.664 (5.639)
17.607 (19.010)

.485 (.558)
1.413 (1.499)
3.622 (3.893)
6.731 (7.139)

49.509 (49.690)

56.240 (56.829)

Note. Factor coefficients for the split-half sample (n = 246) are presented in parentheses. Factor coefficients below .30
were suppressed.
a
Sum of Square loadings b Only values before rotation were reported here because variance explained after an oblique
rotation are not accurate due to correlated factors.

Reliability. Internal consistency of the scale was examined by calculating the
Cronbach’s alpha on the full sample. Cronbach’s alpha for the Measure of Actualizing-
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Strivings (21-item scale) was .79, for Actualizing Aspiration α =. 87, for Goal Striving α
= .91, and for Extrinsic Aspiration α =. 88. All Cronbach’s alphas being above .70, the
internal consistency of the scale is acceptable (DeVellis, 2012; Hair et al., 1998).
Discriminant validity. As preliminary evidence of discriminant validity, the
correlation coefficient between the factors were very low (.10 and -.18), the highest
correlation exist between Factors II and III (.61) which was yet lower than .80 (CabreraNguyen, 2010) or .85 (Kline, 1998) which are indicators of poor discriminant validity.
There was one cross-loading of items (item 19) on Factors I and II; however, it was not
problematic as the difference between loading was above .10 (Gefen & Straub, 2005).
The results showed that the factors were not highly correlated and discriminated among
items.
Convergent validity. All items loaded on the factors by factor coefficients above
.30, which is high enough for a sample size over 350 as the preliminary evidence of
convergent validity (Hair et al., 1998).
Computation of total score for Actualizing-Striving. All the items were retained
in the measure. After reverse coding the items in Factor III (Extrinsic Aspirations), the
total score for Actualizing-Striving was computed summing the item-ratings on all 21
items (M = 112.01, SD = 11.54). Descriptive statistics for MAStriving are presented in
Table 9.
Computation of the Overall Score for Self-Actualization. Standardized total
scores on Actualizing-Self and Actualizing-Striving was summed to form the overall
score for Self-Actualization (M = 0.0, SD = 1.73; see Table 9).
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for the Measures of Self-Actualization (N = 513)
(Sub)Scales

No. of
items

Minimum

Maximum

M (SD)

Cronbach’s
alpha

Actualizing-Self
Meaning-Making Mindset
Openness to Self
Self-Assurance
Independent Mindset
Total

12
5
4
3
24

27.00
6.00
8.00
3.00
63.00

60.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
120.00

47.78 (5.52)
18.63 (3.22)
15.16 (2.33)
10.22 (2.24)
91.79 (10.01)

.80
.69
.64
.66
.85

Actualizing-Striving
Actualizing Aspiration
Goal-Striving
Extrinsic Aspiration
Total

9
6
6
21

28.00
20.00
6.00
77.00

83.00
40.00
42.00
144.00

50.84 (7.28)
33.65 (4.20)
27.52 (7.68)
112.01 (11.54)

.87
.91
.88
.79

Self-Actualization

45

-5.23

5.54

0.0 (1.73)

.87

EFA on the Measure of General Metacognitive Competence (MGMC)
The Measure of General Metacognitive Competence consists of 47 statements
about different personal approaches taken in problem-solving situations. The statements
were rated from 0 to 10 on an 11-point Likert-Scale (Appendix F). Using the Maximum
Likelihood technique, EFA was conducted to obtain evidence of validity of the scale.
Data screening on MGMC prior to the factor analysis. There was an acceptable
sampling adequacy (greater than .50; Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) according to the
KMO test (.954) and significant test of Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity a (p < .001).
Multicollinearity was examined between the variables; none of the items demonstrated
evidence of multicollinearity (all VIFs < 10.0). Examining the correlation matrix also did
not show any correlation above .90 (all less than .70). Linearity was tested using random
pairwise scatterplots of variables. Although the plots did not indicate a clear linearity,
there was no evidence of curvilinearity either. Thus, the linearity assumption was not a
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problem (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). No absolute value of skewness greater than 2.0
and no absolute value of kurtosis greater than 7.0 was identified. Therefore, no
problematic non-normality was detected (West et al. 1995). Using outlier labeling rule,
five cases which showed to be outliers on more than two items were eliminated to keep
the number of outliers under 2%. EFA was run on this new dataset as well as on the full
sample and on the random split-half sample.
Identifying item-candidates for elimination. The Kaiser’s rule of eigenvalues
above 1.0 identified nine components. The scree test, however, suggested a 2- or 3-factor
solution. EFA for three-factor solution did not match across different samples (the full
and the random split-half samples). The two-factor solution, however, showed
consistency across samples. EFA on all samples identified item 34 as unrelated to any of
the factors. Thus, this item was taken out of the measure when calculating the total score.
Preliminary evidence of validity and reliability. EFA on different samples
confirmed the two-factor solution. The results on the sample excluding outliers are
reported here. Factor I included items which were considered Regulation of Cognition in
MAI (26 items: 45, 44, 33, 18, 21, 35, 19, 31, 16, 25, 1, 39, 5, 20, 27, 36, 43, 10, 40, 2,
47, 46, 7, 8, 28, 22) and Factor II included mostly the items which were considered
Knowledge of Cognition in MAI (20 items: 29, 4, 6, 30, 12, 9, 24, 32, 11, 13, 17, 15, 26,
14, 23, 41, 37, 3, 42, 38). The two factors accounted for 38.09% of the variance before
rotation. The result of EFA for MGMC is presented in Table 10.
Reliability. Reliability is reported on the full sample. Internal consistency of the
MGMC was examined by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha for the
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Table 10
Factor Coefficients Based on a Maximum Likelihood Extraction with Promax Oblique Rotation
for the Measure of General Metacognitive Competence (MGMC) (Sample Excluding Outliers; n
= 508)
Scale

Regulation
of Cognition

Knowledge
of Cognition

Scale

Regulation of
Cognition

Knowledge
of Cognition

45
.872
(.813)
29
.843
(.712)
44
.812
(.679)
4
.728
(.734)
33
.738
(.784)
6
.714
(.750)
18
.709
(.652)
30
.698
(.625)
21
.680
(.762)
12
.659
(.827)
35
.676
(.775)
9
.638
(.736)
19
.662
(.694)
24
.627
(.564)
31
.578
(.582)
32
.619
(.544)
16
.571
(.585)
11
(-.331)
.616
(.821)
25
.556
(.578)
13
.611
(.578)
1
.547
(.545)
17
.610
(.528)
39
.544
(.619)
15
.609
(.607)
5
.528
(.380)
26
.572
(.548)
20
.515
(.596)
14
.529
(.526)
27
.490
(.545)
23
.480
(.587)
36
.467
(.547)
41
.431
(.529)
43
.463
(.605)
37
.389
(.348)
10
.454
(.509)
3
.370
(.463)
40
.433
(.427)
42
.326
(.441)
2
.424
(.387)
38
.300
(.312)
47
.390
(.381)
46
.359
(.389)
7
.347
(.478)
8
.340
(.425)
28
.338
(.434)
22
.331
(.336)
15.739 (16.220)
1.782 (2.094)
Extraction SSLa
Rotation SSLa
14.098 (14.331) 13.755 (14.283)
% of variance explainedb
34.215 (35.260)
3.873 (4.552)
Cumulative % of variance
explainedb
34.215 (35.260) 38.088 (39.812)
Note. Factor coefficients for the split-half sample (n = 254) are presented in parentheses. Factor
coefficients below .30 were suppressed.
a
Sum of Square loadings b Only values before rotation were reported here because variance
explained after an oblique rotation are not accurate due to correlated factors.
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overall measure (46 items) was .96, for 26-item Regulation of Cognition was 0.94, and
for 20-item Knowledge of Cognition was .92.
Discriminant validity. There were a few items which loaded on different factors
for different datasets such as items 2, 7, 8, and 46 which loaded on Factor II instead of
Factor I in split-half sample. Although there was one cross-loading in the split-half
sample (item 11), no cross-loading was observed for the sample excluding outliers. The
results provided some support for the discriminant validity of the measure as a 2component measure. The factor correlation matrix showed a correlation above .70 (r =
.74) by which factors were considered highly correlated.
Convergent validity. As the evidence of convergent validity, all items loaded
above the cut-off point (.30) on each factor. The factor coefficient for item 38 was .281
in the sample excluding outliers; this item was retained in the subsequent analyses
because its factor coefficients were marginally above .30 in other samples.
Computation of total score for General Metacognitive Competence. The total
score for General Metacognitive Competence (i.e., Metacognition) was computed
summing the item-ratings on the remaining 46 items (M = 339.14, SD = 5.49).
Descriptive statistics for Metacognition are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for the Measure of Eudaimonic Well-Being (N = 513)
(Sub)Scales
Metacognition
Knowledge of Cognition
Regulation of Cognition
Total

No. of
items

Minimum

Maximum

M (SD)

Cronbach’s
alpha

26
20
46

68.00
75.00
143.00

200.00
258.00
456.00

149.30 (24.72)
189.83 (34.01)
339.14 (55.49)

.92
.94
.96
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EFA on the Measures of Need-Satisfaction
Need-Satisfaction was measured through two sets of items, three items which
were intended to measure General Need-Satisfaction (GNS) and six items which were
intended to measure Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction (GRNS).
The Measure of General Need-Satisfaction (MGNS). Three items each of
which was a statement about one type of needs (i.e., competence, autonomy, and
relatedness) were rated on a 7-point Likert scale.
Data screening on MGNS prior to the factor analysis. There was an acceptable
sampling adequacy according to the KMO test (.68) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p <
.001). No multicollinearity was detected among the variables (VIFs < 3.0). Linearity
was tested using pairwise scatterplots of variables. Although the plots did not indicate a
clear linearity, there was no evidence of curvilinearity either. Thus, the linearity
assumption was not violated (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The number of outliers was
less than the critical number (less than 2% of cases; Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Some of the
variables were negatively skewed. However, all absolute values of skewness were less
than 2.0 and all absolute values of kurtosis were less than 7.0 (i.e., less than critical
values for moderate non-normality; West et al., 1995), which is considered tolerable for
the Maximum Likelihood approach to EFA (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan,
1999). Therefore, subsequent analysis was continued with the original dataset. Due to
the small number of items in the scale, the Kaiser’s rule identified one component with
eigenvalues above 1.0. No item was a candidate for elimination. EFA on the full
samples and random split-half sample also verified this extraction with all three items
loaded on only one factor.
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Preliminary evidence of validity and reliability. The one-factor solution
accounted for 58.11% of variance in the construct.
Reliability. Cronbach’s alpha for the overall measure (three items) was .76.
Computation of total score for General Need-Satisfaction. The total score for
the General Need-Satisfaction was computed summing the item-ratings on the three items
(M = 16.61, SD = 3.14). Descriptive statistics for GNS are presented in Table 13.
EFA on the Measure of Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction (MGRNS). MGRNS
consisted of 6 items, one concerning the need for competence (Goal-Competence), one
concerning the need for relatedness (Goal-Support), and four addressing autonomy
(Goal-Identified, Goal-Intrinsic, Goal-External, Goal-Introjected). Each item was rated
on a 7-point Likert scale for each five personal goals listed by participants (Appendix C).
The ratings were averaged across five goals and those scores were used for EFA.
Data screening on MGNS prior to the factor analysis. There was an acceptable
sampling adequacy according to the KMO test (.62) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p <
.001). No multicollinearity was detected among the variables (VIFs < 3.0). Linearity
was tested using pairwise scatterplots of variables. Although the plots did not indicate a
clear linearity, there was no evidence of curvilinearity either. Thus, the linearity
assumption was not violated (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The number of outliers was
less than the critical number (less than 2% of cases; Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Some of the
variables were negatively skewed. However, nonnormality was not extreme (i.e., all
|skewness| < 2.0 and all |kurtosis| < 7.0; West et al., 1995) and was considered acceptable
for the maximum likelihood approach to EFA (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Therefore,
subsequent analysis was continued with the original dataset.
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Identifying item-candidates for elimination. The Kaiser’s rule as well as scree
plot identified two components with eigenvalues above 1.0. All items were loaded above
the cut-off point (.30) on either one of the factors. Thus, there was no candidate for
elimination.
Preliminary evidence of validity and reliability. EFA on the full samples and
random split-half sample also verified the two-factor solution. Factor I, named NeedSatisfying Goal Pursuit included four items, Goal-Competence, Goal-Support, Identified
Motivation, and Intrinsic Motivation, and Factor II, labeled Controlled Goal Pursuit
included two items, Introjected Motivation and External Motivation. The two factors
accounted for 47.99% of the variance before rotation and after a Promax oblique rotation
the variance accounted for by the two factors was 48.63%. The result of EFA is
presented in Table 12.
Convergent validity. As the evidence of convergent validity, all items loaded
above the cut-off point (.30) on each factor (Hair et al., 1998).
Discriminant validity. The factor correlation matrix showed a negative low
correlation between the factors (r = -.17) and there was no cross-loading of items on
factors in neither the full sample nor the random split-half sample. Both results provided
the preliminary evidence for discriminant validity.
Reliability. Reliability is reported on the full sample. Cronbach’s alpha for the
overall measure (6 items) was .57 (Because Factor II was negatively related to Factor I,
Introjected Motivation and External Motivation were reverse coded to calculate α), for
Need-Satisfying Goal Pursuit α = .70, and for Controlled Goal Pursuit α = .72.
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Table 12
Factor Coefficients Based on a Maximum Likelihood Extraction with Promax Oblique Rotation
for the Measure of Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction (MGRNS) (N = 513)
Scale
2- External Motivation
4- Introjected Motivation
3- Intrinsic Motivation
1- Identified Motivation
4- Goal-Competence
5-Goal-Support
Extraction SSLa
Rotation SSLa
% of Variance explainedb
Cumulative %of variance explainedb

Controlled
Goal Pursuit
.961 (.898)
.578 (.630)

1.331 (1.443)
1.626 (1.629)
22.187 (24.042)
22.187 (24.042)

Need-Satisfying
Goal Pursuit
.784 (.811)
.681 (.663)
.585 (.627)
.326 (.315)
1.548 (1.361)
1.292 (1.255)
25.800 (22.687)
47.986 (46.729)

Note. Factor coefficients for the split-half sample (n = 257) are presented in parentheses. Factor
coefficients below .30 were suppressed.
a
Sum of Square loadings b Only values before rotation were reported here because variance explained after
an oblique rotation are not accurate due to correlated factors.

Computation of total score for Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction. The total scores
for the Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction was computed subtracting the sum of item-ratings
on Factor II from the sum of item-ratings on Factor I (M = 16.78, SD = 4.07).
Descriptive statistics for Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction are presented in Table 13.
Table 13
Descriptive Statistics for the Measures of Need-Satisfaction (N = 513)
(Sub)Scales

No. of
items
3

Minimum

Maximum

M (SD)

4.00

21.00

16.61 (3.14)

Cronbach’s
alpha
.76

Total

4
2
6

14.00
2.00
5.00

28.00
14.00
26.00

24.01 (2.61)
8.76 (2.93)
16.78 (4.07)

.70
.72
.57

Overall Need-Satisfaction

9

-5.22

3.66

0.0 (1.64)

.59

General Need-Satisfaction
Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction
Need-Satisfying Goal Pursuit
Controlled Goal Pursuit

Computation of the Overall Score for Need-Satisfaction. Standardized total
scores on General Need-Satisfaction and Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction were summed
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to calculate the overall score of Need-Satisfaction, M = 0.0, SD = 1.64. Descriptive
statistics for Need-Satisfaction are presented in Table 13.
EFA on the Measures of Non-Defensiveness
In this study, Non-Defensiveness was measured by combining scores on two
measures derived from the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) (see Appendix D): The Measure
of Adaptive Coping (MAC) and the Measure of Defensiveness (MD). The subscales in
the Brief COPE were used to make up these measures of defensiveness based on the
following a priori criterion. Items from Active Coping (1 and 10), Planning (4 and 19),
Positive Reframing (8 and 16), Acceptance (9 and 2), Using Emotional Support (7 and
13), Using Instrumental Support (5 and 17), Religion (15 and 23), and Humor (12 and 26)
subscales of Brief COPE formed MAC in which higher scores indicate more use of
functional coping and lower defensiveness. MD included Denial (14 and 20), SelfDistraction (18 and 25), Behavioral Disengagement (22 and 27), Self-Blame (6 and 28),
and Venting (3 and 21), in which higher scores indicate more use of dysfunctional coping
and higher defensiveness. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the item-ratings
from these two separate measures.
The Measure of Adaptive Coping (MAC). From the categories indicated in
Brief COPE, items under Active Coping, Planning, Positive Reframing, Acceptance,
Emotional Support, Instrumental Support, Religion, and Humor were considered to be
included in the Measure of Adaptive Coping (MAC).
Data screening on MAC prior to the factor analysis. There was an acceptable
sampling adequacy according to the KMO test (.77) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p <
.001). No multicollinearity was detected among the variables (all VIFs < 10.0; Green,
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1991). Linearity was tested using pairwise scatterplots of variables. Although the plots
did not indicate a clear linearity, there was no evidence of curvilinearity either. Thus, the
linearity assumption was not violated (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The number of
outliers was less than the critical number (less than 2% of cases; Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
Thus, no outlier was a candidate for elimination. Some of the variables were negatively
skewed. However, skewness did not reach even the moderate level of non-normality
(i.e., |skew| > 2.0 or |kurtosis| > 7.0 indicate moderate non-normality; West et al., 1995).
Therefore, there was no concern for non-normality for the Maximum Likelihood
approach to EFA (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Subsequent analysis was continued with the
original dataset.
Identifying item-candidates for elimination. The Kaiser’s rule as well as scree
plot identified five components with eigenvalues above 1.0. All items were loaded above
the cut-off point (.30) on either one of the factors. The factor coefficient for item 15 was
above 1.05 that indicated a possibility of multicollinearity (Babakus, Ferguson, &
Joreskog, 1987). In addition, VIF for this item was greater than 5.0 which indicated a
potential multicollinearity issue (Field, 2009). To avoid multicollinearity, item 15 was
eliminated and EFA was run again on the remaining items. Kaiser’s rule, scree plot, and
EFA on the full samples and random split-half sample (excluding item 15) verified the
four-factor solution. The only difference was that in the split-half sample item 23 did not
load on any factor. After eliminating item 23 for the full sample EFA, the amount of

5

Factor coefficients greater than 1.0 are possible for oblique rotation because in the case of oblique
rotation, factor coefficients are equivalents of regression coefficients. On the other hand, in orthogonal
rotation factor coefficients are correlation coefficients and can only take values between -1.0 and +1.0.
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variance accounted for improved by 3% (from 52.97% to 55. 98%). Thus, items 15 and
23 (religion component of Brief COPE) both were excluded for the final EFA.
Preliminary evidence of validity and reliability. The results for the full sample
are reported here. Factor I, Seeking Social Support, included four items of instrumental
support and emotional support (items 5, 7, 13, and 17). Factor II, Solution-Orientation,
included four items from active coping and planning (items 1, 4, 10, and 19). Factor III,
Humor, included items for humor (items 12, and 26) and Factor VI, Acceptance, included
two items from acceptance and two items from positive reframing (items 2, 8, 9, and 16).
Before rotation, the four factors accounted for 55.98% of variance in the construct. The
result of EFA is presented in Table 14.
Convergent validity. As the evidence of convergent validity, all items loaded
above the cut-off point (.30) on each factor (Hair et al., 1998).
Discriminant validity. The factor correlation matrix showed low correlations
among the factors (all less than .85; Kline, 1998). The maximum value for correlations
between factors was .43 (Factor I and II: r = .24, Factor I and III: r = .04, Factor I and
IV: r = .17, Factor II and III: r = .04, Factor II and IV: r = .43, Factor III and IV: r =
.22). There was no cross-loading of items on factors.
Reliability. Cronbach’s alpha for the overall measure (14 items) was .75: for 4item Seeking Social Support α = .89; for Solution-Orientation α = .78, for Humor α = .87,
and for Acceptance α = .65.
Computation of total score for Adaptive Coping. Total scores for Adaptive
Coping were computed summing the item-ratings on all four factors (ranging from 21.00
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to 56.00, M = 42.43, SD = 6.11). Descriptive statistics for Adaptive Coping are presented
in Table 16.
Table 14
Factor Coefficients Based on a Maximum Likelihood Extraction with Promax Oblique Rotation for the
Measure of Adaptive Coping (MAC) (N = 513)
Scale

Seeking Social
Support

17

.889 (.881)

7

.795 (.816)

5

.794 (.811)

13

.793 (.746)

Solution-Orientation

19

.729 (.747)

4

.718 (.738)

1

.666 (.727)

10

.657 (.686)

Humor

12

.690 (.893)

26

.796 (.837)

Acceptance

8

.794 (.783)

16

.724 (.746)

9

.403 (.421)

2
Extraction SSLa

1.924 (3.452)

2.934 (1.573)

2.042 (2.163)

.383 (.385)
.937 (.826)

Rotation SSLa

2.888 (2.976)

2.455 (2.809)

1.680 (1.606)

2.032 (2.178)

% of Variance
explainedb

13.744 (24.654)

20.958 (11.237)

14.585 (15.453)

6.690 (5.897)

Cumulative % of
variance
13.744 (24.654)
34.702 (35.890)
49.286 (51.343)
55.976 (57.240)
explainedb
Note. Factor coefficients for the split-half sample (n = 257) are presented in parentheses. Factor
coefficients below .30 were suppressed.
a
Sum of Square loadings b Only values before rotation were reported here because variance explained after
an oblique rotation are not accurate due to correlated factors.

EFA on the Measure of Defensiveness (MD). From subscales in the Brief
COPE, items under Denial, Self-Distraction, Behavioral Disengagement, Self-Blame, and
Venting were formed the Measure of Defensiveness (MD)
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Data screening on MD prior to the factor analysis. There was an acceptable
sampling adequacy according to the KMO test (.68) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p <
.001). All VIFs were lower than 10.0. Thus, multicollinearity was not a problem (Green,
1991). Linearity was tested using random pairwise scatterplots of variables. Although
the plots did not indicate a clear linearity, there was no evidence of curvilinearity either.
Therefore, it was concluded that the linearity assumption was not violated (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007). The number of outliers was less than the critical number (less than 2% of
cases; Cohen & Cohen, 1983) except for item 24. Item 24 was also negatively skewed,
with skewness value of 2.11 which indicated moderate non-normality (|skew| > 2; West
et al., 1995). Thus, item 24 was eliminated and subsequent analysis was continued with
the original dataset excluding item 24.
Identifying item-candidates for elimination. The Kaiser’s rule as well as scree
plot identified four components with eigenvalues above 1.0. All items were loaded above
the cut-off point on either one of the factors, except for item 11 which did not load on any
of the factors. Also item 25 loaded by factor coefficient above 1.00 on one factor
suggesting an issue of multicollinearity. After eliminating items 11 and 25 (item 24 was
already out) and rerunning EFA, item 18 also did not load on any factor either.
Eliminating all three items 11, 18, and 25 improved the amount of variance accounted for
by the factors by 10.60% from 47.05% to 57.65%. EFA on the split-half sample verifies
the four factor structure.
Preliminary evidence of validity and reliability. The results for the full sample
are reported here. EFA retained the same subscales as presented by Brief COPE: Denial
as Factor I, Behavioral Disengagement as Factor II, Venting as Factor III, Self-Blame as
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Factor IV (Self-Distraction and Substance Use were excluded as the result of EFA). The
four factors accounted for 57.65% of variance before rotation. The result of EFA on the
Measure of defensiveness is presented in Table 15.
Table 15
Factor Coefficients Based on a Maximum Likelihood Extraction with Promax Oblique Rotation
for the Measure of Defensiveness (MD) (N = 513)
Scale

Denial

Behavioral
Disengagement

Venting

Self-Blame

20
14
27
22
3
21
6
28

.880 (1.009)
.650 (.500)

Extraction SSLa

2.241 (1.567)

.977 (1.257)

.750 (.984)

.644 (.590)

Rotation SSLa

1.776 (1.596)

1.787 (1.528)

1.308 (1.214)

1.566 (1.289)

% of Variance
explainedb

28.013 (19.593)

12.215 (15.708)

9.376 (12.302)

8.047 (7.373)

.973 (.726)
.465 (.704)
.854 (.904)
.588 (.475)
.733 (.736)
.690 (.602)

Cumulative % of
variance
28.013 (19.593)
40.229 (35.301)
49.605 (47.604)
57.652
b
explained
(54.977)
Note. Factor coefficients for the split-half sample (n = 257) are presented in parentheses. Factor
coefficients below .30 were suppressed.
a
Sum of Square loadings b Only values before rotation were reported here because variance
explained after an oblique rotation are not accurate due to correlated factors.

Convergent validity. As the evidence of convergent validity, all items loaded
above the cut-off point (.30) on each factor (Hair, et al. 1998). Minimum factor
coefficient was .47.
Discriminant validity. The factor correlation matrix showed low correlations
among the factors, Factor I and II: r = .50, Factor I and III: r = .21, Factor I and IV: r =
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.36, Factor II and III: r = .21, Factor II and IV: r = .45, Factor III and IV: r = .32
(critical value being .85; Kline, 1998) and there was no cross-loading of items on factors.
Reliability. Cronbach’s alpha for the overall measure (8 items) was .70: for
Denial α = .72; for Venting α = .68; for Behavioral Disengagement α = .70; for SelfBlame α = .67.
Computation of total score for Defensiveness. The total scores for
Defensiveness was computed summing the item-ratings on all four factors (M = 16.26,
SD = 4.09). Descriptive statistics for Defensiveness are presented in Table 16.
Table 16
Descriptive Statistics for the Measures of Non-Defensiveness (N = 513)
(Sub)Scales
Adaptive Coping
Seeking Social Support
Solution-Orientation
Humor
Acceptance
Total

No. of
items

Minimum

Maximum

M (SD)

Cronbach’s
alpha

4
4
2
4
14

4.00
4.00
2.00
5.00
21.00

16.00
16.00
8.00
16.00
56.00

11.64 (3.38)
13.45 (2.28)
5.02 (1.97)
12.33 (2.41)
42.43 (6.11)

.89
.78
.87
.65
.75

2
2

1.00
1.00

4.00
4.00

3.55 (.67)
3.43 (.67)

.72
.70

2
2
8

1.00
1.00
8.00

4.00
4.00
32.00

2.45 (.87)
2.43 (.84)
16.26 (4.09)

.68
.67
.70

-4.74

4.08

0.0 (1.39)

Defensiveness
Denial
Behavioral
Disengagement
Venting
Self-Blame
Total
Non-Defensiveness

Computation of the overall score of Non-Defensiveness. Standardized total
scores on Adaptive Coping and reverse coded standardized total scores on Defensiveness
were summed to obtain the overall score of Non-Defensiveness, M = 0.0, SD = 1.39.
Higher scores show more non-defensive approach to stressful situations and lower
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defensiveness and lower scores show use of more defensive coping approaches and, thus,
higher defensiveness. Descriptive statistics for Non-Defensiveness are presented in
Table 16.
Examination of Underlying Assumptions for Parametric Statistics
The hypotheses were tested using correlational and General Linear Regression
analyses techniques. Thus, it was substantial to test the underlying assumptions of these
parametric statistical approaches, namely, multicollinearity, normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity (Hinkle et al., 2005). Severe violation of these assumptions leads to
biased parameter estimates.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is defined as “the existence of substantial correlation among a
set of IV’s [Independent Variables]” (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, p.115), which inflates the
standard error of the regression coefficient estimates and makes the parameter estimates
inaccurate and unstable and difficult to interpret (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Green &
Salkind, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). High intercorrelations between the variables
indicate that those variables are measuring the same construct. Green (1991) suggested
that variables which show an intercorrelation greater than .90 should be removed from
the analyses or should be combined to make one variable. Bivariate correlation analysis
indicated that all variables were significantly and positively correlated. However, their
correlations did not exceed the critical value of .90. The correlation coefficients ranged
between .43 (between Overall-Well-being and Defensiveness) and .77 (between SelfActualization and Need-Satisfaction).
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Another approach to test for multicollinearity is to test IVs in a multiple linear
regression analysis for the variance inflation factor (VIF = 1 / (1 - R2)) as an indicator of
multicollinearity. This approach uses all independent variables in a set of multiple linear
regression analyses while each time taking one of them as the dependent variable and the
remaining variables as predictors (Hair et al., 1998). Thus, this approach was taken using
all IVs (Metacognition, Need-Satisfaction, Defensiveness, and Self-Actualization).
Different literature recommended different cut-off points for VIF as tolerable. For
instance, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggested a maximum level of 10 while some
recommended a maximum level of 5 (Rogerson, 2001) or 4 (Pan & Jackson, 2008).
Thus, because all VIFs appeared to be lower than 3, it was concluded that there is no
multicollinearity among independent variables.
Linearity
The linearity assumption assumes that independent and dependent variables in a
regression analysis have linear relationships (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The failure of this
assumption rather weakens an analysis than invalidates it (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Linearity was tested using pairwise scatterplots of variables of interest (Green 1991,
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). All pairwise scatterplots were examined. The variables
showed a relatively linear relationship. No violation of linearity was observed.
Normality
The assumption of normality assumes that the sampling distribution is normally
distributed. To test the normality, histograms as well as skewness and kurtosis are
examined (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Histograms show relatively normal
distribution for all variables. Skewness and kurtosis scores were standardized (i.e.,
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divided by their Standard Error) and compared against critical values for normal
distribution. According to skewness scores, Defensiveness, Metacognition and WellBeing showed significant negative skewness. Skewness of Self-Actualization was not
significant at p < .05 and skewness of Need-Satisfaction was not significant at p < .001.
None of the kurtosis values were significant. Field (2009) and Tabachnick and Fidell
(2007) recommended that for the sample size above 200 the normality of the sample be
investigated by relying on a histogram and the absolute value of the skewness rather than
the significant test; because even trivial deviations from normality would be significant
for large samples. The closer the value is to zero, the closer the distribution is to a
normal distribution. For large samples (n > 200), extreme non-normality are commonly
detected by absolute values of skewness larger than 3.0 (Kline, 2009; |skewness| > 2.0
indicates moderate non-normality; West et al., 1995). In the case of this study, none of
the skewness scores were greater than .51. The histograms also illustrated approximately
normal distributions for all variables.
Overall, the researcher concluded that the sampling distribution is approximately
normal for all variables. Furthermore, there was no univariate outlier (“cases with
standardized scores in excess of 3.29”; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p.73). The number of
multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis distance > 25 for sample sizes ≥ 500; Field, 2009, p.
247) did not exceed 2% of the cases (i.e., 11 cases) for any of the variables; thus, the
cases were retained for the analysis (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
Homoscedasticity
The assumption of homoscedasticity assumes that “the residuals at each level of
the predictor variable(s) have similar variances” (Field, 2009, p. 787). In other words,
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the variance for the dependent variable or predicted values is the same across different
values of the independent variable. Meeting the assumption of normality (in residual
distribution) is necessary for homoscedasticity to occur (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Green,
1991). This assumption was tested using plots of the standardized residuals and the
Studentized residuals against the standardized predicted values, histograms, and normal
probability plot of residuals. As an evidence of homoscedasticity, the first sets of plots
should be a random array of dots evenly scattered around zero (Field, 2009). As other
evidence, residuals should be normally distributed by showing a bell-shaped curve on the
histogram, and observed residuals should lie on a straight line representing a normal
distribution on the normal probability plot. All plots were examined for all variables
regressed on one another. No evidence of heteroscedasticity was observed.
Demographic Differences in Constructs of Interest
For the main hypothesis testing, the researcher needs to deal with the variances
accounted for by demographic variables. For this purpose, the predictive quality of
demographic variables was tested in relation to each construct of interest and the
variables that significantly accounted for the variance in the constructs under study were
identified. Two-way interactions between demographic variables were also analyzed to
detect possible interaction effects. Two-way interaction terms were created by
multiplying the dummy coded demographic variables (to keep the study feasible, other
orders of interactions were not examined in this study). Non-respondents for parents and
for immigrants also were dummy coded and used in the analyses as separate demographic
groups.
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To identify significant demographic differences for each construct of interest,
hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the interaction effects over and above the
additive effects of demographic variables. In the first step of the hierarchical regression
model, all the demographic variables were entered in the first block and all the two-way
interactions of these variables were entered in the second block. Following the rationale
for Step-Down or Backwards Regression (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Stockburger, 1996),
variables and interactions which demonstrated insignificant predictive qualities in regard
to the DV were identified and eliminated from the model. Remaining variables were
entered in a new hierarchical regression model in the same order as the first analyses (i.e.,
demographic variables at the first step and interactions at the second step).
To test for meaningful interaction effects, all variables involved in the significant
interactions were also included at the first step even if they did not show statistical
significance in predicting the DV. This step-by-step elimination of variables in the
hierarchical regression analysis continued until there remained the least possible variables
in the overall model which altogether significantly explained the variance in the DV.
Alpha levels were reported by their exact amount when they indicated non-significance
or they were very close to significant level of .05 (e.g., .047 or so).
This technique was used to identify demographic variables and the interactions
which were significantly predicting the outcome variables. Identified demographic
variables were used in the main hypothesis analyses for grouping the sample when the
constructs of interest were used as IVs or as control variables when the constructs of
interest were considered DVs.
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Demographic Variables and Well-Being
Well-Being was entered as the DV in a 2-step hierarchical regression model,
demographic variables in the first step and their two-way interactions in the second step.
The result indicated that Block 1 was significant (F(10,502) = 2.651, p < .01) and Block
2 was not significant (F(42,460) = 1.112, p = .297) in predicting Well-Being. In the
overall model, none of the demographic variables had significant alpha level and among
interaction terms, Parent X Non-immigrants, Emerging Adults X Immigrants, Gender X
Ethnicity, and Major X Immigrants significantly predicted Well-Being (p < .05). From
Block I, only Gender was significant (p < .05).
Gender, significant interaction terms and their corresponding variables were
entered into another hierarchical regression model. Both blocks significantly predicted
Well-Being. From Block I (F(7,505) = 3.683, p = .001), Emerging Adults, Gender, and
Major significantly predicted Well-Being (p < .05), while in the overall model (F(4,501)
= 3.846, p < .01), only Emerging Adult (i.e., participants aged between 17 to 29) , Major,
and Major X Immigrants significantly predicted Well-Being (p ≤ .01). Thus, Emerging
Adult, Gender, Major, Immigrant, and Major X Immigrant were entered into the third 2Step hierarchical regression model. The results showed that in this hierarchical
regression model both blocks were significant and all variables in the overall model
significantly predicted Well-Being, F(1,507) = 8.904, R2= .065, adjusted R2= .055, p <
.01.
In other words, Block 1 including demographic variables of Emerging Adults,
Gender, Major, and Immigrant significantly predicted Well-being, F(4,508) = 6.444, R2=
.048, adjusted R2= .041, p < .001. Furthermore, Major by Immigrant interaction was
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significant over and above all aforementioned demographic variables, B = -.963, p < .01.
Emerging Adults (B = -.590, p < .01), Gender (B = -.341, p < .05), Major (B = .716, p <
.01), and Immigrant (B = .645, p < .01) also significantly predicted Well-Being in the
overall model. Table 17 presents the final hierarchical regression analysis. Thus, these
demographic variables and Major by Immigrant interaction were used in the main
hypothesis testing as the control variable when Well-being was a Dependent Variable.
Table 17
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting overall Well-being from Demographic
Variables (N =513)
Variable

Ba
-.590**
-.341*
.716**
.645**

R2

Well-Being
F Change
Adjusted R2

Age Group
Gender
Major
Immigrant
Block 1
.048
.041
-.963**
Major X Immigrant
Block 2
.065
.055
a
The regression coefficients for the overall model are reported here.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

df1

df2

6.444***

4

508

8.904**

1

507

Demographic Variables and Self-Actualization
Self-Actualization was entered as the DV in a 2-step hierarchical regression
model, demographic variables in the first step and their two-way interactions in the
second step. The result indicated that Block 1 was significant (F(10,502) = 4.393, p <
.001) and Block 2 was not significant (F(42,460) = 1.183, p = .207) in predicting SelfActualization. In the overall model, the regression weights for none of demographic
variables were significant while among interaction terms, Marital-Status X Parent (p
=.046), Major X Immigrant (p =.046), and Gender X Missing-Parent (p <.05) were
significant and were included in the next hierarchical regression analysis along with their
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corresponding variables. From Block 1, Parent (p <.05), Gender (p = .001) and
Education (p =.051) were included in the next hierarchical regression analysis.
In the second hierarchical regression analysis, both blocks significantly predicted
Self-Actualization. From Block I (F(6,506) = 6.808, p < .001), Parent and Gender
significantly predicted Self-Actualization (p < .01), while from the overall model
(F(3,503) = 2.303, p = .076), only Gender, and Major had alpha levels below .05. None
of the interactions were significant. Thus, Parent, Gender, and Major were entered into a
multiple regression model. The model was significant, F(3,509) = 13.146, R2= .072,
adjusted R2= .066, p < .001.
In the last multiple regression analysis, all demographic variables significantly
predicted Self-Actualization. For Parent: B = .650 (p < .01), for Gender: B = -.634 (p <
.001), for Major: B = .327 (p = .047). Table 18 presents the final multiple regression
model for predicting Self-Actualization. Thus, these demographic variables were used in
the main hypothesis testing as the control variable when Self-Actualization was a
Dependent Variable and each was used to group the sample when Self-Actualization was
an IV.
Table 18
Summary of Multiple Regression Model Predicting Self-Actualization from Demographic
Variables (N =513)
Variable

Ba
.650**
-.634***
.327*

2

Self-Actualization
F Change
Adjusted R2

R
Parent
Gender
Major
Overall Model
.072
.066
13.146***
a
The regression coefficients for the overall model are reported here.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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df1

df2

3

509

Demographic Variables and Need-Satisfaction
Need-Satisfaction (NS) was entered as the DV in a hierarchical regression model,
demographic variables in the first step and their two-way interactions in the second step.
The result indicated that Block I and II were not significant (respectively, F(10,502) =
1.849, p = .050 and F(42,460) = 1.068, p = .362) in predicting Need-Satisfaction. None
of the demographic variables, in the overall model or Block I, significantly predicted NS.
Among interaction terms, Major X Immigrant (p = .010) and their corresponding
variables were identified to be included in the next hierarchical regression analysis.
In the second hierarchical regression analysis, from Block I (F(2,510) = 5.017, p
< .01) only Major significantly predicted NS (p < .01). The overall model was not
significant (F(1,509) = 3.492, p = .062), indicating no interaction effect. Entering Major
alone in a regression analysis, the model predicted NS at the alpha level of .002, F(1,511)
= 9.847, R2= .019, adjusted R2= .017, B = .460, p < .01. Table 19 presents the final
regression model for Need-Satisfaction. [not included yet] Thus, Major was used in the
main hypothesis testing as the control variable when NS was a Dependent Variable and to
group the sample when NS was an Independent Variable.
Table 19
Summary of Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Need-Satisfaction from Demographic
Variables (N =513)
Variable

a

2

Need-Satisfaction
F Change
Adjusted R2

B
R
Major
Overall Model
.460**
.019
.017
9.847
a
The regression coefficients for the overall model are reported here.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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df1

df2

1

511

Demographic Variables and Non-Defensiveness
Non-Defensiveness (ND) was entered as the DV in a hierarchical regression
model, demographic variables in the first step and their two-way interactions in the
second step. The result indicated that neither Block I nor the overall model was
significant in predicting Non-Defensiveness (respectively, F(10,502) = 1.464, p = .149
and F(42,460) = .952, p = .560). In the overall model, only the regression weight for
Emerging Adult was significant in predicting ND (p = .047). None of the interactions
were significant. In Block I, only Gender significantly predicted ND (p <.05). Thus,
Gender and Emerging Adult and their interaction were entered in the next hierarchical
regression analysis.
In the second hierarchical regression analysis, only the overall model was
significant indicating a significant interaction effect. Age Group X Gender significantly
predicted ND, F(1,509) = 5.716, R2= .022, adjusted R2= .016, B = .812, p < .05. The
regression weights for Age Group and Gender were also significant (respectively, B = .553, p < .01 and B = -.909, p < .01). Table 20 presents the final hierarchical regression
analysis for Non-Defensiveness.
Table 20
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Non-Defensiveness from Demographic
Variables (N =513)
Variable

Ba
-.553**
-.909**

R2

Non-Defensiveness
Adjusted R2 F Change

Age Group
Gender
Block 1
.011
.007
6.444***
.812*
Age Group X Gender
Block 2
.022
.016
5.716*
a
The regression coefficients for the overall model are reported here.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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df1

df2

4

508

1

509

Age Group, Gender, and their interaction were used in the main hypothesis testing as the
control variable when ND was a Dependent Variable and the interaction term was used to
group the sample when ND was an IV.
Demographic Variables and Metacognition
Metacognition was entered as the DV in a hierarchical regression model, where
demographic variables were entered in the first step and their two-way interactions were
included in the second step. The result indicated that Block I and II were not significant
in predicting Metacognition (respectively, F(10,502) = 1.758, p = .066 and F(42,460) =
1.120, p = .285). Within the Blocks, none of the demographic variables were significant
in predicting Metacognition; only the regression weights for interaction term, Major X
Immigrant (p < .01) was significant. Thus, this interaction and its corresponding
variables (i.e., Major and Immigrant) were included in the next hierarchical regression
analysis.
In this second hierarchical regression analysis, only the overall model was
significant, F(1,509) = 6.097, R2= .018, adjusted R2= .013, p < .05, indicating that the
interaction between Major and Immigrant significantly predicted Metacognition (B = 25.937). The regression weights were also significant for Major (B = 18.355, p < .01)
and non-significant for Immigrant (B = 15.730, p = .050) in the overall model. Table 21
presents the final hierarchical regression analysis for Metacognition. Major by
Immigrant interaction was used to group the sample when Metacognition was an IV.
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Table 21
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Metacognition from Demographic
Variables (N =513)
Variable

Ba
18.355**
15.730

R2

Metacognition
F Change
Adjusted R2

Major
Immigrant
Block 1
.007
.003
1.728
-25.937*
Major X Immigrant
Block 2
.018
.013
6.097
a
The regression coefficients for the overall model are reported here.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

df1

df2

2

510

1

509

Hypothesis Testing
Hypotheses 1 through 7 were examined using hierarchical regression analysis and
Hypotheses 8 and 9 were tested using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Control
variables and grouping variables identified in section “Demographic Differences in
Constructs of Interest” were used accordingly in each analysis. Accordingly, a
demographic variable would be used to group the sample if in the previous section it was
found to have a differentiating effect on the dependent variable involved in hypothesis
testing. A demographic variable would be used as the control variable if it was found to
significantly predict the independent variable in the previous section. If the variable was
already in use to group the sample, it would be excluded from the list of control variables.
Grouping the sample and testing the hypotheses across demographically different
samples also help to check the robustness of the finding from the full sample.
Prior to hypothesis testing, the relationship between the constructs of interest was
examined doing one-tailed significant test of bivariate correlational analysis (Table 22).
According to Cohen’s (1988) criterion for evaluating effect sizes, correlational
coefficients between .10 and .30 are small effects; correlational coefficients ranging from
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Table 22
Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients for Well-being, Self-Actualization, Non-Defensiveness, Need-Satisfaction, and Metacognition and Their Underlying Factor Structure
(N = 513)
Variables
WB
SA
ND
NS
MC
SWB
EWB
AcSt
AcSf
Cpg
Dfns
GNS
GRNS
KC
RC
WB
1.00
SWB

.87**

1.00

EWB

.87**

.51**

1.00

.54**

.36**

.58**

1.00

AcSt

.36**

.22**

.42**

.87**

1.00

AcSf

.57**

.40**

.60**

.87**

.50**

1.00

.43**

.25**

.49**

.44**

.28**

.49**

1.00

Cpg

.42**

.35**

.38**

.34**

.16**

.42**

.69**

1.00

Dfns

-.17**

.01

-.30**

-.28**

-.22**

-.26**

-.69**

.04

1.00

NS

.56**

.38**

.60**

.77**

.68**

.66**

.45**

.31**

-.32**

1.00

GNS

.58**

.43**

.57**

.54**

.32**

.62**

.50**

.42**

-.28**

.82**

1.00

GLNS

.34**

.19**

.41**

.72**

.79**

.46**

.24**

.08*

-.25**

.82**

.34**

1.00

MC

.51**

.32**

.56**

.52**

.34**

.56**

.51**

.53**

-.17**

.48**

.52**

.27**

1.00

KC

.50**

.31**

.55**

.50**

.30**

.57**

.50**

.46**

-.24**

.49**

.57**

.25**

.93**

1.00

RC

.47**

.30**

.51**

.48**

.34**

.50**

.46**

.53**

-.11*

.42**

.44**

.25**

.96**

.78**

SA

ND

1.00

Note. WB = overall Well-Being. SWB = Subjective Well-Being. EWB = Eudaimonic Well-Being. SA = Self-Actualization. AcSt = Actualizing-Striving. AcSf =
Actualizing-Self. ND = Non-Defensiveness. Cpg = Adaptive Coping. Dfns = Defensiveness. NS is Need-Satisfaction. GNS = General Need-Satisfaction. GRNS = GoalRelated Need-Satisfaction. MC = Metacognition. KC = Knowledge of Cognition. RC = Regulation of Cognition.
** p < .001, one-tailed. * p < .05, one-tailed
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.30 to .50 are medium effects; and, large effects are determined by correlation
coefficients greater than .50. Table 22 presents zero-order correlations between
constructs of interest and between their underlying factor structures.
All constructs under study were significantly and positively correlated (p < .001)
to each other by effect sizes ranging from very small to large (.04 ≤ r ≤ .79), except for
Defensiveness which was not related to Subjective Well-Being (p = .441) and to
Adaptive Coping (p = .199) and, as expected, was significantly but negatively correlated
to all other variables (p < .001). The zero-order correlations were reported for each
hypothesis testing for the variables involved.
Testing Hypothesis 1: There Is a Positive Relationship Between Self-Actualization
and Overall Well-Being.
The bivariate correlational analysis showed that Well-Being was significantly and
positively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .54, p < .001), Actualizing-Self (r = .57,
p < .001), and Actualizing-Striving (r = .36, p < .001). SWB was also significantly and
positively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .36, p < .001), Actualizing-Self (r = .40,
p < .001), and with Actualizing-Striving (r = .22, p < .001). EWB was significantly and
positively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .58, p < .001), Actualizing-Self (r = .60,
p < .001), and with Actualizing-Striving (r = .42, p < .001). The results support the
positive relationship of Self-Actualization and its components with Well-Being and its
components.
The hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to examine the unique
contribution of Self-Actualization to overall Well-Being. The analysis was conducted
four times, once for the whole sample and three times comparing two demographic
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groups in the sample, grouped by either Gender or Parenthood, or Major each time. Age
Group, Gender, Major, and Major X Immigrants were entered as control variables in the
first block where was appropriate. The possibility of interactions between covariates and
independent variable was checked and none of the interactions were significant in
predicting Well-Being (for Gender X SA, p = .154; for Major X SA, p = .565; Immigrant
X SA, p = .100; Age Group X SA, p = .157), neither for SWB nor for EWB (all p > .05).
Self-Actualization and Well-Being in the full sample. In the full sample, SelfActualization predicted 24.8% of variance in Well-Being over and above demographic
control variables, F(1,506) = 182.109, ∆R2= .248, p < .001, Total R2= .312, Total
adjusted R2= .304. On average, for every 1 SD change in Self-Actualization, Well-Being
changed by .515 SD (or for every 1 unit change in SA score, WB score changed by .517
units.). The results support H1 for the full sample. Table 23 demonstrates the summary
of hierarchical linear regression analysis with overall Well-Being as DV.
Self-Actualization and Well-Being in the split sample by Gender. When splitting
the sample by Gender, again Self-Actualization predicted Well-Being over and above the
remaining control variables (excluding Gender); for females, F(1,324) = 89.097, ∆R2=
.205, R2= .256, adjusted R2= .245, p < .001; for males, F(1,177) = 97.771, ∆R2= .338,
R2= .388, adjusted R2= .371, p < .001. On average, by every 1 SD change in SelfActualization, Well-Being changed by .459 SD for females and by .590 SD for males (or
for every 1 unit change in SA, WB changed by .479 for females and by .578 for males.).
The results support H1 for males and females with the greater amount of variance
accounted for, for males (34.3%) compared to females (20.5%; see Table 23).
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Table 23
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting overall Well-being from SelfActualization
Variable
Full Sample (N =513)
Age Group
Gender
Major
Immigrant
Major X Immigrant
Block 1
Self-Actualization
Block 2
Total R2
.312
Adjusted R2
.304
Female (n = 330)
Age Group
Major
Immigrant
Major X Immigrant
Block 1
Self-Actualization
Block 2
Total R2
.256
Adjusted R2
.245
Male (n = 183)
Age Group
Major
Immigrant
Major X Immigrant
Block 1
Self-Actualization
Block 2
Total R2
.388
Adjusted R2
.371
Parent =0.0 (n = 452)
Age Group
Gender
Major
Immigrant
Major X Immigrant
Block 1
Self-Actualization
Block 2
2
Total R
.355
Adjusted R2
.347

βa
-.084*
.001
.129**
.146*
-.156*
-.515***
--

-.085
.151*
.164
-.170
-.459***
--

∆R2

Adjusted ∆R2

Well-Being
F Change

df1

df2

.065

.055

7.016***

5

507

.248

.249

182.109***

1

506

.052

.040

4.432**

4

325

.205

.205

89.097***

1

324

.050

.028

2.327

4

178

.338

.343

97.771***

1

177

-.095
.089
.140
-.171*
.590***

-.091*
-.013
.135**
.158**
-.188**
-.555***
--

.063

.053

6.020***

5

446

.292

.294

201.517***

1

445

(continued)
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Table 23 (continued)
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting overall Well-being from SelfActualization
Variable

βa

∆R2

Adjusted ∆R2

Well-Being
F Change

Education Students
(n = 312)
Age Group
-.129*
Gender
-.040
Immigrant
-.055
Block 1
-.046
.036
4.911**
Self-Actualization
.508***
Block 2
-.250
.250
108.825***
Total R2
.295
Adjusted R2
.286
Non-Education Students
(n = 201)
Age Group
-.001
Gender
.055
Immigrant
.156*
Block 1
-.043
.028
2.922*
Self-Actualization
.522***
Block 2
-.256
.256
71.383***
Total R2
.298
Adjusted R2
.284
a
The standardized regression coefficients are reported only for the overall model.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

df1

df2

3

308

1

307

3
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1
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Self-Actualization and Well-Being in the split sample by Parenthood. When
splitting the sample by Parenthood, Self-Actualization predicted Well-Being over and
above all control variables for Parenthood = 0.0 (i.e., the combination of non-parents and
non-respondents to parenthood question), F(1,445) = 201.517, ∆R2= .292, R2= .355,
adjusted R2= .347, p < .001 (see Table 23). For this group, on average, by every 1 SD
change in Self-Actualization, Well-Being changed by .555 SD (or for every 1 unit change
in SA, WB changed by .557). For parents (Parenthood = 1.0), however, contribution of
Self-Actualization did not turned out significant, F(1,54) = 1.881, p = .176. The results
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support H1 for the sample of Parenthood = 0.0 (i.e., including non-parents and nonrespondents), but not for parents.
Self-Actualization and Well-Being in the split sample by Major. When split the
sample by Major, again Self-Actualization significantly contributed to the variance in
Well-Being over and above Gender, Age Group, and Immigration Status for both
education students, F(1,307) = 108.825, ∆R2= .250, R2= .295, adjusted R2= .286, p <
.001 and non-education students, F(1,196) = 71.383, ∆R2= .256, R2= .298, adjusted R2=
.284, p < .001. On average, by every 1 SD change in Self-Actualization, Well-Being
changed by .508 SD for education students and by .522 SD for non-education students (or
for every 1 unit change in SA scores, WB score changed by .496 unit for education
students and by .548 unit for non-education students.). The results support H1 for both
education and non-education students with almost similar amount of variance explained
(about 25%) for both groups (see Table 23).
Self-Actualization and EWB/SWB in the full sample. Similar results were
obtained when conducting hierarchical regression analysis with Eudaimonic Well-being
(EWB) or Subjective Well-Being (SWB) as the dependent variables. Independent from
all control variables, Self-Actualization significantly predicted EWB, F(1,506) =
234.731, ∆R2= .292, R2= .371, adjusted R2= .364, p < .001 and SWB, F(1,506) =
62.575, ∆R2= .106, R2= .145, adjusted R2= .134, p < .001. The regression coefficient
for Self-Actualization was 3.952 (β = .559) for EWB and .313 (β = .337) for SWB.
Given the results of the analysis, Hypothesis 1 was supported for the full sample when
having EWB or SWB as indicators of well-being. SA accounted for much higher unique
variance in EWB (29.2%) than did in SWB (10.6%).
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Self-Actualization and EWB/SWB in the split sample by Gender. When splitting
the sample by Gender, again Self-Actualization predicted EWB over and above the
remaining control variables (excluding Gender); for females, F(1,324) = 124.383, ∆R2=
.255, R2= .336, adjusted R2= .326, p < .001; for males, F(1,177) = 111.826, ∆R2= .363,
R2= .425, adjusted R2= .408, p < .001. For EWB, the regression coefficient for SelfActualization was 3.765 (β = .512) for females and 4.260 (β = .612) for males.
Furthermore, Self-Actualization predicted SWB over and above the demographic control
variables; for females, F(1,324) = 28.391, ∆R2= .079, R2= .103, adjusted R2= .090, p <
.001; for males, F(1,177) = 35.831, ∆R2= .164, R2= .190, adjusted R2= .167, p < .001.
For SWB, the regression coefficient for Self-Actualization was .276 (β = .284) for
females and .371 (β = .411) for males.
In sum, the shared variance between SA and either EWB or SWB was
approximately 10% higher for males than for females and about 17% (females) to 20%
(males) higher for EWB than for SWB. Altogether, the results support H1 for males and
females when having EWB or SWB as indicators of well-being.
Self-Actualization and EWB/SWB in the split sample by Parenthood. When
splitting the sample by Parenthood, Self-Actualization predicted EWB over and above all
demographic control variables for the combination of non-parents and non-respondents to
parenthood question (Parenthood = 0.0), F(1,445) = 257.487, ∆R2= .341, R2= .411,
adjusted R2= .403, p < .001. For EWB in this group, the regression coefficient for SelfActualization was 4.288 (β = .600). However, similar to overall Well-Being, the
contribution of Self-Actualization to EWB was not significant for parents (Parent coded
as 1.0), F(1,54) = 1.435, p = .236. Similarly, Self-Actualization predicted SWB over and
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above all control variables for the combination of non-parents and non-respondents to
parenthood question (Parenthood = 0.0), F(1,445) = 67.112, ∆R2= .125, R2= .171,
adjusted R2= .159, p < .001. For SWB in this group, the regression coefficient for SelfActualization was .334 (β = .363). Again, similar to overall Well-Being, the contribution
of Self-Actualization to SWB was not significant for parents (Parenthood = 1.0), F(1,54)
= 1.482, p = .229.
Overall, SA accounted for 34.1% of variance in EWB which is more than twice of
the variance accounted for in SWB (15.9%). The results support H1 for the sample of
Parenthood = 0.0 (i.e., including non-parents and non-respondents), but not for parents
when having EWB or SWB as indicators of well-being.
Self-Actualization and EWB/SWB in the split sample by Major. When splitting
the sample by Major, again Self-Actualization significantly contributed to the variance in
EWB over and above Gender, Age Group, and Immigration Status for both education
students, F(1,307) = 142.384, ∆R2= .296, R2= .362, adjusted R2= .354, p < .001 and
non-education students, F(1,196) = 89.692, ∆R2= .309, R2= .325, adjusted R2= .312, p
< .001. For EWB, the regression coefficient for Self-Actualization was 3.897 (β = .553)
for education students and 4.002 (β = .573) for non-education students. Similarly for
SWB, Self-Actualization significantly contributed to the variance in EWB over and
above Gender, Age Group, and Immigration Status for both education students, F(1,307)
= 33.159, ∆R2= .096, R2= .113, adjusted R2= .102, p < .001 and non-education students,
F(1,196) = 20.005, ∆R2= .122, R2= .178, adjusted R2= .161, p < .001. For SWB, the
regression coefficient for Self-Actualization was .286 (β = .315) for education students
and .355 (β = .360) for non-education students.
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Altogether, SA accounted for almost the same amount of variance in EWB/SWB
for education and non-education major students (i.e., about 30% for EWB and about 10%
for SWB). The explained variance was again two to three times higher in EWB than in
SWB. The results support H1 for education and non-education students when using
EWB or SWB as indicators of well-being.
Summary of results for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1, which stated that there is a
positive relationship between self-actualization and human well-being, was supported by
the results obtained from both bivariate correlational analysis and hierarchical regression
analyses across samples. Among all samples, including samples of males, females,
education students, non-education students, and parent and non-parent students and the
full sample, only the result for parents was not statistically significant at α =.05. Thus,
the researcher did not have enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis for parents (i.e.,
H0: there is no or negative relationship between self-actualization and well-being.).
However, a non-significant result was expected due to the small sample size for parents
(n = 61). The non-significant result for the small sample leaves the researcher
inconclusive about this population. In sum, students (except for parent students) who
reported higher level of self-actualization also experienced higher level of well-being
(both subjective and eudaimonic well-being). This suggests that the more self-actualizing
one is, most probably the higher level of subjective and eudaimonic well-being one
experiences.
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Testing Hypothesis 2: There Is a Positive Relationship Between the Adoption of
More Adaptive Styles of Psychological Defense and Self-Actualization.
In this analysis, Non-Defensiveness scores were used as the indicator of the
adoption of more adaptive styles of psychological defense/coping. The bivariate
correlational analysis showed that Non-Defensiveness was significantly and positively
correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .44, p < .001) and all its components (ActualizingSelf, r = .49, p < .001; and Actualizing-Striving, r = .28, p < .001). Adaptive Coping was
also significantly and positively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .34, p < .001),
Actualizing-Self (r = .42, p < .001), and with Actualizing-Striving (r = .16, p < .001).
Defensiveness was significantly and negatively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .28, p < .001), Actualizing-Self (r = -.26, p < .001), and with Actualizing-Striving (r = .22, p < .001). The results support the positive relationship between Self-Actualization
and Non-Defensiveness, indicating that higher self-actualization is associated with
adopting more adaptive style of psychological defense.
The hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the unique contribution
of Non-Defensiveness (ND) to Self-Actualization (SA). The analysis was conducted two
times, once for the full sample and once comparing four demographic groups in the
sample, grouped by Age Group X Gender (due to the differentiating effect of Age Group
X Gender on ND). Gender, Parenthood, and Major were entered as control variables in
the first block for the full sample, and after grouping only Parenthood and Major were
used as control variables. The possibility of interactions between covariates and
independent variable was checked and none of the interactions were significant in
predicting Self-Actualization.
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Non-Defensiveness and Self-Actualization in the full sample. In the full sample,
Non-Defensiveness predicted 17.6% of variance in Self-Actualization over and above all
control variables, F(1,508) = 118.625, R2= .248, adjusted R2= .242, p < .001. On
average, by every 1 SD change in ND, Self-Actualization changed by .421 SD (or for
every 1 unit change in ND, SA changed by .526.). The results support H2 for the full
sample (see Table 24).
Non-Defensiveness and Self-actualization in the split sample by Age Group X
Gender. When splitting the sample by four factorial groups formed between Gender and
Age Group, again Non-Defensiveness predicted Self-Actualization over and above the
remaining control variables (excluding Gender); for adult females, F(1,50) = 13.237,
∆R2= .195, R2= .26.5, adjusted R2= .221, p = .001; for adult males, F(1,27) = 15.099,
∆R2= .298, R2= .468, adjusted R2= .409, p = .001; for emerging-adult females, F(1,272)
= 53.321, ∆R2= .163, R2= .171, adjusted R2= .162, p < .001; for emerging-adult males,
F(1,148) = 35.702, ∆R2= .191, R2= .207, adjusted R2= .191, p < .001. The regression
coefficient for ND is .567 (β = .447) for adult females, .673 (β = .571) for adult males,
.473 (β = .403) for emerging-adult females, and .585 (β = .441) for emerging-adult males
(see Table 24). These results support H2 (i.e., the positive relationship between nondefensiveness and self-actualization) across different demographic groups.
Summary of Results for Hypothesis 2. The result of bivariate correlational
analysis indicated small- to medium-range effect sizes (Pearson r; Cohen, 1988), ranging
from .16 to .49, for the relationship of Non-Defensiveness and its components with SelfActualization and its components. The results of hierarchical regression analysis also
indicated medium to large effect sizes (adjusted R2, the coefficient of determination;
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Table 24
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Self-Actualization from Non-Defensiveness
Variable
Full Sample (N =513)
Gender
Major
Parents
Block 1
Non-Defensiveness
Block 2
.248
Total R2
.242
Adjusted R2
Adult Female (n = 54)
Major
Parents
Block 1
Non-Defensiveness
Block 2
.265
Total R2
.221
Adjusted R2
Adult Male (n= 31)

βa
-.146***
.085*
.099*
-.421***
--

-.163
.306*
-.447a***
--

∆R2

Self-Actualization
Adjusted ∆R2
F Change

df1

df2

.072

.066

13.146***

3

509

.176

.176

118.625***

1

508

.071

.034

1.935

2

51

.195

.187

13.237a***

1

50

2

28

1

27

2

273

1

272

2

149

1

148

Education
.252
Parents
.058
Block 1
-.170
.111
2.872
.571a***
Non-Defensiveness
Block 2
-.298
.298
15.099a***
2
.468
Total R
.409
Adjusted R2
Emerging-Adult Female
(n = 276)
Education
.060
Parents
.065
Block 1
-.008
.001
1.169
.403***
Non-Defensiveness
Block 2
-.163
.161
53.321***
.171
Total R2
.162
Adjusted R2
Emerging-Adult Male
(n = 152)
Education
.111
Parents
.022
Block 1
-.016
.003
1.199
.441***
Non-Defensiveness
Block 2
-.191
.188
35.702***
.207
Total R2
.191
Adjusted R2
a
The standardized regression coefficients are reported only for the overall model.
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 a***p = .001
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Cohen, 1988) for this relationship ranging from .161 to .298. For adult males, NonDefensiveness accounted for the greatest amount of unique variance (29.8%) in SelfActualization compared to adult females (18.7%), emerging-adult males (18.8%) and
emerging-adult females (16.1%). These results altogether, support H2 which stated that
there is a positive relationship between non-defensiveness and self-actualization. That is,
the more non-defensive people behave in stressful situations, the more self-actualizing
they are in life, and the more defensive people behave, the less self-actualizing people
are.
Testing Hypothesis 3: There Is a Positive Relationship Between Need-Satisfaction
and Self-Actualization.
The bivariate correlational analysis showed that Need-Satisfaction was
significantly and positively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .77, p < .001) and with
all its components (Actualizing-Self, r = .66, p < .001; and Actualizing-Striving, r = .68,
p < .001). General Need-Satisfaction was significantly and positively correlated with
Self-Actualization (r = .54, p < .001), Actualizing-Self (r = .62, p < .001), and with
Actualizing-Striving (r = .32, p < .001). Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction was
significantly and positively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .72, p < .001),
Actualizing-Self (r = .79, p < .001) and with Actualizing-Striving (r = .46, p < .001). The
results support the positive relationship between Need-Satisfaction (NS) and SelfActualization (SA) as stated in Hypothesis 3.
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the unique contribution of
need-satisfaction to the process of self-actualization. The analysis was conducted two
times, once for the full sample and once comparing two demographic groups in the
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sample, grouped by Major (due to the differentiating effect of Major on NS). Gender,
Parenthood, and Major that showed significant mean differences for Self-Actualization
were identified to be used as control variables in the full sample. Only Gender and
Parenthood were used as control variables in split samples by Major.
Prior to starting the hypothesis testing, the possibility of interactions between
covariates and independent variable was checked using hierarchical regression analysis.
Demographic control variables and Need-Satisfaction was entered in Block 1 and
interactions were included in Block 2. For the full sample, only the interaction between
Gender and NS was significant in predicting Self-Actualization (β = .139, p < .001). The
other two interactions were not significant (for Major X NS, p = .073; for Parenthood X
NS, p = .619). The result was the same for the sample of non-education students while
for education students none of the interactions were significant. Therefore, Gender X NS
formed the third block in subsequent hierarchical regression analysis.
Need-Satisfaction and Self-Actualization in the full sample. In the hierarchical
regression analysis for the full sample, Parenthood and Major were entered as covariates
at Block 1, Gender and Need-Satisfaction as independent variables at Block 2 and Gender
X NS at Block 3 to test the interaction effect over and above the additive effect of
independent variables. In the full sample, Block 1 (i.e. covariates) predicted 4.5% of
variance in Self-Actualization (p < .001). Adding Need-Satisfaction and Gender together
accounted for 57% more variance in Self-Actualization (p < .001). The interaction also
accounted for .7% more variance (F(1,507) = 9.957, p < .01) over and above the additive
effect of IVs. R2 for the overall model was .623 (adjusted R2= .619). Table 25 presents
the details of this analysis, and Figure 7 illustrates the existing interaction effect.
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Figure 7. The Gender by Need-Satisfaction interaction in predicting Self-Actualization
for the full sample

Because the interaction effect exists, the main effect of Need-Satisfaction on SelfActualization is not interpretable. Thus, the regression coefficients for all variables in the
overall model are reported here. In the overall model, the regression coefficient for
Major was .052 (β = .015, p = .624), for Parenthood was .335 (β = .063, p < .05), for
Gender was -.437 (β = -.121, p < .001), for Need-Satisfaction was .727 (β = .687, p <
.001), and for Gender X Need-Satisfaction was .194 (β = .106, p < .01). On average, by
every 1 SD change in NS, Self-Actualization changed by .687 SD for females and
changed by .793 (i.e., .687 + .106) SD for males; or for every 1 unit change in NS, SA
changed by .727 unit for females and by .921 (i.e., .727 + .194) unit for males. The result
supports the positive relationship between need-satisfaction and self-actualization (H3).
Need-Satisfaction and Self-actualization in the split sample by Major. When
splitting the sample to education (n = 312) and non-education (n = 201) students, only
Parenthood was used as the covariate and Gender and NS were entered as IVs at the next
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step. The results of a preliminary hierarchical regression analysis showed that there was
not an interaction effect For education students, F(1,307) = 1.876, p = .172. Thus, for
this split sample Parenthood and Gender were treated as covariates and NS was treated as
IV. Need-satisfaction significantly predicted Self-Actualization over and above the effect
of covariates (i.e., Parent and Gender), F(1,308) = 497.026, ∆R2= .593, p < .001.

For

education students, the regression coefficient for NS in predicting SA was .793 (β =
.775). That is, on average, for every 1 SD change in NS of education students, SelfActualization changed by .775 SD; or by every 1 unit change in NS, Self-Actualization
changed by .793 unit on average. The effect size for the overall model was large, R2=
.632 (adjusted R2= .629) (see Table 25).
For non-education students, there was an interaction between Gender and NS,
F(1,196) = 13.201, ∆R2= .028, R2= .591, adjusted R2= .583, p < .001. Thus, a
hierarchical regression analysis similar to the full sample was conducted for this split
sample. For non-education students, the main effect of Need-Satisfaction on SelfActualization is not interpretable due to the interaction effect. Thus, the regression
coefficients for all variables in the overall model were reported here. In the overall
model, the regression coefficient for Parent was -.041 (β = -.005, p = .905), for Gender
was -.523 (β = -.152, p = .001), for Need-Satisfaction was .545 (β = .494, p < .001), and
for Gender X NS was .383 (β = .280, p < .001). On average, by every 1 SD change in
NS, Self-Actualization changed by .494 SD for female non-education students and
changed by .774 (i.e., .280 + .494) SD for male non-education students; or for every 1
unit change in NS, SA changed by .545 unit for female non-education students and by
.928 (i.e., .545 + .383) unit for male non-education students. The effect size for the
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overall model was also large, R2= .591 (adjusted R2= .583). Table 25 presents the details
of this analysis, and Figure 8 illustrates the interaction effect.

Figure 8. The Gender by Need-Satisfaction interaction in predicting Self-Actualization
for non-education students

In line with the result of correlational analysis, the results of hierarchical
regression analysis across samples support the positive relationship between needsatisfaction and self-actualization (H3). The shared variance accounted for is slightly
higher for education students (62.9%) than for non-education students (58.3%) yet both
indicating large effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) at the direction of the hypothesized
relationship.
Summary of results for Hypothesis 3. The results of bivariate correlational
analysis indicated medium to large effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) for the relationship of
Need-Satisfaction and its components with Self-Actualization and its components, with r
ranging from .32 to .79. Moreover, the results from the hierarchical regression analysis
support this hypothesis across samples of education and non-education students as well as
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for the full sample. Large effect sizes ranging from .583 to .629 indicates the overall
variance accounted for by different models from which only zero to 4.1% of variance in
SA was explained by demographic control variables. In sum, the results support H3
across samples indicating that students who have their psychological needs relatively
taken care of are more likely to demonstrate higher level of self-actualization than
students who reported lower extent of need satisfaction.
Table 25
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Self-Actualization from Need-Satisfaction
Variable

βa

∆R2

Adjusted ∆R2

.045

.041

Self-Actualization
F Change

df1

df2

12.048***

2

510

Block 2
.570
.571
376.493***
Gender X NS
Block 3
.007
.007
9.957**
Total R2
.623
Adjusted R2
.619
Non-Education (n = 201)
Parent
-.005
Block 1
-.001
-.004
.226
Gender
-.152a***
NS
.494***
Block 2
-.562
.561
126.806***
.280***
Gender X NS
Block 3
-.028
.026
13.201***
Total R2
.591
Adjusted R2
.583
Education (n = 312)
Parent
.089*
Gender
-.074*
Block 1
-.039
.033
6.230**
NS
.775***
Block 2
-.593
.596
497.026***
Total R2
.632
Adjusted R2
.629
a
The standardized regression coefficients are reported only for the overall model.
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 a***p = .001.

2

508

1

507

1

199

2

197

1

196

2

309

1

308

Full Sample (N =513)
Parent
Major
Block 1
Gender
NS

.063*
.015
--.121***
.687***
-.106**
--
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Testing Hypothesis 4: There Is a Positive Relationship Between Metacognition and
Need-Satisfaction.
The bivariate correlational analysis showed that Metacognition was significantly
and positively correlated with Need-Satisfaction (r = .48, p < .001), General NS (r = .52,
p < .001), and Goal-Related NS (r = .27, p < .001). Knowledge of Cognition was also
significantly and positively correlated with Need-Satisfaction (r = .49, p < .001), General
NS (r = .57, p < .001), and with Goal-Related NS (r = .25, p < .001). Regulation of
Cognition was also significantly and positively correlated with Need-Satisfaction (r =
.42, p < .001), General NS (r = .44, p < .001), and with Goal-Related NS (r = .25, p <
.001). The results support the positive relationship between general metacognitive
competence and need-satisfaction as hypothesized in H4.
The hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the unique contribution
of Metacognition to Need-Satisfaction. The analysis was conducted two times, once for
the full sample and once comparing four demographic groups in the sample, grouped by
Major X Immigrant interaction (due to the differentiating effect of this interaction on
Metacognition scores). Major that showed significant mean difference for NeedSatisfaction was identified to be used as the control variable only when analyzing the full
sample.
The possibility of interactions between covariates and independent variable was
checked for the full sample using the hierarchical regression analysis. Major as the
control variable and Metacognition as IV were entered in the first block. Major X
Metacognition was included in Block 2. The interaction was not significant in predicting
Need-Satisfaction (F(1, 509) = .149, p = .700).
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Metacognition and Need-Satisfaction in the full sample. Major was entered as
the covariate in Block 1 for the full sample, and Metacognition in Block 2 as the
independent variable. Metacognition explained 21.8% of variance in Need Satisfaction
(F(1,510) = 145.850, p < .001) over and above 1.9% variance accounted for by Major
(F(1,511) = 9.847, p < .01). R2 for the overall model was .237 (adjusted R2= .234). The
regression coefficients in the overall model were .332 (β =.099, p < .05) for Major and
.014 (β =.469, p < .001) for Metacognition. That is, on average by every 1 SD change in
Metacognition, Need-Satisfaction changed by .469 SD; or for every 1 unit change in NS,
SA changed by .332. This result supports H4 for the full sample (see Table 26)
Metacognition and Need-Satisfaction in the split sample by Major X Immigrant.
When splitting the sample by Major X Immigrant to four groups, Metacognition was
significant in predicting Need-Satisfaction (p < .001). For non-immigrant non-education
students, F(1,123) = 33.198, R2= .213, adjusted R2= .206, p < .001. For non-immigrant
education students, F(1,215) = 42.380, R2= .165, adjusted R2= .161, p < .001. For
immigrant non-education students, F(1,74) = 20.877, R2= .220, adjusted R2= .210, p <
.001. For immigrant education students, F(1,93) = 49.725, R2= .348, adjusted R2= .341,
p < .001. Table 26 presents the details of these analyses.
The regression coefficient for Metacognition in predicting Need-Satisfaction was .013 (β
= .461) for non-immigrant non-education students, .012 (β = .406) for non-immigrant
education students, .013 (β = .469) for immigrant non-education students, and .017 (β =
.590) for immigrant education students. That is, on average for every 1 SD change in
Metacognition, Need-Satisfaction changed by .461 SD for non-immigrant non-education
students, by .406 SD for non-immigrant education students, by .469 SD for immigrant
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non-education students, and by .590 SD for immigrant education students. The results
support the positive relationship of metacognition with need-satisfaction (i.e., H4) across
all split samples.
Table 26
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Need-Satisfaction from Metacognition
Variable

βa

∆R2

Need-Satisfaction
Adjusted ∆R2
F Change

df1

df2

Full Sample (N =513)
Major
Block 1
Metacognition
Block 2
Total R2
.237
Adjusted R2
.234
Non-Immigrant NonEducation Students (n = 125)
Metacognition
Block 1
Total R2
.213
Adjusted R2
.206
Non-Immigrant Education
Students (n = 217)

.099**
-.469***
--

.461***
--

.019

.017

9.847**

1

511

.218

.217

145.850***

1

510

--

--

33.198***

1

123

1

215

1

74

1

93

Metacognition .406***
Block 1
---42.380***
Total R2
.165
Adjusted R2
.161
Immigrant Non-Education
Students (n = 76)
Metacognition .469***
Block 1
---20.877***
2
Total R
.220
Adjusted R2
.210
Immigrant Education
Students (n = 95)
Metacognition .590***
Block 1
---49.725***
2
Total R
.348
.341
Adjusted R2
a
The standardized regression coefficients are reported only for the overall model.
**p < .01 ***p < .001.
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Summary of results for Hypothesis 4. The results of bivariate correlational
analysis indicated small to large effect sizes (r ranging from .25 to .57; Cohen, 1988) for
the relationship of Metacognition and its components with Need-Satisfaction and its
components. The result of hierarchical regression analyses also confirmed this positive
relationship across samples indicating medium to large effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) with
the greatest amount of variance explained for immigrant education students (34.1%) and
the least amount of variance explained for non-immigrant education students (16.1%).
For immigrant (education & non-education) students the amount of variance explained
was about 21%. The results of the analyses all together provide strong support for H4
indicating appositive relationship between metacognition and need-satisfaction. This
suggests that students with higher level of general metacognitive competence are more
likely to have higher level of need-satisfaction.
Testing Hypothesis 5: There Is a Positive Relationship Between Metacognition and
Adopting Adaptive Styles of Psychological Defense.
In this analysis, Non-Defensiveness scores were used as the indicator of the
adoption of more adaptive styles of psychological defense. The bivariate correlational
analysis showed that Metacognition was significantly and positively correlated with NonDefensiveness (r = .51, p < .001) and Adaptive Coping (r = .53, p < .001) and negatively
and significantly with Defensiveness (r = -.17, p < .001). Knowledge of Cognition was
also significantly and positively correlated with Non-Defensiveness (r = .50, p < .001)
and Adaptive Coping (r = .46, p < .001), while it was negatively and significantly
correlated with Defensiveness (r = -.24, p < .001). Further, Regulation of Cognition was
significantly and positively correlated with Non-Defensiveness (r = .46, p < .001) and
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with Adaptive Coping (r = .53, p < .001), while it was negatively and significantly
associated with Defensiveness (r = -.11, p < .05). The results support the positive
relationship between Metacognition and Non-Defensiveness (i.e., adopting more adaptive
style of psychological defense) as hypothesized in Hypothesis 5.
The hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the unique contribution
of Metacognition to Non-Defensiveness. Similar to hypothesis 4, the analysis was
conducted two times, once for the full sample and once comparing four demographic
groups in the sample, grouped by Major X Immigrant interaction (due to the
differentiating effect of this interaction on Metacognition scores). Age Group X Gender,
that showed significant mean difference for Non-Defensiveness, was identified to be used
as the control variable accompanied with its constituting variables (i.e., Gender and Age
Group).
The possibility of interactions between covariates and independent variable was
checked for the full sample and for each split sample using hierarchical regression
analysis. Covariates and Metacognition were entered in the first block and the two-way
interactions between covariates and Metacognition were included in Block 2. None of
the interactions were significant in predicting Non-Defensiveness.
Metacognition and Non-Defensiveness in the full sample. Age group, Gender,
and their interaction were entered as covariates in Block 1 and Metacognition as the
independent variable in Block 2. Block 1 including covariates predicted 2.2% of
variance in Non-Defensiveness, F(3, 509) = 3.847, R2= .022, adjusted R2= .016, p =
.010. Metacognition accounted for 24.5% more variance in Non-Defensiveness over and
above the variance accounted for by covariates, F(1,508) = 170.292, ∆R2= .245, p < .001.
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R2 for the overall model was .268 (adjusted R2= .262). In the overall model, the
regression coefficient for Metacognition in predicting Non-Defensiveness was .013 (β =
.501, p < .001). That is, on average by every 1 SD change in Metacognition, NonDefensiveness positively changed by .501 SD; or for every 1 unit positive change in
Metacognition, ND positively changed by .013 units. The results support Hypothesis 5
for the full sample (see Table 27).
Metacognition and Non-Defensiveness in the split sample by Major X
Immigrant. When splitting the sample by Major X Immigrant to four groups, Block 1
(covariates) was only significant for immigrant education students (F(3, 91) = 4.706, p <
.01). Like the full sample Metacognition significantly predicted Non-Defensiveness for
all split samples. For non-immigrant non-education students, F(1,120) = 54.329, ∆R2=
.311, p < .001. For non-immigrant education students, F(1,212) = 56.143, ∆R2= .202, p
< .001. For immigrant non-education students, F(1,71) = 9.571, ∆R2=.112, p < .001. For
immigrant education students, F(1,90) = 56.107, ∆R2= .332, p < .001. The regression
coefficient for Metacognition in predicting Need-Satisfaction was .013 (β = .563) for
non-immigrant non-education students, .012 (β = .460) for non-immigrant education
students, .009 (β = .336) for immigrant non-education students, and .015 (β = .610) for
immigrant education students. That is, on average for every 1 SD change in
Metacognition, Need-Satisfaction changed by .563 SD for non-immigrant non-education
students, by .460 SD for non-immigrant education students, by .336 SD for immigrant
non-education students, and by .610 SD for immigrant education students. Therefore,
Hypothesis 5 was supported for all split samples (see Table 27).
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Table 27
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Non-Defensiveness from Metacognition
Variable
Full Sample (N =513)
Age Group
Gender
Age Group X Gender
Block 1
Metacognition
Block 2
.268
Total R2
Adjusted R2
.262
Non-Immigrant Non-Education
Students (n = 125)
Age Group
Gender
Age Group X Gender
Block 1
Metacognition
Block 2
.314
Total R2
.291
Adjusted R2
Non-Immigrant Education
Students (n = 217)
Age Group
Gender
Age Group X Gender
Block 1
Metacognition
Block 2
.236
Total R2
.222
Adjusted R2
Immigrant Non-Education
Students (n = 76)
Age Group
Gender
Age Group X Gender
Block 1
Metacognition
Block 2
Total R2
.170

βa
-.061
-.249**
.208*
-.501***
--

-.098
-.331
.352
-.563***
--

-.047
-.087
-.054
-.460***
--

-.059
-.479
.428
-.336**
--

∆R2

Non-Defensiveness
Adjusted ∆R2
F Change

df1

df2

.022

.016

3.847a**

3

509

.245

.246

170.292***

1

508

.003

-.021

.133

3

121

.311

.312

54.329***

1

120

.034

.021

2.515

3

213

.202

.201

56.143***

1

212

.059

.019

1.494

3

72

.112

.105

9.571**

1

71

3

91

1

90

.124
Adjusted R2
Immigrant Education Students
(n= 95)
Age Group
-.088
Gender
-.300*
Age Group X Gender
.336*
Block 1
-.134
.106
4.706**
Metacognition
.610***
Block 2
-.332
.337
56.107***
.467
Total R2
Adjusted R2
.443
a
The standardized regression coefficients are reported only for the overall model.
*p < .05 **p < .01 a**p = .01 ***p < .001 a***p = .001.
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Summary of results for Hypothesis 5. The results of bivariate correlational
analysis indicated small to large effect sizes (|r| ranging from .11 to .53; Cohen, 1988) for
the relationship of Metacognition and its components with Non-Defensiveness and its
components. The results of hierarchical regression analysis confirmed this relationship
indicating small to large effect sizes (adjusted ∆R2 ranging from .105 to .312; Cohen,
1988). The shared variance in this relationship was the strongest for immigrant education
students (33.7%) and the weakest for immigrant non-education students (10.5%).
Testing Hypothesis 6: There Is a Positive Relationship Between Metacognition and
Self-Actualization Independent of Need-Satisfaction and Styles of Psychological
Defense.
In this analysis, Non-Defensiveness scores were used as the indicator of the
adoption of more adaptive styles of psychological defense. The bivariate correlational
analysis showed that Metacognition was significantly and positively correlated with SelfActualization (r = .52, p < .001), Actualizing-Self (r = .56, p < .001), and ActualizingStriving (r = .34, p < .001). Knowledge of Cognition (KC) was significantly and
positively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .50, p < .001), Actualizing-Self (r = .57,
p < .001), and Actualizing-Striving (r = .30, p < .001). Further, Regulation of Cognition
(RC) was significantly and positively correlated with Self-Actualization (r = .48, p <
.001), Actualizing-Striving (r = .34, p < .001), and with Actualizing-Self (r = .50, p <
.001).
After controlling for Need-Satisfaction and Non-Defensiveness, partial
correlational analysis indicated that Self-Actualization was positively and significantly
correlated with Metacognition (r = .23, p < .001), RC (r = .23, p < .001), and KC (r = .18,
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p < .001). Actualizing-Self showed statistically significant positive relationship with
Metacognition (r = .29, p < .001), KC (r = .31, p < .001), and RC (r = .25, p < .001).
Actualizing-Striving was only correlated with RC (r = .10, p < .05. The relationships of
Actualizing-Striving with Metacognition (p = .142) and with Knowledge of Cognition (p
= .186) were not significant. The results support the positive relationship between
Metacognition and Self-Actualization over and above Need-Satisfaction and NonDefensiveness as hypothesized in Hypothesis 6.
The hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the unique contribution
of Metacognition to Self-Actualization over and above demographic covariates and NS
and ND. Similar to hypothesis 4 and 5, the analysis was conducted two times, once for
the full sample and once comparing four demographic groups in the sample, grouped by
Major X Immigrant (due to the differentiating effect of this interaction on Metacognition
scores). Gender, Parent, and Major that showed significant mean difference for SelfActualization were identified to be used as the control variable.
The possibility of interactions between covariates and independent variable,
Metacognition, was checked for the full sample and for each split sample using the
hierarchical regression analysis. Covariates and Metacognition were entered in the first
block and the two-way interactions between covariates and Metacognition were included
in Block 2. None of the interactions were significant in predicting Self-Actualization
neither in the full sample nor in the split samples, except for Gender by Metacognition
interaction which was significant only for immigrant education students (p < .05). This
interaction was entered in the third block when analyzing the hypothesis for immigrant
education students.
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Metacognition and Self-Actualization in the full sample. Gender, Parent, and
Major were entered as covariates in Block 1, Need-Satisfaction (NS) and NonDefensiveness (ND) as the second set of covariates were entered in Block 2 and
Metacognition in Block 3 as the independent variable. Block 1 accounted for 7.2% of
variance in Self-Actualization (SA), F(3, 509) = 13.146, adjusted R2= .066, p < .001.
NS and ND explained 55.4% more variance in SA over and above demographic
covariates, F(2, 507) = 374.719, adjusted ∆R2= .556, p < .001, and Metacognition
accounted for 2.1% more variance in SA over and above the variance accounted for by all
covariates, F(1,506) = 29.822, adjusted ∆R2= .020, p < .001. R2 for the overall model
was .646 (adjusted R2= .642). In the overall model, the regression coefficient for
Metacognition in predicting Self-Actualization was .006 (β = .177, p < .001). That is, on
average by every 1 SD change in Metacognition, Self-Actualization changed by .177 SD;
or for every 1 unit change in Metacognition, SA changed by .006 unit over and above
changes associated with all covariates (including NS and ND). The result supports H6
for the full sample. Table 28 demonstrates the details of this analysis.
Metacognition and Self-Actualization in the split sample by Major X
Immigrant. When splitting the sample by Major X Immigrant to four groups, similar
hierarchical regression was run for all groups except for Immigrant education students.
In the analysis for the latter group, according to preliminary analysis of homogeneity of
slopes, the interaction term, Gender X Metacognition was entered as the forth block.
Block 1 (demographic covariates excluding Major) was only significant for nonimmigrant education students (F(2, 214) = 7.009, R2= .061, adjusted R2= .053, p = .001)
and for immigrant non-education students, (F(2, 73) = 5.482, R2= .131, adjusted R2=
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.107, p < .01). Block 2, including NS and ND, was significant for all groups. For nonimmigrant non-education students, F(2,120) = 63.438, ∆R2= .500, p < .001. For nonimmigrant education students, F(2,212) = 177.862, ∆R2= .588, p < .001. For immigrant
non-education students, F(2,71) = 52.320, ∆R2=.518, p < .001. For immigrant education
students, F(2,91) = 92.919, ∆R2= .666, p < .001 (see Table 28).
Similar to the full sample, Metacognition significantly predicted SelfActualization over and above all covariates for the first three groups. For non-immigrant
non-education students, F(1,119) = 10.816, ∆R2= .039, p = .001. For non-immigrant
education students, F(1,211) = 13.066, ∆R2= .020, p < .001. For immigrant noneducation students, F(1,70) = 5.091, ∆R2=.024, p < .05. The regression coefficient for
Metacognition in predicting Self-Actualization was .008 (β = .248) for non-immigrant
non-education students, .005 (β = .169) for non-immigrant education students, .006 (β =
.180) for immigrant non-education students. That is, on average for every 1 SD change in
Metacognition, Self-Actualization changed by .248 SD for non-immigrant non-education
students, by .169 SD for non-immigrant education students, by .180 SD for immigrant
non-education students.
For immigrant education students, the interaction (Gender X Metacognition) was
significant, F(1,88) = 4.635, ∆R2= .015, p < .05 (Figure 9). Thus, the main effect of
Metacognition on SA was not interpretable. To examine the simple effect, the regression
coefficients for Gender and Metacognition as well as for Gender X Metacognition were
reported here. The regression weight for Gender was -4.531 (β = -1.046, p < .05), for
Metacognition was .002 (β = .058, p = .500), and for the interaction was .012 (β = .934, p
< .05).
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Table 28
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Actualization from Metacognition
Over and Above Need-Satisfaction and Non-Defensiveness
Variable

βa

Full Sample (N =513)
Gender -.131***
Parent
.054*
Major
.014
Block 1
-Need-Satisfaction
.642***
Non-Defensiveness
.048
Block 2
-Metacognition
.177***
Block 3
-Total R2
.646
Adjusted R2
.642
Non-Immigrant NonEducation Students
(n = 125)
Gender
-.120
Parent
-.036
Block 1
-Need-Satisfaction
.628***
Non-Defensiveness
-.065
Block 2
-Metacognition .248a***
Block 3
-2
Total R
.567
Adjusted R2
.548
Non-Immigrant Education
Students (n = 217)
Gender
-.073
Parent .126**
Block 1
-Need-Satisfaction .643***
Non-Defensiveness
.107*
Block 2
-Metacognition .169***
Block 3
-2
Total R
.670
.662
Adjusted R2

∆R2

Self-Actualization
Adjusted ∆R2
F Change

df1

df2

.072

.066

13.146***

3

509

.554

.556

374.719***

2

507

.021

.020

29.822***

1

506

.027

.011

1.720

2

122

.500

.500

63.438***

2

120

.039

.037

10.816a***

1

119

.061

.053

7.009a***

2

214

.588

.590

177.862***

2

212

.020

.019

13.066***

1

211

(continued)

227

Table 28 (continued)
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Actualization from Metacognition
Over and Above Need-Satisfaction and Non-Defensiveness
Variable

βa

Immigrant Non-Education
Students (n = 76)
Gender
Parent

∆R2

Self-Actualization
Adjusted ∆R2
F Change

.261***
.044
-.649***
-.022
-.180*
--

Block 1
.131
.107
5.482**
Need-Satisfaction
Non-Defensiveness
Block 2
.518
.522
52.320***
Metacognition
Block 3
.024
.020
5.091*
2
Total R
.672
.649
Adjusted R2
Immigrant Education Students
(n = 95)
Parent
.002
Block 1
-.007
-.003
.693
Need-Satisfaction .684***
Non-Defensiveness
.120
Block 2
-.666
.666
92.919***
Gender -1.046*
Metacognition
.058
Block 3
-.019
.012
2.720
.934*
Gender X Metacognition
Block 4
-.015
.013
4.635*
Total R2
.708
Adjusted R2
.688
a
The standardized regression coefficients are reported only for the overall model.
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 a***p = .001.

df1

df2

2

73

2

71

1

70

1

93

2

91

2

89

1

88

That is, on average for every 1 unit change in Metacognition, SA changed by
.002 unit for female immigrant education students (which was not statistically significant;
p = .500) and by .014 unit for male immigrant education students. Overall, the results of
hierarchical regression analyses supported the positive relationship between
metacognition and self-actualization over and above the contribution of need-satisfaction
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and non-defensiveness across all demographically different samples except for female
immigrant education students.

Figure 9. The Gender by Metacognition interaction in predicting Self-Actualization
for the immigrant education students
Summary of results for Hypothesis 6. The results of bivariate correlational
analysis indicated medium to large effect sizes (r ranging from .30 to .57; Cohen, 1988)
for the relationship of Metacognition with Self-Actualization while holding NeedSatisfaction and Non-Defensiveness constant. In addition, the results of hierarchical
regression analysis support Hypothesis 6 indicating a very small to small effect sizes
(adjusted ∆R2 ranging from .013 to .020; Cohen, 1988). However, no statistically
significant relationship for female immigrant education students was detected. A nonsignificant result was expected for this group due to the small sample size for female
immigrant education students (n = 78). The non-significant result for this small sample
leaves the researcher inconclusive about this population.
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In sum, among all the split samples, hierarchical regression model for this
hypothesis accounted for the highest percentage of variance in SA for immigrant
education students (68.8%) while it explained the least amount of variance in SA for nonimmigrant non-education students (54.8%). The unique contribution of Metacognition to
Self-Actualization was the highest for non-immigrant non-education students (3.7%) and
was the least for non-immigrant education students (2.0%). In interaction by Gender,
Metacognition accounted for 3.4% of variance in Self-Actualization. Students who
reported higher level of general metacognitive competence are more likely to report
higher level of self-actualization. This implies that the more competent people are in
their general metacognitive knowledge and regulation the more self-actualizing they are.
Testing Hypothesis 7: There Is a Positive Relationship Between Metacognition and
Well-Being.
The bivariate correlational analysis showed that Metacognition (MC) was
significantly and positively correlated with overall Well-Being (r = .51, p < .001), EWB
(r = .56, p < .001), and SWB (r = .32, p < .001). Knowledge of Cognition (KC) was
significantly and positively correlated with Well-Being (r = .50, p < .001), EWB (r = .55,
p < .001), and SWB (r = .31, p < .001). Further, Regulation of Cognition (RC) was
significantly and positively correlated with Well-Being (r = .47, p < .001), SWB (r = .30,
p < .001), and with EWB (r = .51, p < .001). The results support the positive relationship
between Metacognition and Well-Being as hypothesized in Hypothesis 6.
The hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the unique contribution
of Metacognition to Well-Being. Similar to hypothesis 4 and 5, the analysis was
conducted two times, once for the full sample and once comparing four demographic
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groups in the sample, grouped by Major X Immigrant (due to the differentiating effect of
this interaction on Metacognition scores). Age Group, Gender, Major, and Major X
Immigrant which showed significant mean differences for Well-Being were identified to
be used as the control variable when analyzing the full sample. Immigrant was also
added to this list as one of the constituting variables in the interaction term. For the split
samples, Major, Immigrant and their interaction were excluded from the analysis since
they were used as the grouping variable.
The possibility of interactions between covariates and Metacognition (i.e.,
independent variable) was checked for the full sample and for each split sample using
hierarchical regression analyses. Covariates and Metacognition were entered in the first
block and the 2-way interactions between covariates and Metacognition were included at
step 2. None of the interactions were significant in predicting Well-Being neither in the
full sample nor in the split samples. When predicting SWB, Age Group by Metacognition
interaction was only significant for the full sample and non-immigrant education students
(p < .05). Thus, the interaction was entered as the last step in hierarchical regression
analysis when testing the hypothesis for SWB.
Metacognition and Well-Being in the full sample. Age Group, Gender, Major,
Immigrant and Major X Immigrant were entered as covariates in Block 1 for the full
sample and Metacognition as the independent variable in Block 2. Block 1 accounted for
6.5% of variance in Well-Being (WB), F(5, 507) = 7.016, adjusted R2= .055, p < .001.
Metacognition accounted for 22.4% more variance in WB over and above the variance
accounted for by the covariates, F(1,506) = 159.239, adjusted ∆R2= .225, p < .001. R2
for the overall model was .289 (adjusted R2= .280). In the overall model, the regression
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coefficient for Metacognition in predicting Well-Being was .015 (β = .482, p < .001).
That is, on average by every 1 SD change in Metacognition, Well-Being changed by .482
SD; or for every 1 unit change in Metacognition, WB changed by .015 unit over and
above changes associated with all demographic covariates. Table 29 demonstrates the
details of this analysis. This result supports Hypothesis 7 indicating a positive
relationship between metacognition and well-being.
EWB as DV in the full sample. Similar results were obtained when conducting
hierarchical regression analysis with EWB as the dependent variable. Independent from
all demographic control variables, Metacognition significantly predicted EWB, F(1,506)
= 212.281, ∆R2= .272, R2= .352, adjusted R2= .344, p < .001. Covariates in Block 1
also significantly predicted EWB, F(5,507) = 8.809, R2= .080, adjusted R2= .071, p <
.001. In the full model, the regression coefficients were as follows: for Gender B = 1.135, β = -.044, p = .251; for Age Group B = -3.306, β = -.100, p < .01; for Major B =
3.860, β = .154, p = .001; for Immigrant B = .960, β = .037, p = .509; for Major X
Immigrant B = -1.973, β = -.063, p = .301; and for Metacognition B = .117, β = .531, p <
.001. That is, on average by every 1 SD change in Metacognition, EWB changed by .531
SD; or for every 1 unit change in Metacognition, EWB changed by .117 unit over and
above changes associated with all demographic covariates. This result provided evidence
to support Hypothesis 7 for the full sample when EWB was used as an indicator of
human well-being.
SWB as DV in the full sample. According to preliminary analysis of homogeneity
of slopes, Age Group X Metacognition was significant in predicting SWB. Thus to
predict SWB, Age Group X Metacognition interaction was entered as an additional step
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in hierarchical regression analysis. The result showed that the interaction was significant
(F(1,505) = 6.794, ∆R2= .012, R2= .141, adjusted R2= .129, p < .01) over and above
control variables (F(4,508) = 4.875, R2= .037, adjusted R2= .029, p = .001) and the
additive effect of Metacognition and Age Group (F(2,506) = 26.928, ∆R2= .093, R2=
.130, adjusted R2= .119, p < .001). Figure 10 illustrate this interaction effect.

Figure 10. The Age Group by Metacognition interaction in predicting Subjective
Well-Being for the full sample

The regression coefficients in the full model were as follows: for Gender B = .366, β = -.109, p < .05; for Major B = .258, β = .078, p = .154; for Immigrant B = .596, β
= .175, p < .01; for Major X Immigrant B = -.620, β = -.150, p < .05; for Age Group B =
3.175, β = .734, p = .01; for Metacognition B = .017, β = .573, p < .001; and for Age
Group X Metacognition B = -.009, β = -.754, p < .01. That is, for every 1 unit change in
Metacognition of adults, their SWB changed by .017 unit, over and above changes
associated with all demographic covariates. For emerging adults, for every 1 unit change
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in Metacognition, their SWB changed by.008 (i.e., .017 - .009) unit, over and above
changes associated with all demographic variables. The results indicated a positive
relationship between metacognition and subjective well-being (as an indicator of human
well-being) and, thus, support Hypothesis 7 for the full sample when having SWB as DV.
Metacognition and Well-Being in the split sample by Major X Immigrant.
When splitting the sample to four groups by Major X Immigrant, Gender and Age Group
were entered as covariates in Block 1 and Metacognition as independent variable in
Block 2. Block 1 (demographic covariates) was only significant for non-immigrant
education students (F(2, 214) = 6.655, R2= .059, adjusted R2= .050, p < .01).
Metacognition, however, significantly predicted WB for all four groups over and above
the control variables. For non-immigrant non-education students, F(1,121) = 41.844,
∆R2= .256, Total R2= .259, adjusted R2= .240, p < .001. For non-immigrant education
students, F(1,213) = 68.049, ∆R2= .228, Total R2= .287, adjusted R2= .276, p < .001. For
immigrant non-education students, F(1,72) = 16.641, ∆R2=.185, Total R2= .200, adjusted
R2= .167, p < .001. For immigrant education students, F(1,91) = 29.509, ∆R2= .235,
Total R2= .274, adjusted R2= .250, p < .001 (see Table 29).
The regression coefficient for Metacognition in predicting Well-Being was .016
(β = .508) for non-immigrant non-education students, .015 (β = .489) for non-immigrant
education students, .015 (β = .432) for immigrant non-education students, and .015 (β =
.499) for immigrant education students. That is, on average for every 1 SD change in
Metacognition, Well-Being changed by .508 SD for non-immigrant non-education
students, by .489 SD for non-immigrant education students, by .432 SD for immigrant
non-education students and by .499 SD for immigrant education students. The results of
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hierarchical regression analysis support Hypothesis 7 across split samples when WB was
used as the indicator of overall human well-being.
EWB as DV in the split sample by Major X Immigrant. The result of hierarchical
regression analysis in predicting EWB indicated that Block 1 consisted of Gender and
Age Group was only significant for non-immigrant education students (F(2, 214) =
7.649, R2= .067, adjusted R2= .058, p = .001) and for immigrant education students,
(F(2,92) = 3.350, R2= .068, adjusted R2= .048, p < .05). Metacognition was significant
for all groups over and above covariates. For non-immigrant non-education students,
F(1,121) = 56.316, ∆R2= .317, R2= .318, adjusted R2= .301, p < .001. For non-immigrant
education students, F(1,213) = 68.843, ∆R2= .228, R2= .295, adjusted R2= .285, p < .001.
For immigrant non-education students, F(1,72) = 27.333, ∆R2=.274, R2= .278, adjusted
R2= .248, p < .001. For immigrant education students, F(1,91) = 58.385, ∆R2= .364, R2=
.432, adjusted R2= .413, p < .001.
The regression coefficient for Metacognition in predicting EWB was .119 (β =
.566) for non-immigrant non-education students, .109 (β = .489) for non-immigrant
education students, .120 (β = .526) for immigrant non-education students, and .127 (β =
.621) for immigrant education students. That is, on average for every 1 SD change in
Metacognition, EWB changed by .566 SD for non-immigrant non-education students, by
.489 SD for non-immigrant education students, by .526 SD for immigrant non-education
students, and by .621 SD for immigrant education students. Again the results of
hierarchical regression analyses support Hypothesis 7 for EWB across split samples.
SWB as DV in the split sample by Major X Immigrant. According to preliminary
analysis of homogeneity of slopes, Age Group X Metacognition was significant in
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Table 29
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Well-Being from Metacognition
Variable

βa

∆R2

Well-Being
Adjusted ∆R2
F Change

df1

df2

5

507

1

506

2

122

1

121

2

214

1

213

2

73

1

72

2

92

1

91

Full Sample (N =513)
Gender
-.090*
Age Group
-.059
Major
.136**
Immigrant
.117*
-.120
Major X Immigrant
Block 1
-.065
.055
7.016***
Metacognition
.482***
Block 2
-.224
.225
159.239***
Total R2
.289
Adjusted R2
.280
Non-Immigrant Non-Education
Students (n = 125)
Gender
-.002
Age Group
.002
Block 1
-.002
-.014
.141
Metacognition
.508***
Block 2
-.256
.254
41.844***
Total R2
.259
Adjusted R2
.240
Non-Immigrant Education
Students (n = 217)
Gender
-.106
Age Group
-.140*
Block 1
-.059
.050
6.655**
Metacognition
.489***
Block 2
-.228
.226
68.049***
Total R2
.287
Adjusted R2
.276
Immigrant Non-Education
Students (n = 76)
Gender
-.101
Age Group
-.026
Block 1
-.016
-.011
.578
Metacognition
.432***
Block 2
-.185
.178
16.641***
Total R2
.200
Adjusted R2
.167
Immigrant Education Students
(n = 95)
Gender
-.183*
Age Group
.007
Block 1
-.039
.018
1.867
Metacognition
.499***
Block 2
-.235
.232
29.509***
Total R2
.274
Adjusted R2
.250
a
The standardized regression coefficients are reported only for the overall model.
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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predicting SWB only for non-immigrant education students. Thus, this interaction was
entered as an additional step in hierarchical regression analysis for this group. All other
groups were analyzed using the same hierarchical regression model as for WB and EWB
in split samples. Block 1, consisting of Gender for non-immigrant education students and
Gender and Age Group for all other groups, was not significant for any of the split
samples.
Metacognition significantly predicted SWB for non-immigrant non-education
students F(1,121) = 16.084, ∆R2= .116, R2= .127, adjusted R2= .105, p < .001, for
immigrant non-education student F(1,72) = 4.605, ∆R2= .058, R2= .095, adjusted R2=
.057, p < .05, for immigrant education students F(1,91) = 5.154, ∆R2= .052, R2= .077,
adjusted R2= .047, p < .05. The regression coefficient for Metacognition in predicting
SWB was .010 (β = .342) for non-immigrant non-education students, .008 (β = .242) for
immigrant non-education students, and .007(β = .235) for immigrant education students.
That is, on average for every 1 SD change in Metacognition, SWB changed by .342 SD
for non-immigrant non-education students, by .242 SD for immigrant non-education
students, and by .235 SD for immigrant education students.
For non-immigrant education students, the main effect of Metacognition is not
interpretable because there was a significant interaction between MC and Age Group.
Block 2 in this hierarchical regression analysis included Age Group and Metacognition.
These two variables together accounted for 14.0% of variance in SWB in non-immigrant
education students, F(2,213) = 17.523, ∆R2= .140, R2= .147, adjusted R2= .135, p < .001.
Age Group X Metacognition also explained 2.4% more variance in SWB of this group
over and above all covariates and the additive effect of Age and Metacognition, F(1,212)
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= 6.082, ∆R2= .024, R2= .171, adjusted R2= .156, p < .05. The regression coefficients in
the full model were as follows: for Gender B = -.417, β = -.122, p = .055; for Age Group
B = 4.579, β = 1.192, p < .05; for Metacognition B = .021, β = .785, p < .001; and for Age
Group X Metacognition B = -.013, β = -1.261, p < .05. That is, for every 1 unit change in
Metacognition of adults, their SWB changed by .021 unit over and above changes
associated with all demographic covariates. For emerging adults, for every 1 unit change
in Metacognition, their SWB changed by .008 (i.e., .021-.013) unit, over and above
changes associated with all demographic variables. Figure 11 illustrates this interaction
effect. Overall, the relationship between metacognition and subjective well-being was
positive and significant. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 7 for SWB across all
split samples.

Figure 11. The Age Group by Metacognition interaction in predicting Subjective
Well-Being for non-immigrant education students

Summary of results for Hypothesis 7. The results of bivariate correlational
analysis support H7 indicating medium to large effect sizes (r ranging from .30 to .56;
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Cohen, 1988) for the association of Metacognition with overall Well-Being and its
composite. Moreover, the results of hierarchical regression analyses support H7 for the
full sample and across split samples for WB, EWB and SWB as indicators of human
well-being by effect sizes in small- to medium-range (adjusted ∆R2 ranging from .043 to
.365; Cohen, 1988). In the relationship between Metacognition and overall Well-Being,
the shared variances was the largest for non-immigrant non-education students (25.4%)
and was the smallest for non-immigrant education students (17.8%). Overall, the results
of the analyses provide support for Hypothesis 7 across samples indicating that students
who reported higher metacognition were more likely to score higher on well-being. This
suggests that students who possess higher general metacognitive competence are more
likely to experience higher level of well-being than students who are less metacognitive.
Testing Hypotheses 8 and 9
To test the mediational effect in Hypotheses 8 and 9, Shrout and Bolger’s (2002)
Bootstrap procedure were employed using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) by
AMOS 18.0. Figures in the following sections demonstrate the simplified model for the
SEM analysis only for the full sample. SEM diagrams for split samples are presented in
Appendices G and H. For the purpose of presentation, the correlation paths between
exogenous variables which were added to improve the fit of the model were not presented
in the path diagrams. The parameter estimates for the structural coefficients for each
analysis are presented in figures with unstandardized coefficients presented on each path
and standardized coefficients in parentheses. The residuals in circles indicate the
proportion of unexplained variance by the model (error terms) and are calculated by
subtracting squared multiple correlation (R2) for each variable (the mediator and the
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dependent variable) from 1. Tables in the following sections present the point estimates,
the lower bounds and upper bounds for the 95% confidence intervals for the path ways
between constructs of interest and for the indirect effect (i.e., the mediational effect).
Testing Hypothesis 8: Need-Satisfaction Mediates the Relationship between
Metacognition and Self-Actualization.
Similar to all previous analyses, where Metacognition was involved as IV, Major
X Immigrant was used as grouping variable and a similar model was tested for the full

sample as well as for each split sample. Again similar to all previous analyses where
Self-Actualization (SA) was used as DV, Gender, Major and Parent were included in
SEM as covariates in predicting SA. To improve the model fit, non-significant
demographic variables were excluded from the model after the initial analysis. That is,
Education was excluded from all models and Parent from the sample of immigrant
education student. In addition, according to the result of the analyses for Hypothesis 3,
Gender X Need-Satisfaction was significant in predicting SA for the full sample and for
non-education students. Thus, this interaction term was included in SEM as covariate
only when analyzing the full sample or immigrant and non-immigrant non-education
students.
Finally, to illustrate the unique mediational contribution of Metacognition (MC)
to Self-Actualization (SA), a set of hierarchical regression analyses was conducted to
calculate R-Square Change for the unique contribution of MC to SA before and after
controlling for NS and its interaction with Gender (i.e., before and after inclusion of the
mediator). The results then were subtracted from each other to obtain the proportion of
variance in SA, accounted for by mediation (∆R2without mediator- ∆R2with mediator).
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Model fit. First, the fit of the model was evaluated with AMOS 18.0 using a
maximum likelihood algorithm. The model was statistically over-identified (i.e., positive
df). A variety of indices of model fit was examined, the overall chi-square test of model
fit was not statistically significant neither for the full sample nor for any of split samples
(for the full sample: χ2 = 4.73, p = .32; for non-immigrant non-education students: χ2 =
5.00, p = .29; for non-immigrant education students: χ2 = 2.72, p = .61; for immigrant
non-education students: χ2 = 2.75, p = .61; and for immigrant education students: χ2 =
.13, p = .72). A non-significant chi-square (p > .05) along with other global/absolute and
focused/relative fit indices indicates a good fitting model. The Root Mean Square Error
of Approximation (RMSEA ≤ .08) was .019 for the full sample, .045 for non-immigrant
non-education students, < .001 for non-immigrant education students, < .001 for
immigrant non-education students, and < .001 for immigrant education students. The p
value for the close fit (PCLOSE) was greater than .05 for all cases which indicates a good
fitting model. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI ≥ .095) was .999 for the full sample, .996
for non-immigrant non-education students, 1.000 for non-immigrant education students,
1.000 for immigrant non-education students, and 1.000 for immigrant education students.
The Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR < .05) was .029 for the full sample, .047
for non-immigrant non-education students, .028 for non-immigrant education students,
.033 for immigrant non-education students, and .015 for immigrant education students.
The indices indicated a good model fit. There was no standardized residual covariance
with absolute value greater than 2 and Modification indices highlighted no point of ill fit
in the model.
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Mediation Analysis. The results of SEM analysis showed that indirect effects for
the full sample and for the split samples all were significant (see Table 30). That is,
metacognition significantly predicted self-actualization through its contribution to needsatisfaction. Indirect regression weights/mediational effects for the full sample: β =
.2850, B = .2835, p < .001 (Figure 12); for non-immigrant non-education students: β =
.1689, B = .1682, p < .001; for non-immigrant education students: β = .2779, B = .2881, p
< .001; for immigrant non-education students: β = .2263, B = .2238, p < .001; and for
immigrant education students: β = .4180, B = .3742, p < .001.

Figure 12. Path coefficients for the mediation model tested for Hypothesis 8
(The dashed line represents the indirect/mediational path)
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The (standardized) regression weights were all positive and significant ranging
from .1689 to .4180 across samples. This suggests that there is a mediational effect in the
relationship between metacognition and self-actualization by need-satisfaction. Thus, the
result supports H8 for the full sample and across split samples.
Over and above this contribution, metacognition still accounted for a significant
proportion of variance in self-actualization through its direct effect (see Table 30). For
the full sample: β = .1939, B = .1929, p < .001 (Figure 12); for non-immigrant noneducation students: β = .1934, B = .1926, p < .01; for non-immigrant education students:
β = .2060, B = .2136, p < .001; for immigrant non-education students: β = .1887, B =
.1866, p < .05; and for immigrant education students: β = .1625, B = .1455, p < .05. The
(standardized) regression weights were all positive and significant ranging from .1625 to
.2060 across samples. This result in addition to the previous findings suggests partial
mediational effect for need-satisfaction in the relationship between metacognition and
self-actualization.
The effect sizes for the overall models across samples were large ranging from
.5911 to .6881. The overall model accounted for 64.65% of variance in self-actualization
for the full sample; 95% CI [.5911, .6907], p < .01. The total variance accounted for by
the overall models was .5920 (95% CI [.4509, .6830], p < .01) for non-immigrant noneducation students, .6619 (95% CI [.5757, .7275], p < .01) for non-immigrant education
students, .6879 (95% CI .5370, .7741], p < .01) for immigrant non-education students,
and .6881 (95% CI [.5596, .7726], p < .01) for immigrant education students.
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Table 30
Summary of Mediation analyses Predicting Self-Actualization from Metacognition (MC) with NeedSatisfaction (NS) as the Mediator
Path
Full Sample (N =513)
Direct Effect of MC on NS
Direct Effect of NS on SA
Direct Effect of Gender X NS on SA
Direct Effect of MC on SA
Indirect Effect of MC on SA
Non-Immigrant Non-Education Students
(n = 125)
Direct Effect of MC on NS
Direct Effect of NS on SA
Direct Effect of Gender X NS on SA
Direct Effect of MC on SA
Indirect Effect of MC on SA
Non-Immigrant Education Students
(n = 217)
Direct Effect of MC on NS
Direct Effect of NS on SA
Direct Effect of MC on SA
Indirect Effect of MC on SA
Immigrant Non-Education Students
(n = 76)
Direct Effect of MC on NS
Direct Effect of NS on SA
Direct Effect of Gender X NS on SA
Direct Effect of MC on SA
Indirect Effect of MC on SA

Point of Estimate

Lower Bound to Upper Bound
(95% Confidence Interval)

.4728
(.4723)***
.6028
(.6004)***
.1002
(.1720)***
.1939
(.1929)***
.2850
(.2835)***

4024 to .5354
(.3937 to .5461)
5369 to .6629
(.5313 to.6672)
.0366 to .1637
(.0631 to .2828)
.1325 to .2510
(.1339 to .2514)
.2356 to .3388
(.2300 to .3450)

.4579
(.4385)***
.3689
(.3836)***
.3125
(.3901)**
.1934
(.1926)**
.1689
(.1682)***

.2962 to .5863
(.2808 to .5894)
.1611 to .5679
(.1642 to .5994)
.3125 to .1022
(.1281 to .6502)
.1934 to .0598
(.1926 to .0605)
.0724 to .2901
(.0706 to .2977)

.4107
(.4266)***
.6766
(.6753)***
.2060
(.2136)***
.2779
(.2881)***

.2878 to .5111
(.2995 to .5502)
.5992 to .7437
(.5899 to .7591)
.1220 to .2943
(.1245 to .3045)
.1961 to .3549
(.1989 to .3855)

.4728
(.4438)***
.4788
(.5043)***
.2187
(.3092)*
.1887
(.1866)*
.2263
(.2238)***

.2507 to .6305
(.2338 to .6302)
.2589 to .6812
(.2740 to.7311)
.0201 to .4247
(.0242 to .6014)
.0296 to .3356
(.0290 to .3307)
.1063 to .3846
(.1020 to .3965)
(continued)
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Table 30 (continued)
Summary of Mediation analyses Predicting Self-Actualization from Metacognition (MC) with NeedSatisfaction (NS) as the Mediator
Path

Point of Estimate

Lower Bound to Upper Bound
(95% Confidence Interval)

Immigrant Education Students
(n = 95)
Direct Effect of MC on NS

.5917
.4361 to .7090
(.5905)***
(.4246 to .7590)
Direct Effect of NS on SA
.7065
.5740 to .8177
(.6337)***
(.5067 to .7590)
Direct Effect of MC on SA
.1625
.0229 to .3108
(.1455)*
(.0204 to .2789)
Indirect Effect of MC on SA
.4180
.2982 to .5450
(.3742)***
(.2574 to .5165)
Note. Significant levels are considered based on p values estimated by Bias-Corrected confidence
intervals.

Variance accounted for by Metacognition through mediation. To illustrate an
approximation of the unique mediational contribution of Metacognition (MC) to SelfActualization (SA), a set of hierarchical regression was conducted to calculate R-Square
Change for the unique contribution of MC to SA before and after controlling for NS and
its interaction with Gender (i.e., before and after inclusion of mediator). The results then
were subtracted from each other to obtain the proportion of variance in SA accounted for
by mediation (∆R2without mediator- ∆R2with mediator).
R Square Change obtained through the hierarchical regression analysis
(employing the same covariates as in SEM) showed that before controlling for NeedSatisfaction and its interaction with Gender, MC accounted for 25.2% of variance in SA
(p < .001) for the full sample over and above the variance accounted for by demographic
covariates, 24.5% for non-immigrant non-education students (p < .001), 22.5% for nonimmigrant education students (p < .001), 22.3% for immigrant non-education students (p
< .001); and 33.9% for immigrant education students (p < .001). After controlling for NS
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and Gender X NS, the unique proportion of variance accounted for by metacognition was
2.9% for the full model (p < .001), 2.9% for non-immigrant non-education students (p <
.01), 3.5% for non-immigrant education students (p < .001), 2.7% for immigrant noneducation students (p < .05); and 1.7% for immigrant education students (p < .05).
The calculation indicated that for the full sample MC accounted for 22.3% of
variance in SA through its contribution to NS while another 2.9% of variance was
independent from NS. For non-immigrant non-education students, this proportion of
variance was 21.6% and another 2.9% of variance was independent from NS. For nonimmigrant education students, 19% of variance in SA was accounted for by MC through
its contribution to NS and another 3.5% of variance was independent from NS. Similarly
for immigrant non-education students, 19.6% of variance in SA was accounted for by the
association of MC with NS and another 2.7% was independent from NS. For immigrant
education students, the mediational contribution of MC to SA was 32.2% and another
1.7% of variance accounted for by MC was independent from mediational effect.
Summary of results for Hypothesis 8. The results of Shrout and Bolger’s (2002)
bootstrap procedure to test the mediation effect indicated that there was partial mediation
effect for the contribution of metacognition to self-actualization with need-satisfaction as
the mediator. The model was accounted for large percentage of variance in Selfactualization across samples, the highest being 68.81% for immigrant non-education
students and the lowest being 59.20% for non-immigrant non-education students. The
confirmation of this mediational effect across different demographic samples is an
evidence for the robustness of the results.
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Testing Hypothesis 9: Non-Defensiveness Mediates the Relationship between
Metacognition and Self-Actualization.
Similar to previous analyses, where Metacognition was involved as IV, Major X
Immigrant was used as grouping variable and a similar model was tested for the full
sample as well as for each split sample. Again similar to previous analyses, where SelfActualization (SA) was used as DV, Gender, Major and Parenthood were included in
SEM as covariates in predicting SA. To improve the model fit, non-significant
demographic variables were excluded from the model after the initial analysis. That is,
Major was excluded from all models and Parenthood was excluded from the sample of
immigrant education student.
Finally, to illustrate the unique mediational contribution of Metacognition (MC)
to Self-Actualization (SA), a set of hierarchical regression analyses was conducted to
calculate R-Square Change for the unique contribution of MC to SA before and after
controlling for ND (i.e., before and after inclusion of mediator). The results then
subtracted from each other to obtain the proportion of variance in SA accounted for by
mediation (∆R2without mediator- ∆R2with mediator).
Model fit. First, the fit of the model was evaluated with AMOS 18.0 using a
maximum likelihood algorithm. The model is statistically overidentified (i.e., positive df).
A variety of indices of model fit was examined, the overall chi-square test of model fit
was not statistically significant neither for the full sample nor for any of split samples (for
the full sample: χ2 = 5.20, p = .27; for non-immigrant non-education students: χ2 = 3.70, p
= .30; for non-immigrant education students: χ2 = 5.55, p = .24; for immigrant noneducation students: χ2 = .93, p = .82; and for immigrant education students: χ2 = .68, p =
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.88). A non-significant chi-square (p > .05) along with other global/absolute and
focused/relative fit indices indicates a good fitting model. The Root Mean Square Error
of Approximation (RMSEA ≤ .08) was .024 for the full sample, .043 for non-immigrant
non-education students, .042 for non-immigrant education students, < .001 for immigrant
non-education students, and < .001 for immigrant education students. The p value for the
Close fit (PCLOSE) was greater than .05 for all cases which indicate a good fitting
model. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI ≥ .95) was .997 for the full sample, .992 for
non-immigrant non-education students, .990 for non-immigrant education students, 1.000
for immigrant non-education students, and 1.000 for immigrant education students. The
Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR < .05) was .028 for the full sample, .044 for
non-immigrant non-education students, .031 for non-immigrant education students, .029
for immigrant non-education students, and .023 for immigrant education students. The
indices indicated a good model fit. There was no standardized residual covariance with
absolute value greater than 2 and Modification indices highlighted no point of ill fit in the
model.
Mediation Analysis. The results of SEM analysis indicate indirect regression
weights/mediational effects for the full sample: β = .1150, B = .0036, p < .001 (Figure
13); for non-immigrant education students: β = .1460, B = .0047, p < .001; and for
immigrant education students: β = .1771, B = .0049, p < .01. The (standardized)
regression weights were all positive and significant for the full sample and for immigrant
and non-immigrant education students ranging from .1150 to .1771 across samples. This
suggests that there is a mediational effect in the relationship between metacognition and
self-actualization by non-defensiveness for these samples. However, for immigrant non-
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education students: β = .0305, B = .0009, p = .42; and for non-immigrant non-education
students: β = .0778, B = .0024, p = .12. Overall, these results support the research
hypothesis for education students but did not support the mediational effect of nondefensiveness in the relationship between MC and SA for none of the samples of noneducation students (see Table 31).

Figure 13. Path coefficients for the mediation model tested for Hypothesis 9
(The dashed line represents the indirect/mediational path)
In all cases, metacognition still accounted for a significant proportion of variance
in self-actualization through its direct effect even over and above the mediational effect.
For the full sample: β = .3932, B = .0122, p < .001; for non-immigrant non-education
students: β = .4233, B = .0131, p < .001; for non-immigrant education students: β =
.3324, B = .0107, p < .001; for immigrant non-education students: β = .4472, B = .0138, p
< .001; and for immigrant education students: β = .4028, B = .0113, p < .001. The
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(standardized) regression weights were all positive and significant ranging from .3324 to
.4233 across samples. Adding this result to previous findings suggests partial
mediational effect for non-defensiveness in the relationship between metacognition and
self-actualization for education students (see Table 31).
Table 31
Summary of Mediation analyses Predicting Self-Actualization (SA) from Metacognition (MC)
with Non-Defensiveness (ND) as the Mediator
Path
Full Sample (N =513)
Direct Effect of MC on ND
Direct Effect of ND on SA
Direct Effect of MC on SA
Indirect Effect of MC on SA
Non-Immigrant Non-Education Students
(n = 125)
Direct Effect of MC on ND
Direct Effect of ND on SA
Direct Effect of MC on SA
Indirect Effect of MC on SA
Non-Immigrant Education Students
(n = 217)
Direct Effect of MC on ND
Direct Effect of ND on SA
Direct Effect of MC on SA
Indirect Effect of MC on SA

Point of Estimate

Lower Bound to Upper Bound
(95% Confidence Interval)

.5064
(.0127)***
.2271
(.2817)***
.3932
(.0122)***
.1150
(.0036)***

.4205 to .5764
(.0106 to .0146)
.1409 to .3156
(.1700 to .3958)
.3137 to .4723
(.0096 to .0149)
.0689 to .1688
(.0021 to .0053)

.5576
(.0126)***
.1396
(.1918)
.4233
(.0131)***
.0778
(.0024)

.4018 to .6740
(.0088 to .0160)
-.0390 to .3136
(-.0503 to .4567)
.2357 to .5888
(.0074 to .0191)
-.0194 to .1817
(-.0006 to .0057)

.4651
(.0124)***
.3139
(.3804)***
.3324
(.0107)***
.1460
(.0047)***

.3304 to .5771
(.0088 to .0159)
.1843 to .4373
(.2180 to .5398)
.2125 to .4529
(.0069 to .0149)
.0821 to .2280
(.0026 to .0076)

(continued)
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Table 31 (continued)
Summary of Mediation analyses Predicting Self-Actualization (SA) from Metacognition (MC)
with Non-Defensiveness (ND) as the Mediator
Path
Immigrant Non-Education Students
(n = 76)
Direct Effect of MC on ND
Direct Effect of ND on SA
Direct Effect of MC on SA
Indirect Effect of MC on SA

Point of Estimate

.3507
(.0096)***
.0870
(.0982)
.4472
(.0138)***
.0305
(.0009)

Lower Bound to Upper Bound
(95% Confidence Interval)
.1177 to .5612
(.0035 to .0149)
-.1152 to .3589
(-.1276 to .4241)
.2639 to .6041
(.0079 to .0203)
-.0274 to .1767
(.0053 to .4196)

Immigrant Education Students
(n = 95)
Direct Effect of MC on ND

.6521
.4824 to .7681
(.0157)***
(.0110 to .0195)
Direct Effect of ND on SA
.2716
.0609 to .4788
(.3160)*
(.0701 to.5593)
Direct Effect of MC on SA
.4028
.1960 to .6008
(.0113)***
(.0052 to .0176)
Indirect Effect of MC on SA
.1771
.0462 to .3399
(.0049)**
(.0013 to .0094)
Note. Significant levels are based on p values estimated by Bias-Corrected confidence intervals.

The effect sizes for the overall models across samples were in medium range
(ranging from .2801 to .4077). The overall model accounted for 34.61% of variance in
self-actualization for the full sample; 95% CI [.2808, .4046], p = .001. The total variance
accounted for by the overall models was .2801 (95% CI .1380, .3927], p < .01) for nonimmigrant non-education students, .3600 (95% CI [.2489, .4521], p < .01), for nonimmigrant education students, .3471 (95% CI .1783, .4634], p < .01) for immigrant noneducation students, and .4077 (95% CI [.2544, .5118], p < .01) for immigrant education
students.
Variance accounted for by Metacognition through mediation. Similar to
Hypothesis 8, a set of hierarchical regression analyses was conducted to find an
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approximation of the unique mediational contribution of Metacognition (MC) to SelfActualization (SA) for the full sample and for non-education samples (for procedural
details please see the same section on H8). The unique contribution of Metacognition,
when no mediator was involved (i.e., before controlling for ND) was obtained in testing
H8: 25.2% for the full sample, 24.5% for non-immigrant non-education students, 22.5%
for non-immigrant education students, 22.3% for immigrant non-education students, and
33.9% for immigrant education students, p < .001. After controlling for ND, the unique
proportion of variance accounted for by Metacognition was 11.3% for the full model (p <
.001), 8.4% for non-immigrant education students (p < .001), and 9.3% for immigrant
education students (p < .001).
The calculation (∆R2without mediator - ∆R2with mediator) indicated that for the full sample
MC and ND shared 13.9% of variance in SA while another 11.3% of variance accounted
for by Metacognition was independent from ND. For non-immigrant education students,
14.1% of variance in SA was shared by MC and ND and another 8.4% of variance
accounted for by MC was independent from ND. For immigrant education students, the
mediational contribution of MC to SA was 24.0% and another 9.3% of variance
accounted for by MC was independent from mediational effect.
On the other hand, in samples of non-education students the unique contribution
of MC in predicting SA after controlling for ND was 12.2% for non-immigrant noneducation students (p < .001) and 17.1% for immigrant non-education students (p < .001).
For non-immigrant non-education students the variance in SA which was shared by both
MC and ND was 12.3% and another 12.2% of variance accounted for by MC was
independent from ND. Similarly for immigrant non-education students, 5.2% of variance
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in SA was shared by MC and ND while remaining 17.1% of variance was independent
from ND.
Summary of results for Hypothesis 9. In total, the results of Shrout and Bolger’s
(2002) bootstrap procedure to test the mediation effect indicated that indirect effects for
the full sample and for the two samples of education students (immigrants and nonimmigrants) were significant, while the indirect effects and, in fact, the direct effect of
ND on SA was not significant for non-education students. That is, metacognition
significantly predicted self-actualization through its contribution to non-defensiveness for
education students but not for non-education students with immigrant students having
higher mediated variance accounted for (24.0%) compared to non-immigrants (14.1%).
The confirmation of this mediational effect only across two of the four demographic
samples provides only partial support for Hypothesis 9.
Summary
The results of bivariate correlation analyses and hierarchical regression analyses
support the hypothesized relationships for H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, and H7. The
constructs, metacognition and self-actualization were both significantly and positively
associated with well-being (H1and H7). The constructs, metacognition, needsatisfaction, and non-defensiveness explained unique variances in self-actualization (H2,
H3, and H6). Further, metacognition was significantly and positively associated with
both need-satisfaction and non-defensiveness (H4 and H5). There were two nonsignificant results, one for the sample of parents (n = 61) and another one for the sample
of female immigrant education students (n = 78) respectively for H1 and H6. These
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results were equivocal due to small sample sizes; the hypotheses need to be further
investigated with larger samples of parents and female immigrant education students.
Furthermore, the partial mediational effect of need-satisfaction in the relationship
between metacognition and self-actualization was supported by the data (H8). The
mediational effect of non-defensiveness in aforementioned relationship (H9) was
partially supported for education students, but not for non-education students. Chapter 5
discusses the results and implications of these findings for research, theory, and practice.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Chapter 5 provides a brief summary of the study and a discussion of the results.
Implications for theory, research, and practice are presented, as well as recommendations
for future research.
Summary of Study
Today’s educational system seems to be shortsighted in conceptualizing and
operationalizing a holistic view of education. The high pressure of good academic
performance has often left students’ psychological nurturing, their personal growth, and
their overall well-being to themselves. The field of psychology, nevertheless, has much
to offer to enrich our educational practices and to take care of present shortcomings.
Humanistic psychology with its account of human nature and self-actualization, positive
psychology with its more modern take on human well-being and optimal human
functioning, and cognitive psychology with its breakthroughs about the science of
learning and brain functions are all invaluable resources in building both the theoretical
and practical foundations of a holistic education, which has self-actualization of the
individuals as its chief goal.
Based on this vision, this study was centered on unraveling the challenges of
training self-actualizing minds with a focus on individuals’ metacognitive and cognitive
capabilities. This study addressed these challenges from a theoretical perspective to
establish a conceptual foundation for future research in the direction of developing the
best practices for self-actualization and personal growth suited for educational settings.
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Taking an Aristotelian perspective in the conceptual framework set forth in this
study, self-actualization was conceptualized as a goal-oriented process which is the
means to achieve eudaimonia or well-being. In addition, guided by humanistic theories
of self-actualization, Maslow’s (1968) and Roger’s (1961), need-satisfaction and nondefensiveness were argued as precursors of self-actualization. Moreover, general
metacognitive competence was identified as a facilitator of reasoning, analyzing,
problem-identification, goal-setting, and problem-solving. As such, it was considered a
precursor and facilitator in the process of self-actualization, need-satisfaction, and nondefensiveness. The conceptual model presented in Figure 6 (p. 122; re-presented below)
illustrates the hypothesized antecedents and outcomes of self-actualization set forth by
this conceptual framework.
Need-Satisfaction
Metacognition

Self-Actualization

Well-being

Non-Defensiveness
Figure 6. A conceptual model presenting possible antecedents and outcomes of SelfActualization

The results of correlational analysis, hierarchical regression analysis, and
mediational analysis (using Shrout and Bolger’s [2002] Bootstrap procedure using
structural equation modeling), largely support the hypotheses of this study, except for a
few exceptions. The findings suggest some refinements to the conceptual model. The
results are discussed in the following sections.
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Discussion of the Results
Overall, the results supported the hypotheses and suggested statistically
significant and meaningful relationships among the constructs of interest. However, H1,
H6 and H9 were not supported for some demographic groups. The following section
discusses the results of the study for each hypothesis and a brief summary to conclude the
section.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 1
H1: Summary of results. The results of the bivariate correlational analysis
indicated medium to large effect sizes for the relationship between self-actualization (SA)
and well-being (WB). This suggests that students who reported higher degrees of selfactualization, actualizing-self, and actualizing-striving, compared to ones who scored
lower on these variables, also were more likely to report experiencing a higher level of
subjective well-being (SWB), eudaimonic well-being (EWB), and well-being in general
Except for inconclusive results for the parents, the results of the hierarchical
regression analysis supported hypothesis 1, which posited a positive relationship between
self-actualization and human well-being. The unique variance accounted for by selfactualization ranged from .205 to .292 for WB (i.e., medium to large effect size), .255 to
.363 for EWB (i.e., medium to large effect size), and .079 to .164 for SWB (i.e., small to
medium effect sizes). In conclusion, self-actualization made a unique positive
contribution to overall WB (p < .001).
H1: Discussion. Hypothesis 1 stated that there was a positive relationship
between self-actualization and WB. The results of the analyses support this hypothesis
across samples, except for the relatively small sample of parents (n = 61). This finding is
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consistent with Bauer et al.’s (2011) studies of self-actualization and well-being. Bauer
et al. (2011) found that people in highest stages of Loevinger’s (1979) ego development,
which was argued to correspond to Maslow’s (1968) self-actualization, are more likely to
experience higher level of well-being (i.e., SWB and PWB) as compared to people in
lower levels of ego development.
In the present study, self-actualization was defined as a goal-oriented process
consisting of goal self-concordance, goal aspiration and goal striving. In studies by
Sheldon and colleagues (2002; 2004) and by Kasser and Ryan (1996, 2001), intrinsic
goal aspirations and motives (i.e., intrinsic vs. extrinsic), self-concordant goal attributions
or (i.e., autonomous vs. controlled or self-concordant), and indicators of goal striving
(e.g., goal progress and goal attainment) were found to positively predict WB. Kasser
and Ryan (1996) found positive correlations between intrinsic goal aspirations and
different indicators of psychological and physical well-being. Sheldon et al. (2002; 2004)
found that autonomous and self-concordant goal attributions positively and significantly
predicted SWB and PWB. Attaining intrinsic goals also predicted PWB while attaining
extrinsic goals did not (Kasser & Ryan, 2001).
Furthermore, goal progress, regardless of goal motives, was positively and
significantly related to both PWB and SWB (e.g., felt aliveness; psychological
adjustment and positive affect vs. negative affect; Sheldon & Kasser, 1998; Sheldon et
al., 2002). Thus, the present findings support existing research on goals and well-being.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 2
H2: Summary of results. The bivariate correlational analyses results indicated a
significant relationship between Non-Defensiveness (ND) and SA (small to medium
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effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). This suggests that students who reported higher degrees of
self-actualization, actualizing-self, and actualizing-striving, compared to ones who scored
lower on these variables, were more likely to be using adaptive styles of psychological
defense, more likely coped successfully with a stressful situation and less likely to merely
react to the situation.
The results of the hierarchical regression analyses also supported Hypothesis 2
with medium to large effect sizes. The F changes were significant for the full sample and
for the four groups in the split-sample analyses when using SA as the dependent variable
and ND as the independent variable, over and above all demographic covariates. Finding
significant results for each of the groups suggests that the adoption of more adaptive
styles of psychological defense uniquely contribute to the self-actualization of
individuals.
H2: Discussion. Hypothesis 2 stated that there was a positive relationship
between the adoption of more adaptive styles of psychological defense and SA. In this
study, ND scores were used as the indicator of the adoption of more adaptive styles of
psychological defense. The results of the analyses support this hypothesis across splitsamples. These results provide preliminary evidence indicating that ND is an antecedent
to self-actualization, as implied by Rogers’ self (-actualization) theory (1951, 1961).
Definitional and, thus, ambiguity issues have unnecessarily limited SA research.
Some related research studies though have investigated the relationship between defense
mechanisms and WB. Among them, the ones which focused on PWB or Self-Realization
in PWB are presented as supportive evidence for H2’s results. The present study’s
findings are consistent with Milquelon and Vallerand’s (2008) research. Milquelon and
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Vallerand, however, tested a predictive path from self-realization to defense/coping,
finding a negative association between self-realization (growth-component of PWB) and
avoidant coping (i.e., defensiveness) and a positive association with vigilant/active
coping. Studies by Kling et al. (1997) and Park and Adler (2003) also supported the
positive link between adaptive styles of defense and PWB.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 3
H3: Summary of results. The bivariate correlational analyses indicated medium
to large effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) for the relationship of Need-Satisfaction and its
components with Self-Actualization and its components. This suggests that students who
reported a higher level of need-satisfaction in total, in a general sense, or in relation to
their goal pursuits were more likely to experience higher degrees of self-actualization and
more likely to demonstrate higher levels of both actualizing-self (personality) and
actualizing-striving (i.e., committedly pursuing self-actualizing goals). This result
supports Hypothesis 3, which hypothesized a positive relationship between NS and SA.
Testing the contribution of Need-Satisfaction (NS) to predicting SelfActualization (SA) included the interaction between gender and NS for both the full
sample and subsample of education students. Testing the simple effect of NS for males
and females showed that in both samples, the change in SA was greater for males than it
was for females for every 1 SD (or 1 unit) change in NS (i.e., different slopes for the
regression lines for males and females). On the other hand, for the sample of education
students, the changes in SA (which was associated with changes in NS) did not differ for
males and females (i.e., no interaction between Gender and NS in predicting SA). In
sum, the association of NS with SA was positive and statistically significant for the full
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sample and for the two split samples by Major (large effect sizes; Cohen, 1988). The
results of the hierarchical regression analysis provide additional evidence to support
Hypothesis 3.
H3: Discussion. Hypothesis 3 stated that there was a positive relationship
between need-satisfaction (NS) and self-actualization (SA). The analyses provide
preliminary supporting evidence for NS being an antecedent to SA, as implied by
Maslow’s (1968) conceptualization of hierarchy of needs.
Similar to non-defensiveness, there is a lack of research investigating the link
between SA and NS. There are a few studies (e.g., Reis et al., 2000; Sheldon et al., 1996)
however that investigated the relationship between NS and WB, but not with SA. In
addition, there are two studies that investigated the moderating or mediational role of NS
(respectively, Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Niemeic et al., 2006) in the relationship between
goal attainment and SWB. Although the positive relationship between need-satisfaction
and intrinsic goal-attainment was supported as part of the mediational study (Niemeic et
al., 2006), none of the studies looked at NS as an antecedent to SA as it is in accordance
with Maslow’s (1968) self-actualization theory. The present study was the first to the
researcher’s knowledge attempting to test this relationship in the context of Maslow’s
(1968) conceptualization of needs and self-actualization as the highest level need, within
an educational setting.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 4
H4: Summary of results. The bivariate correlational analyses revealed
significant relationships between Metacognition (MC) and Need-Satisfaction (NS) (small
to large effect sizes, Cohen, 1988). This suggests that students who reported a high level
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of overall general Metacognition (GMC), Knowledge of Cognition (KC), or Regulation
of Cognition (RC) were more likely to report higher degrees of overall NS, General
Need-Satisfaction (GNS), and Goal-Related Need-Satisfaction (GRNS). This supports
Hypothesis 4 which predicts a positive relationship between MC and NS. The unique
contribution of MC to NS was also found for the full sample, as well as the four split
samples Major X Immigrant. The effect sizes ranged from medium to large for this
contribution.
H4: Discussion. Hypothesis 4 stated that there was a positive relationship
between MC and NS. The results of the analyses provided supporting evidence for MC
positively predicting NS.
There is a lack of research examining the relationship between MC and NS. The
novel view employed by this study posited that every need and every problem was a goal
of metacognition, rather than more traditional views that see need-satisfaction as a social
or personal arbitrary occurrence. Aside from very basic tangible needs (physiological
and safety needs), basic psychological needs are in part manageable by the individual if
satisfying needs is consciously set as personal goals and tackled strategically and
skillfully. The results of the present research lend support to the notion that
metacognitive knowledge and skills may be part of an overarching psychological system
to deal with the problem of NS.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 5
H5: Summary of results. The bivariate correlational analyses indicated small to
large associations between Metacognition (MC) and Non-Defensiveness (ND). The
results suggested that students who reported a high level of total Metacognition (GMC),

262

Knowledge of Cognition (KC), or in their Regulation of Cognition (RC) were more likely
to adopt a more adaptive style of defensiveness (i.e., demonstrate higher degree of nondefensiveness), use more coping mechanisms, and express less reactive emotions and
behaviors in a stressful situation. This result supports Hypothesis 5 which predicts a
positive relationship between MC and ND.
The regression results found the unique contribution of MC to ND for the full
sample as well as each of the four split samples by Major X Immigrant. The effect sizes
ranged from small to large for this contribution.
H5: Discussion. Hypothesis 5 stated that there was a positive relationship
between MC and adopting adapting styles of psychological defense. In the present study,
ND scores were used as indicators of adopting adapting styles of psychological defense.
The results provided supporting evidence for MC positively predicting ND.
To the researcher’s knowledge, no study has directly investigated the MC and ND
relation. Few researchers (Berzonsky, 1990, 1992; Berzonsky & Kinney, 2008; Soenens
et al., 2005), however, have explored the relationship between defense mechanisms and
self-awareness and self-concept, which can be considered closely associated conceptually
with metacognitive knowledge. Demarree and Marrison (2011) nicely outlined selfrelated concepts including self-awareness, self-worth, and defensiveness as metacognitive
processes. Individuals with limited self-awareness or lack of openness to
unfamiliar/uncertain experiences are more likely to use reactive defense, such as denial
and behavioral disengagement (Berzonsky, 1990, 1992; Soenens et al., 2005).
Metacognitive individuals, who were characterized as individuals with informational
identity style, are more likely to use adaptive coping strategies, such as positive
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reframing and active coping, and planning/problem-solving (Berzonsky & Kinney, 2008).
The present findings are in line with previous studies of defense mechanisms and add
more to the body of knowledge by introducing MC as a potential overarching construct
associated with both identity styles and choice of defense mechanisms. Further research
would enrich our understanding of the relations among MC, identity style, and defense
choice.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 6
H6: Summary of results. The bivariate correlational analyses indicated the
relationship of Metacognition (MC) with Self-Actualization (SA), while holding NeedSatisfaction (NS) and Non-Defensiveness (ND) constant (medium to large effect sizes,
Cohen, 1988). The results suggested that regardless of their NS level and style of
psychological defense, students who reported a high level of total Metacognition (GMC),
Knowledge of Cognition (KC), or in their Regulation of Cognition (RC) were more likely
to report higher degrees of SA. This result supports Hypothesis 6, which posits a positive
relationship between MC and SA over and above NS and styles of psychological defense.
The regression results revealed the unique contribution of MC to SA for the full
sample as well as each of the four split samples by Major X Immigrant. When the gender
by MC interaction was involved in the analysis for the immigrant education students, the
positive and significant contribution of MC to SA only held true for males(i.e., the simple
effect of MC was not significant for females).
H6: Discussion. Hypothesis 6 stated that there was a positive relationship
between MC and SA over and above the variance accounted for by NS and ND.
Although the effect sizes were small across samples, after controlling for all other
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variables, and the effect was non-significant for the small sample of female immigrant
education students, the overall results suggested MC positively predicted SA,
independent of NS and ND.
This finding is in line with Culbert et al.’s (1968) study which showed that
trainings focused on self-awareness enhanced students’ self-actualization orientation,
although not necessarily their self-aware verbal behavior about such personal
orientations. Bar-On (2001, 2006) also identified self-awareness as a key factor in
predicting self-actualization. None of the studies, however, discussed this relationship in
a metacognitive framework. Again, the present study provided evidence suggesting MC
may be a potential overarching construct in predicting SA.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 7
H7: Summary of results. The bivariate correlational analyses supported H7,
indicating medium to large effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). Metacognition (MC) was
positively associated with overall well-being (WB; rs ranging from .47 to .51),
eudaimonic well-being (EWB; (rs ranging from .51 to .56), and subjective well-being
(SWB; rs ranging from .30 to .32). The results suggested that students who reported a
high level of Metacognition in total (GMC), Knowledge of Cognition (KC), or
Regulation of Cognition (RC) were more likely to experience higher WB, SWB and
EWB. This result supported Hypothesis 7 which predicted a positive relationship
between MC and WB.
The regression results of revealed the unique contribution of MC to WB for the
full sample, immigrant education and non-education students, and non-immigrant noneducation students for WB, EWB, and SWB as DVs. When the Age Group by MC

265

interaction was involved in predicting SWB for non-immigrant education students, the
results showed that the contribution of MC differed for adults (at or above 30 years of
age) and emerging adults (17-29 years of age). However, this contribution was still
positive and statistically significant for both groups.
H7: Discussion. Hypothesis 7 stated that there was a positive relationship
between MC and WB. The results of the analyses provided supporting evidence for MC
positively predicting WB.
There was no known research that investigated the MC and WB relationship. The
present study provided support for the positive relationship between MC and WB and
shed light on the potential predictive utility of MC for WB. An additional preliminary
regression analysis of the full sample indicated that MC accounted for unique variance in
WB over and above Non-Defensiveness (ND), Need-Satisfaction (NS), and SelfActualization (SA), F(1,503) = 27.626, ∆R2= .032, p < .001. The variance accounted for
by the overall model corresponded to a large effect size, R2= .423, adjusted R2= .412.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 8
H8: Summary of results. The effects for the overall models predicting SA
across samples were large, ranging from .591 to .688 of the variance being explained. By
employing Shrout and Bolger’s (2002) bootstrap procedure to test possible mediational
effects, there was evidence of a partial mediational effect for the contribution of MC to
SA, with NS as the mediator.
H8: Discussion. The results support the thesis of this study that MC is an
antecedent to NS and SA, and predicts SA partially through its contribution to NS.
Finding evidence for the mediating role of NS also validates the idea of partial personal
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autonomy and control over one’s NS through acquiring and applying general
metacognitive competence. Whether or not more need-specific metacognitive strategy
use, instead of general ones, better helps with NS and SA is a subject for future research.
Research on this topic might add new insights into better understanding the nature of
metacognition and to develop effective metacognitive strategies to be practiced in a selfcoaching curriculum.
Summary and Discussion of Results for Hypothesis 9
H9: Summary of results. Shrout and Bolger’s (2002) bootstrap procedure was
used to test for mediational effects, revealing significant indirect effects for the full
sample and for the two education student samples (immigrants and non-immigrants).
The indirect and direct effects of ND on SA in the model were not significant for noneducation students. That is, MC significantly predicted SA through its contribution to
ND for education students, but not for non-education students. For non-education
students, the contribution of MC to SA was independent from their non-defensiveness.
In other words, a partial mediation effect was detected for the contribution of
metacognition to self-actualization, with non-defensiveness as the mediator only for
education students. The confirmation of this mediational effect only across two of the
four demographic samples provides only partial support for hypothesis 9.
H9: Discussion. The regression analyses on the two samples of non-education
students confirmed that the regression weights in the overall model were not significant
for ND in predicting SA. However, ND predicted SA significantly over and above the
demographic covariates for both samples before adding MC to the model. For nonimmigrant non-education students, F(1,121) = 19.785, ∆R2= .137, B = .512 , β = .371, p <
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.001, R2= .164, adjusted R2= .143. For immigrant non-education students, F(1,72) =
5.169, ∆R2=.058, B = .277 , β = .244, p < .05, R2= .189, adjusted R2= .155. This
significant contribution was eliminated when MC was added to the regression model;
demonstrating a suppression effect.
This finding implies that MC may fully mediate the contribution of ND to SA for
non-education students. This new notion was tested by running an SEM in Amos 18.0;
the notion was supported for both immigrant non-education students (indirect effect =
.18, standardized indirect effect = .16, p < .01) and non-immigrant non-education
students (indirect effect = .32, standardized indirect effect = .23, p < .001).
Of course, a causal relationship could not be argued for the mediation analysis
due to the lack of an experimental design. Therefore, the more plausible approach in
discussing the observed relationship in H9 was through analyzing the variance shared by
the three constructs of interest. Limiting the discussion to these two samples of noneducation students, additional regression analyses showed that MC accounted for 24.5%
of the variance in SA for the first group, 12.3% of which is the same variance accounted
for by Non-Defensiveness, and 22.3% for the second group, of which 5.2% is the same
variance accounted for by Non-Defensiveness.
Implications for Theory, Research, and Practice
The conceptual model researched by the present study sought to bring an
interdisciplinary perspective to the fields of education and psychology with the goal of
informing school policies and practices of the implications of psychological theories and
practices for holistically enriching students’ lives in educational settings. It also tested
self-actualization models implied by two venerable theories of self-actualization, Rogers’
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(1951, 1961) and Maslow’s (1968), that had been largely overlooked by both
psychological and educational researchers. The findings from this study have wide range
of implications for scholars, researchers, and practitioners. The following sections present
the implications of this study for theory, research and practice.
Implications for Theory
The conceptual framework and the conceptual model presented in this study
portray a novel approach to human well-being and full functionality by taking a goaloriented view of self-actualization. The framework was also intended to establish a
theoretical foundation to revisit the philosophy of education and rethinking it towards
holistically enhancing human wellbeing and functionality. By finding support for this
conceptual model, which includes a teachable competence, namely metacognition, as an
overarching contributing variable to human well-being and self-actualization, a
fundamental step has been taken towards supporting this conceptual framework as a
means to guide educational practices, as well as life-coaching and counseling practices.
The following sections outline the theoretical implications related to each hypothesis.
Theoretical implications for H1. The findings provide support for the thesis that
self-actualization and human well-being are two separate phenomena. This thesis offers
a contemporary operational definition for self-actualization that permits researching the
link between self-actualization and well-being. This is in contrast to the traditional
approach in well-being research where self-actualization is regarded as being part of
well-being, rather than being independent (e.g., psychological well-being; Watson et al.,
1988). Finding support for this hypothesis gave credibility to the new operational
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definition of self-actualization taken by the present study to inform both the positive and
humanistic psychology literatures.
Theoretical implications for H2 and H3. Supporting evidence for Hypothesis 2
and 3 add to the body of knowledge by directly exploring the relationship of selfactualization with defense/coping mechanisms and need-satisfaction which, to the best of
the researcher’s knowledge, had not been undertaken by any previous psychological
research. Finding supporting evidence for these hypotheses highlights some underexamined aspects of Roger’s (1951, 1961) and Maslow’s (1968) theories where such
relationships were implied. Guided by these theories, the present study identified, tested,
and found empirical support for some heretofore untested contributors to the process of
self-actualization. These findings can enrich our understandings of the self-actualization
phenomenon and its related conceptualizations (e.g., Maslow’s [1968] and Rogers’
[1951, 1961]).
Theoretical implications for H4 and H5. Hypothesis 4 and 5 also explored and
found support for the relationship of metacognition with need-satisfaction and nondefensiveness. It was one of the first attempts to identify a common contributor to needsatisfaction and non-defensiveness, constructs which were implied by Rogers’s (1951,
1961) theory of self and Maslow’s (1968) theory of motivation as precursors to selfactualization.
Theoretical implications for H6 and H7. Supporting evidence for Hypothesis 6
and 7 also establishes the beginning of an evidence-based theoretical foundation to
broaden the conceptualization and implications of metacognition.
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Theoretical implications for H8 and H9. Hypothesis 8 and 9 tested the nature of
self-actualization by investigating metacognition as the precursor to need-satisfaction,
non-defensiveness, and self-actualization, which contributes to self-actualization through
its contribution to the two aforementioned constructs. Although these mediational
models were supported largely, the mediational effect of non-defensiveness was not
supported for non-education students. These inconsistent findings suggest that the
conceptual framework and the conceptual model presented in this study can benefit from
further refinement.
For instance, in explaining the amount of variance in self-actualization,
metacognition functions as the overarching construct in relation to non-defensiveness,
rather than as an antecedent to non-defensiveness. In other words, there is a proportion
of variance in self-actualization which is defined through the relationship of
metacognition and non-defensiveness, while metacognition accounts for more than this
shared variance. The proposition of a causal relationship, that is, whether enhancing
metacognition helps with developing higher level of non-defensiveness, or it is nondefensiveness that provides a medium to add to general metacognitive competence is
subject to further research using experimental design.
Implied by the direction of the path in the refined mediational model tested and
supported earlier (see H9: Discussion), higher non-defensiveness may be hypothesized to
result in a higher level of metacognition. The direction of this “causal” relationship,
however, does not contradict the proposed premise of this study that non-defensiveness
can be a goal of metacognition. Indeed, to manipulate non-defensiveness some
interventions need to be developed, including but not limited to meditational
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interventions, social interventions or emotional interventions; all can be regarded as
strategies to achieve the goal of non-defensiveness. The notion is that using these
strategies metacognitively makes them effective. Using strategies metacognitively means
being aware of the different strategies and their probable effectiveness in different
situations (i.e., metacognitive monitoring), and selecting a strategy to start with and
shifting between strategies if one in use is not working (i.e., metacognitive control).
Thus, the hypothesis is that if by applying these strategies, higher non-defensiveness is
achieved, then higher non-defensiveness leads to growth in general metacognitive
competence. Thus, effective interventions to develop non-defensiveness affect general
metacognitive competence as well as domain-specific metacognitive competence. The
argument is that domain-specific metacognitive development (which is centered on an
issue such as defensiveness) might add to the general metacognitive competence of
individuals and help with metacognitive development in general.
Implications for Research
Prior to this research, little was known empirically about the precursors or
outcomes of self-actualization. What’s more, self-actualization was assessed as a set of
personality characteristics and a view of self-actualization as a process was absent from
the empirical literature. Rules (1991) suggested a contemporary view of selfactualization which regards it as a goal-oriented process; an operational definition that
suggests measuring a self-variable as well as a goal-related variable. The present study
adopted this perspective and conducted research employing an ex post facto design to test
a conceptual model predicting self-actualization and to add insight to understanding the
nature and requirements of the self-actualization process.
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Educational psychologists are urged to further test this conceptual model to refine
it by uncovering more about the nature of each construct in the model and identifying
other antecedent variables which might improve the variance explained by the conceptual
model. Replicating this study could provide more evidence supporting the model.
Replication of the study is also recommended while utilizing larger samples allowing for
proportional representation for each demographic group. In addition to replicating the
study with a similar population, researchers need to take it further and test the conceptual
model in different populations in terms of ethnicity/nationality and also different
educational as well as organizational settings. Measures can be refined to be ageappropriate to test the conceptual model for different educational levels in school
settings. They also can be used, as they are, in other organizational settings; the results
from these studies can be also used for personal and professional development in
workplaces.
Using the measures with different populations would also help further refine and
validate the measures. The present study provided preliminary evidence of validity and
reliability (through Exploratory Factor Analysis) for the measures used in this study (see
Chapter 4). All of the constructs were a combination of scores from different measures
and some of the measures were modified. Therefore, further validation studies could be
useful for additional instrument development purposes. Although the hypotheses were
largely supported, the predictive quality of constructs changed somewhat from subsample to sub-sample (i.e., subsamples split by demographic variables) for all
hypotheses. Investigating similar research questions across demographically different
samples might add insight to our understanding of the nature and functionality of each
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construct. Moreover, detecting differences in their functionality and predictive quality
may shed light on developing demographically appropriate and effective interventions to
enhance self-actualization and well-being and to maintain a realistic expectation of the
effectiveness of the interventions for each demographic group.
Finally, self-actualization needs to be measured longitudinally to be completely in
line with Rule’s (1991) conceptualization of self-actualization. One of the characteristics
Rule (1991) explained in his operational definition of self-actualization was defining it as
a process; not static in time like a personality trait. To bring this consideration to the
measurement of self-actualization, he suggested including the function of time in
measuring this construct. Administering pre-tests and post-tests before and after
implementing an intervention is indeed necessary. Further, longitudinal designs that
follow individuals over a longer period of time (e.g., over the years) will help to examine
the persistence of skill-building or character-building through specific interventions. It
may also help to understand each phenomenon developmentally.
Implications for Practice
The findings provide empirical support for the practical implications of the
conceptual model tested for tackling cognitive, emotional, and psychological dilemmas in
educational settings as well as in coaching and counseling. For instance, in an
educational context, there are several daily emotional and psychological challenges that
teachers and school personnel need to address in classrooms and on school grounds.
Bullying, a substantial challenge in educational settings, was found to be associated with
high psychological defensiveness, low self-esteem and the urge for popularity in bullies
and low belonging and esteem in the victims (Hawker, & Boulton, 2000; Nail, Bihm, &
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Simon, 2011; Salmivalli, Kaukiainen, Kaistaniemi, & Lagerspetz, 1999). Academic and
social competitive atmosphere of schools may create situations that threaten students’
self-worth and/or bring to the surface dissatisfaction of their esteem and belonging needs.
The conceptual model presented in this study provides a theoretical foundation for
practice and research to develop curricular and instructional interventions that teaches
specific metacognitive skills focused on developing need-satisfaction, reducing
defensiveness, and promoting the use of adaptive coping strategies. This model could be
extended in a practical sense to include any other psychological growth-oriented
challenges of students as metacognitive goals.
The present study has employed university students as the target population for
the purpose of investigating the relationship between a general metacognitive
competence, self-actualization, and individuals’ well-being. The reason for this choice
was that emerging adults (i.e., university-age individuals) tend to be more advanced in
their cognitive development (Reio & Sanders-Reio, 2009) and in their metacognitive
development (e.g., Pressley et al., 1984), as compared to school-age students. Therefore,
findings supporting evidence for the hypotheses with this population adds empirical
support for its possible applicability in designing interventions for earlier ages, as well as
for university students in educational settings beyond the geographic region where the
data were collected.
Accordingly, the findings of this study provided an empirical foundation to
developing metacognitive curricular and instructional interventions that help students
develop a metacognitive system towards self-actualization. Nevertheless, the ageappropriateness of interventions must be acknowledged to accommodate stage and age of
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cognitive development. Metacognitive skills can be taught from early ages, and because
they need practice and habituation over years to be fully and effectively developed
(Gaskin & Pressley, 2005), it seems prudent to begin teaching them as early as possible.
Although research supports the effectiveness of different models of metacognitive
instructions for different age groups, one must employ age-appropriate language when
teaching general metacognitive skills.
Perhaps, developing metacognitive knowledge of psychological concepts may not
be expected from young children. In the case of addressing need-satisfaction, it seems
more appropriate to develop metacognitive curricular interventions for emerging adults
(e.g., college and university students) in that they may be more in charge of fulfilling
their own needs and abler to pursue their interests as compared to younger individuals.
Some metacognitive interventions may also be useful for adolescents in the areas of
belonging and esteem needs to encourage them to become involved in shared activities
and community-based learning, and to develop the same respect and recognition for their
peers as they would wish for themselves (i.e., their esteem needs). Need-Satisfaction for
younger individuals may be best handled by their families and schools.
On the other hand, teaching and learning about psychologically threatening
situations, defense mechanisms, and adaptive coping strategies, through the use of
suitable metacognitive skills, may be addressed in early ages, as well as in adolescence
and young adulthood. It necessitates establishing age-appropriate psychological literacy.
Psychological literacy has been defined as “the general capacity to adaptively and
intentionally apply psychology [i.e., psychological principles] to meet personal,
professional and societal needs” (Cranney, Botwood, & Morris, 2012, p. iii).
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In line with this vision, the present study suggests directions for practice and
research to develop a self-coaching curriculum with an aim for self-actualization. For the
development of an evidence-based self-coaching curriculum, the researcher suggests
developing a metacognitive instructional model of coaching that teaches metacognitive
skills specifically related to need-satisfaction and defense/coping mechanisms. Of
interest for future research is the investigation of developing and incorporating
psychological literacy in form of a self-coaching curriculum for individuals in different
age-groups. Life coaching approaches that incorporate metacognitive skills and focus on
students’ psychological needs can be a curricular innovation for schools.
Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research
Limitations
The findings of this study are limited by the use of metacognition in the model as
the way of approaching self-actualization. There may be other constructs, such as
emotional intelligence, that better relate to self-actualization and/or well-being or adding
them to the model may explain more variance in the criterion variables. Although the
present research was focused on intrapersonal factors in relation to individuals’ selfactualization and well-being, there are also factors external to the person (i.e., social
environment), which may contribute to their metacognition, need-satisfaction,
defensiveness, self-actualization, and well-being. Future research should examine other
possible routes towards self-actualizations and well-being.
Moreover, using self-report measures may introduce common method biases to
the measurements and, thus, to the parameter estimates. However, some procedural
considerations can be taken to reduce the probability of common method biases
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(Podsakoff et al., 2003; Reio, 2010). The procedural remedies used for this study include
(a) reducing item ambiguity by modifying the wording of some items, (b) assuring
participants of the confidentiality of their responses, (c) using different scales and end
points for different measures, (d) providing verbal labels for different scale points, and
(d) counter balancing the order in which the measurements were presented to
participants.
In addition, the convenience sample used in this study introduces a limitation to
the generalizability of the findings. The sample was a convenient sample of graduate and
undergraduate students with a majority being Hispanic (64.3%) and majoring in
education (60.8%) in a public university in South Florida (e.g., all graduate students were
education students.). Therefore, caution should be used when generalizing the results to
demographically different populations. Also small sample sizes for split samples lowered
the power of the analysis. Future research needs to consider a more diverse population
and larger sample sizes, particularly with respect to grouping demographic variables used
in this study.
Recommendations for Future Research
This study provided a conceptual framework for research and practice in the field
of self-actualization and human well-being, particularly in educational contexts. The
vision taken by the author is to revive a self-actualizing philosophy of education by
providing theoretical foundations for developing the best practices for self-actualization
suited for educational settings. Some recommendations have been made to provide
direction for future research with the aim of developing metacognitive self-coaching
curricula for different age-groups while targeting self-actualization as the goal.
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Enhancing students’ psychological literacy, as an addition to students’ metacognitive
knowledge repertoires, should be one of the objectives of this self-coaching curriculum.
In this study, general metacognitive competence was identified to be associated
with need-satisfaction and non-defensiveness in contributing to self-actualization.
Further research is needed to define effective domain-specific metacognitive skills and
strategies in the areas of need-satisfaction and defensiveness/coping for different age
groups ranging from childhood to adolescence to emerging adulthood and adulthood.
Developing such strategies and examining their age-appropriateness are challenges for
future research. Developing strategies and interventions will help experimentally test the
conceptual model presented in this study and make evidence-based causal inferences.
This study was the first study which used a contemporary operational definition of
self-actualization, considered well-being and self-actualization as separate variables,
hypothesized and investigated a metacognition-based conceptual model for selfactualization and well-being, and tested the self-actualization theories of Maslow (1968)
and Rogers (1951,1961). The author calls for further theoretical and experimental studies
to provide additional empirical supports for the findings of this study and add insight to
possible causal relationships between constructs of interest in this study.
Moreover, the present study calls for further research on existing school practices
to investigate their short-term and long-term effects on students’ personal growth and
well-being. Identifying and investigating other intrapersonal and interpersonal factors
which may enhance or detract from students’ self-actualization and well-being can be the
topic of future research. Research on different possible contributors to self-actualization
enriches the conceptual model set forth in this study. Furthermore, of interest for future
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research is the investigation of demographic differences in the constructs involved in this
study and the contribution of different demographics to the relationship between the
constructs. This line of research will add insight to our understanding of the nature of
each construct.
Conclusion
Developing effective, independent individuals who know how to monitor and
control their goals, actions, and plans has been one of the intended objectives of
metacognitive instructional approaches in classrooms for a few years now (e.g., Gaskin &
Pressley, 2005). The present study views self-actualization as a conscious and deliberate
process that involves pursuing one’s intrinsic, self-concordant, constitutive, and
personally expressive goals, and recognizes holistic education as the gateway for selfactualization. The model presented in this study establishes a conceptual and empirical
foundation to incorporate into the school curricula some psychological aspects of life and
human development that students need to build bright futures and fulfilling lives.
The present study provides a direction for future research and informs educational
policy to advance education as a means to keeping individuals on the path for life-long
learning and to continuously and holistically advancing towards their optimal well-being.
Achieving this goal requires collaborative interdisciplinary endeavors among educational
psychologists and curriculum specialists as well as educational policy-makers and
administrators. These efforts need to be put to work in two ways: (a) one is to raise
awareness of the need for reviving the self-actualizing philosophy of education and (b)
the other is to promote research and intervention development to support the practice of
this philosophy.
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Appendix A
Measures of Well-Being (Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being)
Measures of Hedonic (Subjective) Well-Being
(1) The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; see Watson et al., 1988, for
the complete questionnaire)
(2) The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985, see
http://internal.psychology.illinois.edu/~ediener/SWLS.html for the complete
questionnaire)
The Measure of Eudaimonic Well-Being (Adapted with the authors’ permission)
This questionnaire contains a series of statements that refer to how you may feel things
have been going in your life. Read each statement and decide the extent to which you
agree or disagree with it. Try to respond to each statement according to your own feelings
about how things are actually going, rather than how you might wish them to be.
Please use the following scale when responding to each statement.
Strongly Disagree
123456789101112131415161718-

0

1

2

3

4 Strongly Agree

Adapted from QEWB (Waterman et al., 2010)6
I find I get intensely involved in many of the things I do each day.
I believe I have discovered who I really am.
I think it would be ideal if things came easily to me in my life. (R)
My life is centered around a set of core beliefs that give meaning to my life.
It is more important that I really enjoy what I do than that other people are impressed by it.
I believe I know what my best potentials are and I try to develop them whenever possible.
Other people usually know better what would be good for me to do than I know myself. (R)
I feel best when I’m doing something worth investing a great deal of effort in.
I can say that I have found my purpose in life.
If I did not find what I was doing rewarding for me, I do not think I could continue doing it.
As yet, I’ve not figured out what to do with my life. (R)
I can’t understand why some people want to work so hard on the things that they do. (R)
I believe it is important to know what I’m doing is something worth pursuing.
When I engage in activities that involve my best potentials, I have this sense of really being
alive.
I am confused about what my talents really are. (R)
I find a lot of the things I do are aligned with who I really am.
It is important to me that I feel fulfilled by the activities that I engage in.
If something is really difficult, it probably isn’t worth doing. (R)

6

From “The Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being: Psychometric Properties, Demographic
Comparisons, and Evidence of Validity,” by A. S. Waterman, S. J. Schwartz, B. L. Zamboanga, R. D
Ravert., M. Williams, V. B. Agocha, S.Y. Kim, and M. B. Donnellan, 2010, The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 5 (1), p. 49. Copyright 2010 by A. S. Waterman. Adapted with permission.
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19- I find it hard to get really invested in the things that I do. (R)
20- I believe I know what I was meant to do in life.

Items adapted from LRI-R (Debats, 1998)7
21- I feel that I’m really going to attain what I want in my life.
22- I spend most of my time doing things that really aren’t very important to me. (R)
23- There honestly isn’t anything that I totally want to do. (R)
24- I have a clear idea of what I’d like to do with my life.
25- I have real passion in my life.
26- I have a philosophy of life that really gives my living significance.
27- I get so excited by what I’m doing that I find new stores of energy I didn’t know that
I had.
Note. (R) Item is revers scored.

7

From “Measurement of Personal Meaning: The Psychometric Properties of the Life Regard Index,” by D.
L. Debats, 1998. In T. P. Wong and P. S. Fry (Eds.), The Human Quest for Meaning: A Handbook of
Psychological Research and Clinical Applications (pp.237-260), Copyright 1998 by D. L. Debats. Adapted
with permission.
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Appendix B
Measures of Self-Actualization
(a) Actualizing-Self (Actualizing Disposition& Actualizing Initiation):
(1) Measure of Actualizing Dispositions (27 items): Items 1 to 27 of the Measure
of Actualization of Potentials (see Leclerc et al., 2002, for the complete
questionnaire and manual)
(2) Measure of Actualizing Initiation (2 items): Items 28 & 29 were adopted from
the Personal Growth Initiative Scale (Robitschek, 1998, items were reprinted
with the author’s permission)8
Using the scale below, circle the number which best describes the extent to which the
statement is true about you.
28. If I want to change something in my life, I initiate the transition process.
1
not me at all

2

3

4

somewhat me

5

definitely me

29. I have a plan for making my life more balanced.
1
not at all

2

3

Somewhat

4

5

very much

(b) Actualizing-Striving
List of Goals
Please think of your personal goals you want to accomplish, your goals you are
concerned about when planning for your future, and goals that inspire you in your
everyday life. Personal goals might involve various life areas, as for example study,
family, friends, your own personal growth, leisure time, health, jobs, housing conditions,
etc. Focus on long-term goals (e.g., to improve the relationship with a friend) rather than
on single behavioral acts or short-term pursuits (e.g., to buy a present for a friend next
week).

8

From “Personal Growth Initiative: The Construct and Its Measures,” by C. Robitschek, 1998.
Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 30(4), 183-198. Copyright 1998 by C.
Robitschek. Reprinted and adapted with permission.
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List or briefly describe the five most important goals you are pursuing in your life at the
present:
1
2
3
4
5
(1) Measures of Goal Self-Concordant and Goal Aspiration9
(one copy per goal)
Please rewrite your first goal here
_________________________________________________
And answer the following questions about this goal.
Think about this goal and keep in mind, it really does not matter if your goal actually
leads to these specific things mentioned below or not. Please think about your aspirations
and intentions and honestly rate on a scale of 1 to 7 to what extent you pursue this goal:
1- Because you endorse it freely and value it wholeheartedly.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

2- Because somebody else wants you to or because the situation seems to compel it.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

3- Because of the enjoyment or stimulation which that goal provides you.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

9

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

The first 4 items represent Goal Attribution or Goal Self-Concordance and were adapted from Optimal
Human Being: An Integrated Multi-Level Perspective, by K. M. Sheldon, 2004, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates. Copyright 2004 by K. M. Sheldon. Adapted with permission. Items for Goal
Aspirations (5 to 15) were developed guided by literature (see Table 2 in the manuscript for more details).
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4- Because you compel yourself because you would feel ashamed, guilty, or anxious
if you didn’t.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

5- Because it is good by itself.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

6- Because it makes you a better person.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

7- Because people will like you more.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

8- Because it makes you learn new things about yourself and/or the world.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

9- Because it makes you look better among your friends, family, or other people in
general.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

10- Because it makes other people’s lives better.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

11- Because it makes you well-known.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3
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12- Because it makes your life more meaningful.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

13- Because it helps you with financial success.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

14- Because it makes you use and build upon your potentials.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

15- Because it reflects who you are.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

(2) Measure of Goal Striving10 (one copy per goal)
Clarity:
16- I know what I need to do to get started toward reaching my goals.
1
not at all

2

3

4
Moderately

5

6

7
very much

6

7
very much

17- I have a specific action plan to help me reach my goals.
1
not at all

2

3

4
Moderately

10

5

Clarity items were adapted from “Personal Growth Initiative: The Construct and Its Measures,” by C.
Robitschek, 1998. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 30(4), 183-198.
Copyright 1998 by C. Robitschek. Adapted with permission. Importance and Effort items were adapted
from The Psychology of Ultimate Concerns: Motivation and Spirituality in Personality, by R. A. Emmons,
1999, New York, NY: Guilford. Copyright 1999 by R. A. Emmons. Adapted with permission. Goal
Inspiration items were adapted from “Inspired to Get There: The Effects of Trait and Goal Inspiration on
Goal Progress,” by M. Milyavskaya, I. Ianakieva, E. Foxen-Craft, A. Colantuoni, & R. Koestner, 2012,
Personality and Individual Differences, 52, p. 56-60. Copyright 2012 by M. Milyavskaya. Adapted with
permission.
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Importance:
18- How important is this goal to you in your life, and how committed are you to
working towards each goal?
1
not at all
important

2
slightly
important

3
somewhat
important

4
moderately
important

5
very
important

6
extremely
important

Inspiration:
19- How inspiring is this goal to you?
1
not at all

2

3

4
moderately

5

6

7
extremely

6

7
extremely

20- How inspired are you to pursue and reach this goal?
1
not at all

2

3

4
moderately

5

Effort:
21- How much effort and energy do you generally expend in trying to be successful in
this goal?
1
no effort

2
very little
effort

3
some effort

4
moderate
effort
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5
much effort

6
very much
effort

Appendix C
Measure of Need-Satisfaction (Sheldon & Elliot’s approach, 1999)11
(Adapted with the authors’ permission)
(1) General Need-Satisfaction
Please rate the extent to which you are having each of these three types of experience in
your life, at present:
1- feeling generally competent and able in what I attempt
1
Very little

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

6

7
Very much

2- feeling generally autonomous and choiceful in what I do
1
Very little

2

3

4

5

3- feeling generally related and connected to people spend time with
1
Very little

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much

(2) Goal-Related Need Satisfaction (One copy per goal)
Please write your goal here
______________________________________________________
And answer these questions about your goal striving:
(a) Competence
How competent you feel while striving for this goal?
1
Very little

2

3

4

11

5

6

7
Very much

The approach and the items were Adapted from “Goal striving, need satisfaction, and longitudinal weilbeing: The self-concordance model,” by K. M. Sheldon and A. J. Elliot, 1999, Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 76(3), p. 482-497. Copyright 1999 by K. M. Sheldon. Adapted with permission. The
Support (Relatedness) item was adapted from The Psychology of Ultimate Concerns: Motivation and
Spirituality in Personality, by R. A. Emmons, 1999, New York, NY: Guilford. Copyright 1999 by R. A.
Emmons. Adapted with permission.
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(b) Autonomy
(1) Identified Motivation, (2) External Motivation, (3) Intrinsic Motivation, and
(4) Introjected Motivation
To what extent you pursue this goal:
(1) Because you endorse it freely and value it wholeheartedly
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

(2) Because somebody else wants you to or because the situation seems to compel it
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

(3) Because of the enjoyment or stimulation which that goal provides you.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

(4) Because you compel yourself because you would feel ashamed, guilty, or anxious
if you didn’t.
1
Not at all for
this reason

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much for
this reason

(c) Support (Relatedness)
Think about the person who has the most impact on you in pursuing this specific goal
(either positive impact, negative impact, or both), choose a number from the scale below
to rate the degree of support or hindrance that you usually receive from that person in
your effort to attain this goal.
1 = Extremely supportive of my efforts at achieving this goal
2 = Supportive of my efforts at achieving this goal
3 = Somewhat supportive of my efforts at achieving this goal
4 = Neither supportive of nor a hindrance to my efforts at achieving this goal
5 = Somewhat of a hindrance to my efforts at achieving this goal
6 = A hindrance to my efforts at achieving this goal
7 = An extreme hindrance to my efforts at achieving this goal
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Appendix D
Non-Defensiveness
(Modified and reordered version of Brief-COPE; Carver, 1997)12
We are interested in how people respond when they confront difficult or stressful events
in their lives. There are lots of ways to try to deal with stress. This questionnaire asks you
to indicate what you generally do and feel, when you experience stressful events.
Obviously, different events bring out somewhat different responses, but think about what
you usually do when you are under a lot of stress. Think about what you do, not what
most people do.
Use the scale below to rate your answers:
1 = I usually don’t do this at all
2 = I usually do this a little bit
3 = I usually do this a medium amount
4 = I usually do this a lot
1- I concentrate my efforts on doing something about the situation I am in.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

2- I learn to live with it.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

3- I say things to let my unpleasant feelings escape.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

4- I try to come up with a strategy about what to do.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

12

4

I usually do this a
lot

Adapted from “You want to measure coping but your protocol's too long: Consider the Brief COPE,” by
C. S. Carver, 1997, International Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 4, p. 92-100. Copyright 1997 by C. S.
Carver. The use was permitted by the author: http://www.psy.miami.edu/faculty/ccarver/sclBrCOPE.html
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5- I get help and advice from other people.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

6- I criticize myself.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

7- I get emotional support from others.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

8- I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

9- I accept the reality of the fact that it has happened.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

10- I take action to try to make the situation better.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

11- I think about using alcohol or other drugs to help me get through it.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

12- I make jokes about it.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

13- I get comfort and understanding from someone.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount
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4

I usually do this a
lot

14- I say to myself “this isn’t real.”
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

15- I try to find comfort in my religion or spiritual beliefs.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

16- I look for something good in what is happening.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

17- I try to get advice or help from other people about what to do.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

18- I turn to work or other activities to take my mind off things.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

19- I think hard about what steps to take.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

20- I refuse to believe that it has happened.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

21- I express my negative feelings.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount
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4

I usually do this a
lot

22- I give up trying to deal with it.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

23- I pray or meditate.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

24- I think about using alcohol or other drugs to make myself feel better.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

25- I do something to think about it less, such s going to movies, watching TV,
reading, daydreaming, sleeping, or shopping.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

26- I make fun of the situation.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

27- I give up the attempt to cope.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount

4

I usually do this a
lot

28- I blame myself for things that happened.
1

2

I usually don’t do
this at all

I usually do this a
little bit

3

I usually do this a
medium amount
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4

I usually do this a
lot

Appendix E
Modifications Applied to Metacognitive Awareness Inventory13

(Items reprinted with the authors’ permission)
Subscalesa
RC

Original Instrument
1- I ask myself periodically if I am
meeting my goals.

Modified Instrument
Remained the same

2- I consider several alternatives to a
problem before I answer.

I consider several alternatives to a problem
before I try to solve it.

RC

3- I try to use strategies that have
worked in the past.
4- I pace myself while learning in
order to have enough time.

Remained the same

KC

Eliminated

RC

5- I understand my intellectual
strengths and weaknesses.

Remained the same

KC

6- I think about what I really need to
learn before I begin a task.

I think about what I really need to learn or
know before I begin a task.

RC

7- I know how well I did once I finish
a test.

I know how well I am doing when dealing
with a problem.

RC

8- I set specific goals before I begin a
task.

Remained the same

RC

9- I slow down when I encounter
important information.

Remained the same

RC

10- I know what kind of information is
most important to learn.

I know what kind of information is most
important to learn or to know in order to
deal with a problem.

KC

11- I ask myself if I have considered all
options when solving a problem.

Remained the same

RC

12- I am good at organizing
information.
13- I consciously focus my attention on
important information.

Remained the same

KC

Remained the same

RC

14- I have a specific purpose for each
strategy I use.

Remained the same

KC

13

From “Assessing Metacognitive Awareness,” by G. Schraw and R. S. Dennison, 1994, Contemporary
Educational Psychology, 19(4), p. 460-475. Copyright 1994 by G. Schraw. Reprinted and Adapted with
permission.
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15- I learn best when I know something
about the topic.

Eliminated

KC

16- I know what the teacher expects me
to learn.

Eliminated

KC

17- I am good at remembering
information.

Remained the same

KC

18- I use different learning strategies
depending on the situation.

I use different strategies depending on the
situation.

KC

19- I ask myself if there was an easier
way to do things after I finish a task.

Remained the same

RC

20- I have control over how well I learn.

I have control over how well I handle a
problem or a situation.

KC

21- I periodically review to help me
understand important relationships.

Remained the same

RC

22- I ask myself questions about the
materials before I begin.

I ask myself questions about how to
approach a task or situation before I take
actions.

RC

23- I think of several ways to solve a
problem and choose the best one.

Remained the same

RC

24- I summarize what I’ve learned after
I finish.

I think of what I’ve learned after I am done
with a task.

RC

25- I ask others for help when I don’t
understand something.

Remained the same

RC

26- I can motivate myself to learn when
I need to.

I can motivate myself to start on or continue
with a task when I need to.

KC

27- I am aware of what strategies I use
when I study.

I am aware of strategies I use when I am
dealing with a problem.

KC

28- I find myself analyzing the
usefulness of strategies while I
study.

I find myself analyzing the usefulness of
strategies while I am on a task.

RC

29- I use my intellectual strengths to
compensate for my weaknesses.

Remained the same

KC

30- I focus on the meaning and
significance of new information.

Remained the same

RC

31- I create my own examples to make
information more meaningful.

Remained the same

RC
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32- I am a good judge of how well I
understated something.

Remained the same

KC

33- I find myself using helpful learning
strategies automatically.

I find myself using helpful strategies
automatically.

KC

34- I find myself pausing regularly to
check my comprehension.

I find myself using helpful strategies to
check my understanding of the situation or
the problem.

RC

35- I know when each strategy I use will
be most effective.

Remained the same

KC

36- I ask myself how well I
accomplished my goals once I am
finished.

Remained the same

RC

37- I draw pictures or diagrams to help
me understand while learning.

I draw pictures and diagrams to help me
understand a situation, solving a problem,
or planning.

RC

38- I ask myself if I have considered all
options after I solve a problem.

Remained the same

RC

39- I try to translate new information
into my own words.

I try to put into my own words my
experiences and new information I learned.

RC

40- I change strategies when I fail to
understand.

I change strategies when I fail to
accomplish my goals.

RC

41- I use the organizational structure of
the text to help me learn.

Eliminated

KC

42- I read instructions carefully before I
begin a task.

I read or pay attention to instructions
carefully before I begin a task.

RC

43- I ask myself if what I’m reading is
related to what 1 already know.

I ask myself if what I am dealing with is
related to my previous experiences.

RC

44- 1 reevaluate my assumptions when I
get confused.

Remained the same

RC

45- I organize my time to best
accomplish my goals.

Remained the same

RC

46- I learn more when I am interested in
the topic.

Eliminated

KC

47- I try to break studying down into
smaller steps.

I try to break my task/a problem down into
smaller steps.

RC

48- I focus on overall meaning rather
than specifics.

I focus on overall meaning underlying a
situation rather than specifics.

RC
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49- I ask myself questions about how
well I am doing while I am learning
something new.

Remained the same

RC

50- I ask myself if I learned as much as I
could have once I finish a task.
51- I stop and go back over new
information that is not clear.

Remained the same

RC

Remained the same

RC

52- I stop and reread when I get
confused.

I stop and check what I am saying or what I
am doing when I get confused.

RC

Note. a RC = Regulation of Cognition, KC = Knowledge of Cognition.
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Appendix F
The Measure of General Metacognitive Competence
(A modified version of MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994)14
Consider yourself in a problem-solving situation. It can be in an academic setting (e.g.,
learning, studying, taking a test, etc.) or in a real-world situation (e.g., planning, finding
my way in a new town, looking for a job, giving advice to a friend on a personal problem,
dealing with an emotional distress, etc.). On a scale of 0 to 10 to what extent each
statement is true about you:
0
not at
all

1

2

3

4

5
half of
the time

6

7

8

9

10
all of
the
time

123456789-

I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals.
I consider several alternatives to a problem before I try to solve it.
I try to use strategies that have worked in the past.
I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.
I think about what I really need to learn or know before I begin a task.
I know how well I am doing when dealing with a problem
I set specific goals before I begin a task.
I slow down when I encounter important information.
I know what kind of information is most important to learn or to know when
dealing with a problem.
10- I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a problem.
11- I am good at organizing information.
12- I consciously focus my attention on important information.
13- I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use.
14- I am good at remembering information.
15- I use different strategies depending on the situation.
16- I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a task.
17- I have control over how well I handle a situation or problem.
18- I periodically review to help me understand important relationships.
19- I ask myself questions about how to approach a task or situation before I take
actions.
20- I think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one.
21- I think of what I’ve learned after I am done with a task.
22- I ask others for help when I don’t understand something.
14

From “Assessing Metacognitive Awareness,” by G. Schraw and R. S. Dennison, 1994, Contemporary
Educational Psychology, 19(4), p. 460-475. Copyright 1994 by G. Schraw. Reprinted and Adapted with
permission.
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23- I can motivate myself to start on or continue with a task when I need to.
24- I am aware of strategies I use when I am dealing with a problem.
25- I find myself analyzing the usefulness of strategies while I am on a task.
26- I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses.
27- I focus on the meaning and significance of new information.
28- I create my own examples to make information more meaningful.
29- I am a good judge of how well I understated something.
30- I find myself using helpful strategies automatically.
31- I find myself pausing regularly to check my understanding of the situation or the
problem.
32- I know when each strategy I use will be most effective.
33- I ask myself how well I accomplished my goals once I am finished.
34- I draw pictures and diagrams to help me understand a situation, solving a
problem, or planning.
35- I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem.
36- I try to put into my own words my experiences and new information I learned.
37- I change strategies when I fail to accomplish my goals.
38- I read or pay attention to instructions carefully before I begin a task.
39- I ask myself if what I am dealing with is related to my previous experiences.
40- 1 reevaluate my assumptions when I get confused.
41- I organize my time to best accomplish my goals.
42- I try to break my task/a problem down into smaller steps.
43- I focus on overall meaning underlying a situation rather than specifics.
44- I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am learning something
new.
45- I ask myself if I learned as much as I could have once I finish a task.
46- I stop and go back over new information that is not clear.
47- I stop and check what I am saying or what I am doing when I get confused.
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Appendix G
SEM diagrams for Split Samples for Hypothesis 8
The dashed line represents the indirect/mediational path.

Gender X Need‐Satisfaction

.79

.3125 (.3901)**

Need‐Satisfaction
.3689 (.3836)***

.41

.4579 (.4385)***

.1934 (.1926)**

Metacognition

Self‐Actualization
.1689 (.1682)***

‐.0476 (‐.2766)

‐.0742(‐.1551)

Gender

Parent

(a) Path Coefficients for the Mediation Model tested for Non-Immigrant Non-Education
Students
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.83

Need‐Satisfaction
.6766 (.6753)***

.41

.4107 (.4266)***

Metacognition

.2060 (.2136)***

Self‐Actualization

.2779 (.2881)***

‐.0835(‐.1962)*

Gender

.1270 (.3832)**

Parent

(b) Path Coefficients for the Mediation Model tested for Non-Immigrant Education
Students
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Gender X Need‐Satisfaction

.78

.2187 (.3092)*

Need‐Satisfaction
.4788 (.5043)***

.4728 (.4438)***

Metacognition

.1887 (.1866)*

.31

Self‐Actualization

.2263 (.2238)***

.0200 (.0613)

‐.2634(‐.4665)

Gender

Parent

(c) Path Coefficients for the Mediation Model tested for Immigrant Non-Education
Students
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.65

Need‐Satisfaction
.7065 (.6337)***

.5917 (.5905)***

Metacognition

.1625 (.1455)*

.31

Self‐Actualization

.4180 (.3742)***

‐.1265 (‐.3176)*

Gender

(d) Path Coefficients for the Mediation Model tested for Immigrant Education
Students
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Appendix H
SEM diagrams for Split Samples for Hypothesis 9
The dashed line represents the indirect/mediational path.

.69

Non‐Defensiveness
.1396 (.1918)

.72

.5576 (.0126)***

Metacognition

.4233 (.0131)***

Self‐Actualization

.0778 (.0024)

‐.0155(‐.1555)

‐.1300 (‐.4696)

Gender

Parent

(a) Path Coefficients for the Mediation Model tested for Non-Immigrant NonEducation Students
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.78

Non‐Defensiveness
.4651 (.0124)***

.3139 (.3804)***

.64

.3324 (.0107)***

Metacognition

Self‐Actualization
.1460 (.0047)***

.1592 (.8310)**

‐.1051 (‐.4271)

Gender

Parent

(b) Path Coefficients for the Mediation Model tested for Non-Immigrant Education
Students
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.88

Non‐Defensiveness
.65

.0870 (.0982)

.3507 (.0096)***

.4472 (.0138)***

Metacognition

Self‐Actualization
.0305 (.0009)
‐.3253(‐.9944)***

Gender

.0183 (.0965)

Parent

(c) Path Coefficients for the Mediation Model tested for Immigrant Non-Education
Students
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.57

Non‐Defensiveness
.2716 (.3160)*

.6521 (.0157)***

.59

.4028 (.0113)***

Metacognition

Self‐Actualization
.1771 (.0049)**
‐.1550 (‐.6736)

Gender

.0058 (.0225)

Parent

(d) Path Coefficients for the Mediation Model tested for Immigrant Education
Students
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